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Background: Delusions are characterised by conviction, distress, preoccupation, 
and disruption.  ‘Jumping-to-conclusions’ (JTC) and a lack of belief flexibility (BF) 
have been shown to be associated with delusions. 
The thesis: The overall aim was to investigate psychological processes of change 
in delusions over time and to examine response to treatment of aspects of delusional 
experience.  Specific questions were: do psychological processes associated with 
delusions change?  And do reasoning biases predict change in delusions? 
Method: Three longitudinal studies were conducted using three separate samples 
of patients with delusions of at least moderate severity.  Studies 1 (N = 40) and 3 (N 
= 16) involved patients in an acute phase of psychosis, whereas Study 2 participants 
(N = 273) were in the recovery phase.  Study 1 investigated changes in delusional 
dimensions, JTC and BF over eight weeks of antipsychotic treatment.  Study 2 
examined the factor structure and longitudinal relationship of conviction, JTC and 
BF over 12 months.  Study 3 assessed moment-by-moment levels of delusional 
dimensions, BF and aberrant salience over two weeks using experience sampling 
methodology.  
Results: During the early phase of antipsychotic treatment, all delusional 
dimensions improved over eight weeks (Study 1), whereas only distress and 
disruption improved over two weeks (Study 3).  BF and conviction were distinct 
factors (Study 2), and higher flexibility was consistently related to lower conviction.  
JTC was stable within the study periods, although higher rates of JTC during the 
acute phase suggest improvement across phases.  JTC predisposed to the presence 
of delusions (Study 2) and was associated with higher and more variable conviction 
during treatment (Study 3).   
Conclusions: That JTC and BF contribute to the development and maintenance 
of delusions was largely confirmed using longitudinal data.  Future research is 
required to further consolidate the psychological model of delusions and develop 
effective treatment that involves modifying reasoning biases.   
 3 
Acknowledgements 
First of all, thanks are due to the study participants, who gave up their time 
to complete the assessments, at a time in their lives when they were having great 
difficulties.  Their selfless contribution to scientific research deserves my greatest 
respect. 
I am extremely grateful to my supervisors, Prof. Philippa Garety, Prof. Shitij 
Kapur, and Dr. Emmanuelle Peters, for their inspiring insights, meticulous advice, 
and immense patience.  Without their continuous support, I would never have 
completed this work.  I would like to thank Prof. Daniel Freeman for supervising 
Study 2, and other members of the Psychosis Research Partnership – Prof. Paul 
Bebbington, Prof. Graham Dunn, Prof. David Fowler, Prof. Elizabeth Kuipers, and 
Dr. Suzanne Jolley – for their helpful comments on Study 2. 
Acknowledgement should be extended to Dr Daniel Stahl, for his statistical 
advice, Mrs Jackie Sansom, for her administrative support, and clinical staff at 
Lambeth Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital for their help in recruitment of study 
participants.  I would like to acknowledge the contribution of friends who have 
proof-read parts of the thesis: Sue Pick, Ulrich Reninghaus, Lindsay Smith, and 
Deborah Tsang.  I would also like to thank my colleagues Daniel Mograbi and Sue 
Pick, who have made the office a lovely place to work in, and my friends Amy and 
Victor, for never failing to support me and make me laugh. 
Last but certainly not least, I am ever indebted to my parents and in-laws, 
who always believe in me and are my rock in times of doubts.  Thanks to their 
selfless sacrifice, I have been able to concentrate on my work with full confidence 
that our children are in good hands.  I would like to thank Perry for his love and for 
bravely joining me in this adventure.  He and our lovely children, Preston and 
Hannah, have made my life complete.  Thanks be to God, for “Unless the Lord 
builds the house, its builders labour in vain.  Unless the Lord watches over the city, 
the watchmen stand guard in vain.” Psalm 127:1 (NIV) 
This work was supported by a Medical Research Council grant, the 
Croucher Foundation scholarship, and the University of London Central Research 
Fund. 
 4 
Statement of contribution 
The author was primarily responsible for the conceptualisation, development 
of research questions and study hypotheses, and determination of study 
methodology for all the studies for this PhD.  The PhD supervisors, Prof. Philippa 
Garety, Prof. Shitij Kapur and Dr. Emmanuelle Peters, guided the development of 
the ideas for the research programme and the methodology, analysis and 
interpretation of findings. 
 The systematic literature review on treatment response of reasoning biases 
(Chapter 2) is from a published paper by the author and her supervisors (So, Garety, 
Peters, & Kapur, 2010).  The author determined the inclusion criteria and undertook 
the literature search.  Study 2 (Chapter 4) draws on the sample of the Psychological 
Prevention of Relapse (PRP) study (ISRCTN83557988), funded by the Wellcome 
Trust.  The PRP study was a multi-centre randomised controlled trial of cognitive 
behaviour therapy and family intervention for psychosis.  Research workers 
employed on the PRP trial were responsible for recruiting and assessing participants.  
The author, working with her supervisors and study collaborators, determined the 
study design, specific hypotheses, measures and methodology.  Data analysis was 
performed by the author in collaboration with Prof. Graham Dunn.  This study was 
published in a paper with the author as the first author and investigators on the PRP 
trial as co-authors (So et al., 2012).  
 For Studies 1 (Chapter 3) and 3 (Chapter 5), the author was responsible for 
seeking ethical approval, designing study protocols, proposing study hypotheses, 
selecting measures, piloting the studies, and conducting all recruitment and 
assessment of participants.  Study 3 adopted a novel method of assessment, 
experience sampling method.  The author acquired the skills in conducting this kind 
of research through receiving training from experts in Maastricht, Netherlands, and 
was responsible for setting up the assessment tools.  With technical support from Dr 
Joel Swendsen, the author was responsible for programming the experience 
sampling assessment into the personal digital assistants (PDAs) for the participants, 
transfer of data and management of the database for Study 3. 
Data analysis and interpretation of findings for all studies was the work of 
the author, in consultation with her supervisors and statistical advisors. 
 5 







Statement of contribution 
Table of Contents 
List of tables 
List of figures 
List of appendices 
List of abbreviations 














Delusions: Psychological models, assessment and 
changes with treatment 
1.1 Definitions of delusions 
1.2 Continuity of delusional experience 
1.3 Biological and psychological models of psychosis 
1.3.1 Biological factors 
1.3.2 Psychological models 
1.4 Assessment of delusions 
1.4.1 Multidimensional measures 
1.4.2 Experience sampling method 
1.5 Changes in delusional dimensions with antipsychotic and 
psychological treatment 
1.5.1 Response of delusional dimensions to antipsychotic treatment 
1.5.2 Response of delusional dimensions to psychological 
intervention 





















Reasoning biases associated with delusions and their 
response to treatment 
2.1 Introduction 
2.2 Reasoning in psychosis 
2.2.1 Jumping to conclusions cognitive bias (Data gathering) 
2.2.2 Belief inflexibility (Evidence evaluation) 
2.2.3 Externalising attributional style 
2.2.4 Theory of mind 
2.3 Effect of antipsychotics on reasoning – two potential pathways 
2.4 Methods 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Longitudinal studies on psychosis and reasoning 
2.5.2 Cross-sectional studies on psychosis and reasoning 
2.6 Discussion 



















Study 1: Change in delusional dimensions, JTC, belief 
flexibility and emotions in the first eight weeks of 
antipsychotic treatment 
3.1 Introduction 





3.4 Statistical analysis 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Demographic and clinical data 
3.5.2 Hypothesis 1: Delusional distress, preoccupation and impact on 
functioning will reduce before delusional conviction 



















reduce alongside improvements in delusional dimensions 
3.5.4 Hypothesis 3: Belief flexibility (but not JTC) will improve 











Study 2: Jumping to conclusions, a lack of belief 
flexibility and delusional conviction in psychosis: A 
longitudinal investigation of the structure, frequency and 
relatedness of reasoning biases 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 Reasoning processes associated with delusions 
4.1.2 The measurement of delusional conviction and reasoning 
processes 




4.3.3 Inter-rater reliability of clinical assessments 
4.4 Statistical analysis 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Demographic and clinical data 
4.5.2 Hypothesis 1: Delusional conviction, JTC and belief flexibility 
are distinct but inter-related processes 
4.5.3 Hypothesis 2: Conviction and a lack of belief flexibility will 
decline over time, whereas JTC is relatively stable 
4.5.4 Hypothesis 3: Baseline JTC and lack of belief flexibility will 
moderate change in conviction over time 
4.6 Discussion 
Addendum to Chapter 4 – Comparison of JTC bias in psychotic patients 































Study 3: Changes in delusions, belief flexibility and 
aberrant salience in the first two weeks of antipsychotic 
medication 
5.1 Introduction 
5.2 Experience sampling method (ESM) 





5.5 Statistical analysis 
5.6 Results 
5.6.1 Demographic and clinical data 
5.6.2 Feasibility, validity and reliability of the ESM assessment 
5.6.3 Changes in psychotic symptoms over two weeks 
5.6.4 Hypothesis 1: Delusional distress and preoccupation (but not 
delusional conviction) will reduce significantly over two weeks 
of antipsychotic treatment 
5.6.5 Hypothesis 2: Delusional distress and preoccupation will be 
associated with aberrant salience cross-sectionally and over 
time 
5.6.6 Hypothesis 3: Change in delusional conviction over time will be 
associated with a higher level of belief flexibility 
5.6.7 Hypothesis 4: Within the same day, there will be an association 
between conviction at one assessment point and belief 
flexibility at the next assessment point, and vice versa 
5.6.8 Hypothesis 5: JTC bias at baseline will predict more 








































What has been learnt about change in delusions and 
reasoning processes, and the way forward 
6.1 Summary of the studies 
6.2 Summary of results 
6.3 Theoretical implications 
6.3.1 Differential response of delusional dimensions to 
antipsychotics? 
6.3.2 What does symptom improvement on clinical rating scales 
mean? 
6.3.3 Aberrant salience was associated with delusional dimensions 
but did not change with antipsychotics 
6.3.4 Relationship between BF and the strength of delusions 
6.3.5 Stability and prevalence of JTC 
6.3.6 JTC and divergent change in conviction 
6.3.7 Use of ESM in acute patients with delusions over two weeks 
6.4 Limitations 
6.5 Clinical implications and future research 




























List of tables 
 
 






Longitudinal studies on reasoning in psychosis 
Cross-sectional studies on reasoning in psychosis with data 



























Timetable of assessment  
Mean (SD) PANSS total and positive scores at different time 
points 
Pearson correlations of delusional dimensions at each time 
point 
Mean levels (SD) of depression, anxiety and subjective 
distress 
Beads task performance of individuals with complete data  (n 
= 27) 
Cross-tabulation comparison of beads task performance 
among individuals with complete data (n = 27) 
Cross-tabulation comparison (week 0 vs. week 4 & week 8) 
of PM among participants with complete data (n = 30) 
Cross-tabulation comparison (week 4 vs. week 8) of PM 
among participants with complete data (n = 30) 
Cross-tabulation comparison (week 0 vs. week 4 & week 8) 
of RTHC among participants with complete data (n = 29) 
Cross-tabulation comparison (week 4 vs. week 8) of RTHC 
among participants with complete data (n = 29) 
Mean levels (SD) on Cards task items in participants with 



































Mean scores (SD) of psychotic symptom and delusional 
conviction measures at each time point 
Pearson correlations between all baseline measures entered 
in the factor analysis (N = 273) 
Comparison of factor models on conviction and reasoning 
Exploratory factor analysis of baseline measures of 
conviction, JTC and BF – Geomin rotated factor loadings 
Comparison of measurement models on baseline conviction 



















ESM items  
Mean levels (SD) of symptom ratings at baseline and week 2  
(N = 16) 

















Mean levels (SD) of delusional dimensions on PSYRATS  
Mean levels (SD) of delusional dimensions on PQ 
Pearson correlations of delusional dimensions on PSYRATS 
at each time point 









List of figures 
 




Figure 1.1 Schematic representation of a cognitive model of the positive 











Reasoning biases as a moderator of the relationship between 
antipsychotics and delusions  
Reasoning biases as a mediator of the relationship between 











Changes in VAS delusional dimensions (N = 40) 
Changes in BDI-II and BAI scores (N = 40) 







Figure 4.1 Final factor structure and loadings (standardised estimates) 
of conviction, JTC and belief flexibility following 















Assessment schedule for study 3 
Changes in delusional dimensions on ESM (N = 16) 
Changes over time in aberrant salience, delusional distress 
and preoccupation (N = 16) 
Change over time in conviction by baseline response to 




















Change over time in conviction by baseline response to 
Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction (N = 15) 
Change over time in belief flexibility summary score and 
conviction on the ESM (N = 16) 
Change over time in conviction by baseline JTC on the 60:40 
beads task (N = 14) 
Within-day variability (measured by SD) of conviction by 
baseline JTC on the 60:40 beads task (N = 14) 
Change over time in ESM belief flexibility by baseline JTC 
on the 60:40 beads task (N = 14) 
Within-day variability (measured by SD) of ESM belief 


















Changes in PSYRATS delusional dimensions (N = 40) 




List of appendices 
 
 
  Page 






















Measures of all studies 
 
259 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (Study 1) 
Beck Depression Inventory – II (Study 1) 
Cards Task (Study 1) 
Clinical Global Impressions (Study 1) 
Cognitive Biases Questionnaire for Psychosis (Study 1) 
Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Scale Belief Maintenance Section 
(All studies) 
Personal Questionnaire & Visual Analogue Scale (Study 1) 
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (All studies) 
Psychotic Rating Scale (All studies) 
Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (Studies 2 & 3) 
















Supplementary results of Study 1 using the Psychotic 







List of abbreviations 
 
AE  Alternative Explanations 
AH  Auditory Hallucinations 
AIC  Akaike’s Information Criterion 
ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
ASI  Aberrant Salience Inventory 
BADE  Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence 
BAI  Beck Anxiety Inventory 
BDI-II  Beck Depression Inventory – II 
BF  Belief Flexibility 
BIC  Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion 
BPRS  Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale 
CBQ-P Cognitive Biases Questionnaire for Psychosis 
CBT  Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
CBTp  Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for Psychosis 
CFI  Comparative Fit Index 
CGI  Clinical Global Impressions 
DIPI  Dimensions of Psychosis Instrument 
DSM-IV Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – IV 
DV  Dependent Variable 
EFA  Exploratory Factor Analysis 
EoE  Explanation of Experience interview 
ESM  Experience Sampling Method 
IPSAQ  Internal, Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire 
IV  Independent Variable 
 16 
JTC  Jumping to Conclusions 
MADS  Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Scale 
MCT  Metacognitive Training 
ML  Maximum Likelihood estimator 
PANSS Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale 
PDA  Personal Digital Assistant 
PDI  Peters et al’s Delusions Inventory 
PII  Personal Ideation Inventory 
PIT  Pragmatic Inference Task 
PM  Possibility of being Mistaken 
PQ  Personal Questionnaire 
PRP  Psychological Prevention of Relapse in Psychosis trial 
PSYRATS Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales 
RMSEA Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
RTHC  Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction 
SANS  Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms 
SAPS  Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms 
SAT  Salience Attribution Task 
SPSS  Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
SUDS  Subjective Unit of Distress Scale 
ToM  Theory of Mind 
VAS  Visual Analogue Scale 
WLSMV Weighted Least Squares with Mean and Variance Adjustment 
 
 17 
General preface to the thesis 
 The broad aim of this programme of research was to investigate changes in 
delusions and associated reasoning biases, both in the short and long term with 
treatment.  This thesis begins with an introductory chapter that focuses on the 
psychological models and assessment of delusions, and reviews the literature on 
treatment response of delusions.  The second chapter is a systematic review of 
literature on reasoning biases associated with psychosis and their changes with 
treatment.  The three chapters that follow will describe three empirical studies 
examining changes in delusions and associated psychological processes, over 
periods ranging from two weeks to 12 months.  The thesis will conclude with a 
discussion of the key findings in relation to the psychological understanding of 
delusions and treatment implications. 
 The review on changes of reasoning biases (Chapter 2) and Study 2 (Chapter 
4) have been published in Psychosomatic Medicine and Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology respectively.  Therefore, these chapters will be presented as they appear 
in the journals.  Subsequent analyses and discussion of those studies that are 
relevant to the thesis but were not in the publications will be included in the 
addendum following the chapter.  
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Chapter 1 
Delusions: Psychological models, assessment and 
changes with treatment 
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1.1 Definitions of delusions  
Delusions are the most prevalent symptom of psychosis, affecting about one 
half of all people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (Sartorius et al., 1986).  The 
phenomenological characteristics of delusions have been the topic of debate for 
over a century, with key early proposals from the work of Kraepelin (1899), Bleuler 
(1911), and, especially, Karl Jaspers (1913).  Jaspers (1963) considered delusions as 
fixed, false beliefs that are incomprehensible and held with absolute conviction:  
“the term delusion is vaguely applied to all false judgements that 
share the following characteristics to a marked, though undefined, 
degree: (1) they are held with an extraordinary conviction, with an 
incomparable, subjective certainty; (2) there is an imperviousness to 
other experiences and to compelling counter-argument; (3) their 
content is impossible” (Jaspers, 1963).   
Subsequent descriptions of delusions were also characterised by these qualities: 
absolute conviction, incorrigibility, lack of amenability to reason, fantastic or 
inherently unlikely content, and being a belief not shared by the believer’s own 
subculture (Mullen, 1979; Sims, 1988).  
This kind of definition poses a number of difficulties.  Firstly, the definition 
of delusion requiring fixity and absolute/extraordinary certainty has been 
challenged by the empirical evidence that conviction is not absolute (Garety, 1985; 
Rudden, Gilmore, & Frances, 1982; Strauss, 1969).  Clinical rating scales such as 
the Present State Examination (Wing et al., 1974) and the Psychotic Symptom 
Rating Scales (Haddock et al., 1999) allow for delusions with a varied degree of 
conviction.  In fact, the level of conviction varies not only between persons, but also 
within persons, over time and across environments (Brett-Jones, Garety, & Hemsley, 
1987; Myin-Germeys, Nicolson, & Delespaul, 2001a; Peters et al., 2011).   
Secondly, the view that characterises delusions as having an impossible, 
‘fantastic or unlikely’ content is problematic.  Assessment of the possibility of 
content is arbitrary and studies have reported less than satisfactory inter-rater 
reliability on ratings of bizarreness (e.g. Kendler et al., 1983; Flaum et al., 1991; 
Junginger et al., 1992).  In addition, there is a wealth of evidence that many people 
in the general population have delusion-like beliefs and psychotic experiences that 
resemble delusions in patients with a diagnosis of psychotic disorder, suggesting 
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that the distinction between normal beliefs and delusions is one of degree, rather 
than of qualitative difference (see Section 1.2). 
There are ongoing debates (e.g. Garety & Hemsley, 1994; Heinimaa, 2002; 
Jones et al., 2003) about the difficulties of defining delusion.  However, the work of 
this thesis, which is focussed on the study of delusions and cognitive changes over 
time in the context of treatment, requires an operational definition.  One definition 
which has an acceptable and widely used phenomenological description is that of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 
2000).  It defines delusion as ‘A false belief based on incorrect inference about 
external reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes 
and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the 
contrary.’  However it makes an assumption, not based upon the phenomenology, 
about ‘incorrect inference’ which lacks operational criteria and is not necessary for 
the purposes of the current study.  Taking account of the foregoing discussion, the 
definition of delusion adopted for the present thesis, adapted from the DSM-IV 
definition, is as follows: a false belief about external reality with marked (though 
not absolute) subjective certainty which is not ordinarily accepted by other 
members of the person’s subculture and is unresponsive to countervailing evidence.  
 
1.2 Continuity of delusional experience 
Using a questionnaire designed to measure delusional ideation in the normal 
population, the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI), Peters et al. (1999) reported 
a considerable overlap of the ranges of scores between the normal group and the 
group of individuals who had delusional beliefs, with 10% of their normal sample 
scoring higher than the mean of the psychotic in-patient group.  van Os et al. (2001) 
reported that 4.2% in their community sample of 7000 adults had experienced 
hallucinations or delusions attested to by a psychiatrist and 17.5% reported at least 
one experience evoking the concept of psychosis, and yet only 2% of these 1237 
individuals had been given a diagnosis of non-affective psychosis.  van Os et al.’s 
(2009) meta-analyses reported prevalence rates of positive psychotic symptoms that 
are around 10 times greater than reported rates for psychotic disorder.  In another 
study of more than 8000 individuals, Johns et al. (2004) found that 21.2% of 
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individuals without a diagnosis of psychosis felt that people were against them at 
times, 9.1% felt that people had deliberately harmed them, 9.0% felt that their 
thoughts were directly interfered with or controlled by some outside force/person, 
and 1.5% feared of a plot.  Freeman (2006) reviewed 15 studies and concluded that 
approximately 1-3% of the non-clinical population had delusions of a level of 
severity comparable to clinical cases of psychosis.  A further 5-6% had a delusion 
of less severity, which was associated with social and emotional difficulties.  In 
addition, 10-15% had fairly regular delusional ideation (Freeman, 2006).   
These findings suggest that delusions and psychotic experiences are not 
incorrigible phenomena that are categorically distinct from normality.  Psychotic 
symptoms are not uncommon in the general population, and the same demographic 
and environmental risk factors and clinical variables associated with clinical 
psychosis are also associated with the occurrence of psychotic symptoms in the 
non-clinical population (Johns & van Os, 2001; Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam, & 
van Os, 2003b; van Os et al., 2000).  Therefore, it has been argued that psychotic 
symptoms, including delusions, are better conceptualised as more extreme points 
along a dimension extending into the general population, sharing similar 
aetiological factors with the sub-clinical psychotic experiences (Claridge, 1987; 
Johns & van Os, 2001; Strauss, 1969; van Os et al., 2009). 
 
1.3 Biological and psychological models of 
psychosis 
 Researchers have proposed models linking psychosis to multiple biological, 
psychological and environmental factors.  Underlying these models is a stress-
vulnerability framework, which assumes that the emergence of symptoms is an 
interaction between factors that render an individual prone to developing the 
disorder and factors that impose stress onto the individual, leading to impairment 
and need for treatment (Cougnard et al., 2007; Nuechterlein & Dawson, 1984; van 
Os et al., 2009; Zubin & Spring, 1977).  This section will include the key factors 
that have been shown to be associated with the development of psychosis (and 
delusions in particular), with a focus on reasoning and emotions and their changes. 
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1.3.1 Biological factors 
 Vulnerability for psychotic disorders is partly genetic.  Heritability estimates 
for schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, and mania are between 82% and 85% 
(Cardno et al., 1999).   McGrath and colleagues (2009) studied the familiality of 
nine factorial dimensions of schizophrenia in more than 1000 patients.  They 
reported a heritability estimate of 38% for their Schneiderian first-rank symptom 
factor which consisted mainly of delusions.  A number of studies have noted that 
brain changes as well as cognitive and behavioural deviations, such as 
developmental delay, cognitive impairments, and social anxiety, are detectable 
years before the onset of psychosis (Cannon, Jones, & Murray, 2002; Jones et al., 
1994; Pantelis et al., 2003).  This line of evidence supports the neurodevelopmental 
theory of psychosis, which postulates that genetic predisposition interacts with non-
genetic risk factors in the early development, such as prenatal infection and 
environmental insults, leading to later emergence of psychosis (Jones & Murray, 
1991; Murray & Lewis, 1987; Rapoport et al., 2005). 
Onset of psychosis may also be triggered by other biological factors such as 
substance abuse.  Prospective studies have found evidence for a close relationship 
between cannabis use and heightened risk for psychotic disorders and symptoms 
(see reviews by Moore et al., 2007; Verdoux & Tournier, 2004).  Exposure to 
cannabis can cause a mild and transient psychotic state, and this effect is stronger in 
individuals with pre-existing vulnerability to psychosis (D'Souza et al., 2004; 
Henquet et al., 2005, 2006). 
While the neurodevelopmental theory explains the predisposition of some 
individuals to psychosis, dopamine dysregulation is believed to be the final 
common pathway linking the abnormality in the brain to the psychological 
experience of psychotic symptoms (Broome et al., 2005; Howes & Kapur, 2009).  
According to Gray et al.’s (Gray, 1998; Gray et al., 1991) neuropsychological 
theory of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, psychosis begins with a structural 
abnormality in the limbic forebrain, leading to hyperactivity of dopamine 
transmission, which in turn leads to a cognitive disturbance described by Hemsley 
(1987, 1993) as “a weakening of the influences of stored memories of regularities of 
previous input on current perception”.  Subsequently, the individual fails to 
 23 
interpret current events using stored past regularities of experience and delusional 
interpretations therefore arise (Hemsley, 1994a, 1994b).   
The key role of dopamine in the pathogenesis of psychosis, on a 
neuroanatomical and neurochemical level, is supported by a wide range of evidence 
from brain imaging findings, animal learning studies, post-mortem brains of 
patients with schizophrenia, and experiments involving amphetamine exposure (see 
reviews by Gray, 1998; Gray et al., 1991; Howes & Kapur, 2009).  On a 
psychological level, the dopaminergic system is important in mediating attribution 
of salience whereby events and thoughts come to one’s attention, drive action and 
influence goal-directed behaviour as a consequence of their association with reward 
or punishment (Berridge, 1999; Berridge & Robinson, 1998).  In the state of 
psychosis, random increases in dopamine release in the mesolimbic pathways are 
thought to lead to abnormal ‘gating’ of information into the prefrontal cortex, which 
conditions the processing of irrelevant information as if it were important and of 
relevance (Braver, Barch, & Cohen, 1999; Shaner, 1999).  Kapur argued that, in 
psychosis, the hyperactive dopaminergic system fires and releases dopamine 
independent of cues and context, leading to an aberrant assignment of salience and 
novelty to external objects and internal representations (Kapur, 2003; Kapur, 
Mizrahi, & Li, 2005).  Therefore, patients experience “a somewhat novel and 
perplexing state marked by exaggerated importance of certain percepts and ideas”, 
and delusions are “a ‘top-down’ cognitive explanation that the individual imposes 
on these experiences of aberrant salience in an effort to make sense of them” and to 
resolve anxiety (Kapur, 2003, p. 15; Kapur & Mamo, 2003).  According to this 
theory, antipsychotics block dopamine and reduce emotional distress as well as 
aberrant salience of preoccupying psychotic experiences without modifying the 
appraisals of experiences, while patients work through their symptoms towards a 
“psychological resolution” (Kapur, 2004; p. 404; Kapur et al., 2006).  
Broome et al. (2005) also considered that dopamine dysregulation plays a 
central role in the onset of psychosis.  Taking the neurodevelopmental perspective, 
Broome et al. (2005) suggested that dopamine dysregulation is first determined by 
genetic predisposition or developmental damage, and then compounded by 
substance abuse, social adversity and affective change.  Subsequently, biased 
cognitive appraisal processes contribute to the delusional interpretation of abnormal 
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perceptual experiences.  Therefore, neurobiological factors and cognitive/ 
psychological factors interact to lead to the onset of psychosis. 
 
1.3.2 Psychological models  
In the past decade or so, psychologists have identified in greater detail the 
cognitive and emotional factors that contribute to the development and maintenance 
of psychosis.  These psychological models have a common emphasis on appraisals 
and the contribution of emotional processes in the aetiology of delusions. 
1.3.2.1 Appraisal of experiences 
 Several cognitive theories of psychosis have suggested that the psychology 
of psychotic symptoms involves two steps: a state of arousal triggered by a normal 
or anomalous experience, followed by appraisal or interpretation of the experience.  
Maher (1974, 1988) suggested that delusions are the result of a search for meaning 
of anomalous perceptual experiences through normal reasoning processes.  
Chadwick and Birchwood (1994, 1995; Birchwood & Chadwick, 1997) first 
suggested that the impact of voices was not necessarily linked directly to voice 
content or activity, but was mediated by beliefs about them: i.e. voice hearers who 
interpret their voices as omnipotent and malevolent experience depressed mood and 
show behavioural resistance towards them.  Morrison (1998a) argued that auditory 
hallucinations, similar to body sensations in panic disorder, are normal 
psychological phenomena that may be experienced by anybody.  However, when ‘a 
normal auditory hallucination’ is misinterpreted as threatening to the individual, 
negative mood and physiological arousal are increased, which then produce more 
auditory hallucinations.  Drawing on cognitive models of anxiety disorders, 
Morrison (2001) argued that hallucinations and delusions can be conceptualised as 
intrusions into awareness and that it is the interpretation or appraisal of these 
intrusions that leads to the associated distress and disability.   
Garety and colleagues suggested that basic cognitive processes are disrupted 
when a triggering event occurs to a predisposed individual, giving rise to anomalous 
conscious experiences, as well as associated emotional changes (Garety & Hemsley, 
1994).  These are then followed by an interpretation of the puzzling and distressing 
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experiences as externally caused and personally significant.  It is this external 
appraisal that provides a necessary condition for psychotic experiences to turn into 
psychotic symptoms (Garety et al., 2001).  A recent study reported that overall 
levels of psychotic-like experiences did not differentiate individuals who required a 
“need for care” from those who did not, but the clinical group was more distressed 
and endorsed more externalising and personalising appraisals (Lovatt et al., 2010).  
See Figure 1.1 for Garety et al.’s (2001, 2007) model. 
 
Figure 1.1  
Schematic representation of a cognitive model of the positive symptoms of 
psychosis (as originally presented in Garety et al., 2001) 
 
1.3.2.2 Psychological processes associated with appraisals 
 What then influences the interpretation of experiences?  Although cognitive 
models of psychosis differ in their relative emphasis, the following three factors 
have been considered to contribute to appraisal of experiences directly and in 
combination: Reasoning biases, mood, and social adversity (including trauma).  
Reasoning biases associated with psychosis and their response to treatment will be 
discussed at length in Chapter 2.  What is of note here is the ‘jumping to 
conclusions’ (JTC) style, the most replicated reasoning bias associated with 
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delusions, where individuals with delusions and delusion-proneness tend to make 
decisions based upon gathering less information than controls (Fine et al., 2007; 
Lincoln et al., 2010).  A lack of belief flexibility is another reasoning bias that is 
closely related to delusions – around two-thirds of individuals with delusions had 
difficulty considering the possibility of being mistaken about their belief and 
generating alternative explanations about their experience (Freeman et al., 2004; 
Garety et al., 2005).  Both JTC and lack of belief flexibility have been shown to be 
associated with delusional conviction, with belief flexibility being a predictor of 
positive response to cognitive behavioural therapy (Chadwick & Lowe, 1994; 
Freeman et al., 2004; Garety et al., 1997, 2005; Kuipers et al., 1998).  Garety et al. 
(2001, 2005) proposed that, when individuals jump to conclusions based on 
inadequate data gathering and do not consider the possibility of being mistaken, the 
delusional belief fails to correct itself and delusional conviction is maintained.  An 
externalising attributional style and theory of mind deficit are other reasoning 
processes that have been proposed to lead to abnormal inferences of experiences in 
patients with persecutory delusions (Bentall et al., 2001; Freeman et al., 2002).  
These will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
 Mood disturbance plays an integral role throughout the course of psychosis.  
Mood disturbance predates the onset of psychosis and predicts the transition from 
the prodrome to frank psychosis (Hanssen et al., 2005; Krabbendam et al., 2005; 
Yung et al., 2003).  Research on the continuum of delusions between clinical and 
non-clinical populations has found that it is not the content of the delusional beliefs, 
but the emotional distress attached to them, that differentiates the clinical from the 
non-clinical individuals (Lincoln, 2007; Peters et al., 1999).  In addition, co-morbid 
diagnoses of mood disorders are common during a psychotic episode (Achim et al., 
2011; Braga, Petrides, & Figueira, 2004; Moller, 2005; Turnbull & Bebbington, 
2001).  Cognitive processes and behavioural characteristics that denote cognitive 
models of anxiety disorders, such as self-focused attention (Clark, 1999; Ensum & 
Morrison, 2003), worry (Freeman & Garety, 1999) and safety behaviours (Freeman 
et al., 2007), are also found in individuals experiencing hallucinations and delusions.  
According to Freeman et al. (2002), these processes play a prominent role in 
maintaining persecutory delusions.  Freeman et al.’s (2002) threat anticipation 
model postulated that the content of the persecutory delusions reflects the emotional 
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state of the individual, and anxiety is prominent when the persecutory delusion (or 
threat belief) prevails, involving anticipation of danger.  Anxiety-related cognitive 
and behavioural processes direct the individual’s attention to threat-related cues and 
to discard disconfirmatory evidence, thus maintaining the threat belief (Freeman et 
al., 2002).  Recent evidence of an increase in reasoning biases and paranoia 
following stress/anxiety manipulation in both patients and healthy participants 
supports the interaction between reasoning and mood, as suggested in the threat 
anticipation model of persecutory delusions (Ellett, Freeman, & Garety, 2008; 
Lincoln et al., 2009; Moritz et al., 2011a).  Conceptualising hallucinations and 
delusions as intrusions into awareness, Morrison (2001) also argued that 
interpretations of intrusions are maintained by selective attention and avoidance 
behaviour, as well as meta-cognition about uncontrollability and counter-productive 
control strategies (Baker & Morrison, 1998; Morrison, 1998a, 1998b; Morrison & 
Wells, 2000). 
 Apart from reasoning biases and emotional processes, social adversity and 
stressful life events, especially trauma and social isolation, may also fuel psychotic 
experiences and appraisal.  The relationship may be direct (Bebbington et al., 2004; 
Janssen et al., 2004; Larkin & Read, 2008; Lovatt et al., 2010; Morgan & Fisher, 
2007; Morgan et al., 2008) or indirect mediated by schemas (Bentall et al., 2001; 
Birchwood et al., 2000; Fowler et al., 2011).  Myin-Germeys (2005) reported an 
association between subtle psychotic experiences and minor stresses in the daily life 
of individuals at increased risk of psychosis.  Barrowclough et al. (2003) also found 
an association between psychotic symptoms and criticisms by carers and low self-
esteem.  Extreme negative evaluations of the self and others are associated with the 
intensity of psychotic symptoms and content of delusional beliefs (Bowins & 
Shugar, 1998; Close & Garety, 1998; Fowler et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2006).  
Several cognitive models of psychosis have suggested that negative life experiences 
may contribute to delusional interpretation of experiences by affecting pre-existing 
beliefs or schemas about the self and the world (Bentall et al., 2001; Birchwood et 
al., 2000; Fowler, 2000; Freeman et al., 2002).  Using structural equation modelling, 
Fowler et al. (2011) reported a directional relationship from depressed mood and 
negative cognition to paranoid beliefs, and found that the relationship between 
depressed mood and paranoia was mediated by negative cognition.   
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 In summary, psychosis is a condition of a multi-factorial aetiology, and it is 
widely accepted that psychotic symptoms evolve through a complex interplay of the 
neurobiology and psychology of the individual.  Antipsychotics targeting dopamine 
dysregulation are the first line treatment for psychosis, while cognitive behavioural 
therapy, targeting reasoning and emotions, is also provided to some patients (NICE, 
2009).  It has recently been proposed that a combination of pharmacological and 
psychological treatment domains may promote fuller recovery (van der Gaag, 2006).  
However, while the cognitive models discussed above are useful in identifying 
important maintenance factors of delusions, they do not specify mechanisms of 
change when symptoms remit with medication.  What is not known is how the 
psychological processes associated with delusions respond to antipsychotic 
treatment.  For mood, longitudinal studies have found a reduction of anxiety 
symptoms following antipsychotic treatment (Depping et al., 2010; Katzman, 2011; 
Lorenz, Jackson, & Saitz, 2010), whereas evidence for change in depression in 
response to antipsychotics is mixed (Leucht et al., 2009; Weizman & Weizman, 
2001).  Schennach-Wolff et al. (2011) reported that although depression scores 
decreased, 23% of patients with schizophrenia were still depressed at discharge.  
More importantly, response of reasoning biases to treatment is largely under-
researched (see Chapter 2).  In view of the importance of reasoning biases and 
emotional processes in the transition to psychosis and maintenance of delusions, 
investigating the prospective relationship between these processes and delusions 
during the process of antipsychotic treatment is likely to lead to important treatment 
implications. 
 
1.4 Assessment of delusions 
1.4.1 Multidimensional measures 
Factor analyses have shown that the delusional experience is not an all-or-
nothing phenomenon but consists of several characteristics or dimensions 
(Appelbaum, Robbins, & Roth, 1999; Garety & Hemsley, 1987; Kendler, Glazer, & 
Morgenstern, 1983; Stoll et al., 1980).  These dimensions respond to psychological 
(Brett-Jones et al., 1987; Chadwick & Lowe, 1990, 1994) and, potentially, 
antipsychotic (Mizrahi et al., 2006) interventions differently, and have differential 
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associations with other psychological processes such as reasoning biases (Freeman 
et al., 2004; Garety et al., 2005).  The number of dimensions reported ranges from 
two to seven (Appelbaum et al., 1999, 2004; Hole, Rush, & Beck, 1979; Kendler, 
Glazer, & Morgenstern, 1983), with a varying degree of inter-correlations between 
dimensions (Appelbaum et al., 1999; Harrow et al., 2004; Kendler et al., 1983).  A 
number of researchers have concluded that major dimensions in studies 
investigating delusions and reasoning include conviction, distress, preoccupation 
and disruption to life (Garety & Hemsley, 1987; Lincoln, 2007; Peters et al., 2004).  
While conviction is central to the traditional definition of delusions (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000; Appelbaum et al., 2004; Harrow, Rattenbury, & 
Stoll, 1988), recent work on delusional beliefs in clinical and non-clinical 
individuals has shown that other dimensions, especially distress, may be more 
relevant than conviction in contributing to patient status (Lincoln, 2007; Peters et al., 
1999; van Os et al., 1999).  Therefore, multi-dimensional assessment of delusion is 
important in evaluating treatment outcomes. 
Delusional dimensions can be reliably assessed using observer-rated 
measures such as the Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Schedule (MADS; 
Buchanan et al., 1993; Taylor et al., 1993, 1994) and the Psychotic Symptom 
Rating Scales (PSYRATS; Haddock et al., 1999; Steel et al., 2007), as well as self-
rated questionnaires such as the Personal Questionnaire (Brett-Jones et al., 1987; 
Chadwick & Lowe, 1990, 1994; Garety, 1985; Phillips, 1977; Shapiro, 1961) and 
the Personal Ideation Inventory (PII; Harrow et al., 1988, 2004; Rattenbury et al., 
1984).  These measures tap into different dimensions of delusions and have been 
widely used to assess changes in delusional dimensions over time.  The Peters et al. 
Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 1999, 2004) was designed to assess 
dimensions of delusional ideation in non-clinical populations. 
 
1.4.2 Experience sampling method 
Psychotic experiences are internal phenomena that occur in the realm of 
daily life, and there has been an increasing research interest in studying psychosis in 
the context of moment-by-moment interaction between the person and the 
environment.  The experience sampling method (ESM), also known as the 
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Ecological Momentary Assessment (Collins et al., 1998; Shiffman, Stone, & 
Hufford, 2008; Stone & Shiffman, 2002), is a structured diary technique, assessing 
current context and psychological phenomena such as mood in the flow of daily life 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987; Delespaul, 1995; deVries, 1992; Myin-Germeys 
et al., 2009; Palmier-Claus et al., 2011b).  Participants are assessed in their daily 
living environment.  They typically receive either a digital wristwatch, together 
with a set of self-assessment forms collated in a booklet for each day, or for 
computerised ESM, a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA).  Multiple times a day on a 
number of consecutive days, the watch or the PDA emits a signal (beep) at irregular 
intervals during the day.  After each “beep”, participants are asked to stop their 
activity and fill out the ESM self-assessment forms in the booklet or the PDA.  The 
ESM questions are phrased in such a way as to enquire how the participant thinks 
and feels “at the moment”, hence capturing moment-to-moment changes of 
psychological phenomena in real time.  Self-assessments are rated on visual 
analogue, 7-point Likert (from 1 ‘not at all’ to 7 ‘very’) or bipolar (e.g. -3 to +3) 
scales, or in the form of open questions.  General guidance about how to conduct 
the ESM assessments is now available (Conner Christensen et al., 2003; Palmier-
Claus et al., 2011b). 
ESM as a measure of psychological experiences has several advantages 
(Trull & Ebner-Priemer, 2009).  Firstly, it is an assessment applicable in the real 
world in the flow of daily life, with high ecological validity.  Secondly, it is an 
assessment in the moment, encompassing repeated and micro-longitudinal 
measurements, which helps to demonstrate fluctuations across time and person-
environment interactions and avoids recall bias (Delespaul, 1995; Trull & Ebner-
Priemer, 2009).  Thirdly, it allows for three levels of variability to be assessed – 
across beeps, across days, and across individuals.  Using statistical procedures 
involving multi-level modelling (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1987, 1992; Kenny, Kashy, 
& Bolger, 1997; Kreft & de Leeuw, 1998), researchers can model the influence of 
within and between-subject factors simultaneously on the variables of interest.  
Fourthly, ESM minimises the possibility of observer bias and socially desirable 
answers as the participant enters responses directly into the PDA or booklets in the 
absence of a researcher.   
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With the development of software packages, recent studies have conducted 
the ESM assessments electronically using palmtop computers, or PDAs (Granholm, 
Loh, & Swendsen, 2008; Kimhy et al., 2006, 2010; Le, Choi, & Beal, 2006; Scharer 
et al., 2002a, 2002b).  In computerised ESM, time-stamped data are stored in the 
PDA’s memory, so that an objective index of compliance is provided and 
researchers can verify when the participants completed their reports (Conner 
Christensen et al., 2003).  While there is evidence that paper-and-pencil and 
computerised ESM provide equivalent results (Green et al., 2006; Gwaltney, 
Shields, & Shiffman, 2008; Jacobs et al., 2005), computerised ESM reduces the 
chance of human error as data are not entered manually (Barrett & Barrett, 2001).  
It has also been argued that computerised ESM has better validity because, with 
booklets, participants may not respond to questionnaires at the appropriate times or 
may complete them in mass at more convenient times (Broderick et al., 2003; Stone 
& Shiffman, 2002; Stone et al., 2003), thereby introducing sampling bias into the 
data.  Recent work has shown promise for the use of mobile devices such as mobile 
phones, PDAs, and “PsyMate” (Myin-Germeys, Birchwood, & Kwapil, 2011) as a 
methodology for delivering psychological intervention for severe mental illnesses 
(Depp et al., 2010; Wichers et al., in press). 
ESM has been applied with success in studies covering a wide variety of 
psychiatric conditions, including personality disorders, anxiety and depression, 
chronic pain, psychosis, and substance abuse (Collins et al., 1998; Delespaul & 
deVries, 1987; deVries, Delespaul, & Dijkman, 1987; deVries & Delespaul, 1989;  
Ebner-Priemer & Trull, 2009; Freedman et al., 2006; Glaser et al., 2010; Kimhy, 
Durbin, & Corcoran, 2009; Lowenstein et al., 1987; Peeters et al., 2003; Stone et al., 
2003; Swendsen, 1997; Swendsen et al., 2000; Verdoux et al., 2003).  Previous 
applications of ESM in people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia have demonstrated 
feasibility, validity, and reliability of the method in patients with psychosis 
(reviewed by Myin-Germeys et al., 2003a, 2009; Oorschot et al., 2009).  Using 
paper-based assessments in community-dwelling patients with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, studies using ESM have investigated a wide range of aetiological 
issues including stress reactivity (Myin-Germeys et al., 2000, 2005; Palmier-Claus 
et al., 2011a), relationships between affect and psychotic symptoms (Delespaul, 
deVries, & van Os, 2002; Myin-Germeys et al., 2001b; Thewissen et al., 2011), 
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relationships between self-esteem and paranoia (Thewissen et al., 2008), and gene-
environment interactions of the effect of cannabis on psychosis (Henquet et al., 
2009).   
Using computerised ESM, Granholm, Swendsen and colleagues assessed 
out-patients with psychosis multiple times a day for one week; they reported a high 
compliance rate (87%) (Granholm et al., 2008) and found prospective predictive 
relationships between negative emotional states and occurrence of subsequent 
persecutory ideation (Ben-Zeev et al., 2011).  Kimhy and colleagues applied 
computerised ESM to in-patients with schizophrenia over a one-day or 36-hours 
period (Kimhy et al., 2006, 2010), and as an adjunct to cognitive behaviour therapy 
(Kimhy & Corcoran, 2008).  A compliance rate of 60-79% was reported in these 
studies.  In summary, ESM is a well-suited method for understanding fluctuations in 
psychological phenomenon in the flow of daily life and can be used in patients 
suffering from severe mental illnesses such as psychosis.   
Change in delusions has been examined using ESM with patients in the 
community.  Using items such as preoccupation (“I’m preoccupied by my thoughts 
right now”), suspicion (“My thoughts are suspicious”), paranoia (“I feel that others 
might hurt me”), feeling unreal (“I feel unreal”) or feeling controlled (“My thoughts 
are being influenced”), Myin-Germeys et al. (2001a) reported that patients with 
schizophrenia experienced delusions around one-third of the time.  However, since 
the content of delusions differs across individuals, a potentially more effective 
option may be to use wording that is relevant to the specific content and meaningful 
to the individual patient.  Peters et al. (2011) examined key elements of the 
cognitive models of psychosis, using ESM ratings on the specific content of each 
patient’s delusions.  They found that conviction fluctuates over time and that the 
presence of delusions is associated with more negative affect.  ESM will be applied 




1.5 Changes in delusional dimensions with 
antipsychotic and psychological treatment 
1.5.1 Response of delusional dimensions to antipsychotic 
treatment 
Two studies have examined changes in delusional dimensions prospectively 
beginning when patients were hospitalised until after discharge.  Using the Personal 
Questionnaire (Shapiro, 1961), Brett-Jones et al. (1987) assessed delusional 
conviction, preoccupation, and interference weekly, in nine patients, until discharge, 
or for a maximum of six months.  During the study period, the patients received 
usual psychiatric treatment, including antipsychotic medication. The authors found 
that preoccupation and interference were correlated with each other, but conviction 
was not correlated with preoccupation or interference.  In addition, they reported a 
desynchrony of changes between conviction and preoccupation during the six-
month assessment period, with a decrease in conviction preceding a decrease in 
preoccupation.  This study was important as it illustrated the possibility of gaining 
quantifiable data about processes of change from participants with acute delusions 
through interviews.  Replication of the results from the case series would be 
however required.  Using the Personal Ideation Inventory (Rattenbury et al., 1984), 
Harrow et al. (1988) measured changes of conviction in delusions, perspective on 
delusions, and emotional commitment to delusions in 34 patients at the height of the 
psychotic episode and after one month of hospitalisation.  They reported significant 
reductions in all three dimensions, although improvement in perspective was 
smaller than in the other two dimensions after one month of hospitalisation.  At the 
one-month follow-up, patients who received antipsychotic treatment had better 
perspective and less emotional commitment than patients who were not on 
antipsychotics.   
Although Brett-Jones et al. (1987) and Harrow et al. (1988) demonstrated 
the differential changes in delusional dimensions over time, they did not set out to 
examine the process of change at the early phase of antipsychotic treatment.  The 
initial interview took place within five weeks of admission in Brett-Jones et al. 
(1987) and a median of 26 days following admission in Harrow et al. (1988).  In 
Harrow et al.’s (1988) sample, only 68% received antipsychotic treatment.  
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However, examining changes in psychosis during the early phase of antipsychotic 
treatment is important.  For decades, it was accepted that there is delay of two to 
three weeks between the start of antipsychotic administration and the onset of 
specific therapeutic benefits, although dopamine receptor blockade is observable in 
the first few days.  This clinical ‘delayed onset’ hypothesis was challenged by the 
results of Agid et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis which examined data on 7450 patients 
in 42 double-blind, comparator controlled studies.  They reported that core 
psychotic symptoms improved in all patients within the first week of treatment and 
that the improvement in psychosis during the first two weeks of treatment was 
much greater than the improvement observed in any subsequent two-week period 
(Agid et al., 2003).  Leucht et al. (2005a) analysed 1708 patients’ clinical responses 
to amisulpiride over time and reported that reduction in psychotic symptoms up to 
week 2 of treatment was greater than the additional change up to week 4 of 
treatment.  In keeping with the ‘early onset’ account, Correll et al. (2003) found that 
minimal improvement in positive symptoms during the first week of treatment with 
a typical antipsychotic predicted poor treatment response after four weeks of 
treatment (see also Stern et al., 1993).  Therefore, assessing patients a few weeks 
after admission might have missed the period of the greatest change.   
Mizrahi et al. (2006) was the only study that measured changes in 
dimensions of psychotic symptoms in the early phase of antipsychotic treatment.  
They assessed 17 patients at baseline (drug-free) and every two weeks for ten weeks.   
They reported a modest improvement in conviction six weeks after the start of 
antipsychotic treatment, which was slower and of a lesser magnitude than the 
improvement in other dimensions, including behavioural impact and emotional 
preoccupation.  The authors concluded that antipsychotics do not greatly alter 
patients’ conviction in their psychotic experience in the short term (Mizrahi et al., 
2006).  It should be noted that the semi-structured interview used in this study, 
Dimensions of Psychosis Instrument (DIPI), had not been used in other studies, and 
that the dimensions measured were not consistent with the delusional dimensions 
generated in factor analysis studies (Appelbaum et al., 1999; Garety & Hemsley, 
1987; Kendler et al., 1983; Stoll et al., 1980).  One of the aims of this thesis was to 
replicate Mizrahi et al.’s (2006) finding of differential changes in conviction and 
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distress in the early phase of antipsychotics using validated measures of delusional 
dimensions and experience sampling method.   
 
1.5.2 Response of delusional dimensions to psychological 
intervention 
With the use of multi-dimensional measures, several single-case studies 
examined changes in delusional dimensions during the course of cognitive therapy.  
Chadwick and Lowe (1990) measured changes in delusional dimensions in six 
patients using the Personal Questionnaire (Phillips, 1977; Shapiro, 1961).  During 
the baseline period, conviction and accommodation of alternative explanation were 
extremely stable, whereas preoccupation and anxiety were highly variable.  During 
psychological intervention procedures (namely structural verbal challenge and a 
reality test), five out of six patients showed substantial reductions in conviction by 
the end of the intervention phases, but there was individual variation in whether 
other dimensions changed at the same time as conviction (Chadwick & Lowe, 
1990).  Their later study (Chadwick & Lowe, 1994) also showed that most of the 
patients maintained high and stable conviction at baseline, but reported a reduction 
in conviction after psychological intervention.  Among the ten individuals who 
reduced in conviction during cognitive therapy, six reported a reduction in 
preoccupation, anxiety, or accommodation, but there was no reliable measure of the 
relationship between these changes.  In another single-case study series (Sharp et al., 
1996), three out of six patients with delusions reported a reduction in conviction 
during cognitive therapy.  While there was some association between conviction 
and affect at baseline, the two dimensions were not associated during cognitive 
therapy.  Spearman rank-order correlations between conviction and preoccupation 
were weak across the baseline and therapy phases in two participants (correlation 
was not determinable for the other four participants as either variable was constant 
throughout phase).  Although these studies were limited by their low samples and a 
lack of controls, overall this body of work suggests that there is a desynchrony of 
change amongst the different delusional dimensions during the course of therapy, 
especially between conviction and affective dimensions. 
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Several randomised controlled trials have analysed the effect of cognitive 
behavioural therapy (CBT) on dimensions of delusions, for example Kuipers et al. 
(1997) and Garety et al. (2008).  Over nine months, Kuipers and colleagues (1997) 
found that delusional conviction and distress reduced more markedly following 
CBT compared to treatment as usual.  At the 18-month follow-up (Kuipers et al., 
1998), the effect of CBT was significant for delusional distress and preoccupation, 
but not for delusional conviction.  Garety et al. (2008) reported that, in a sample of 
recently relapsed individuals, delusional conviction and distress reduced over 24 
months in all three conditions – CBT, family intervention, and treatment as usual.  
In their review, Turkington and Dudley (2004) also reported the role of CBT in 
reducing distress associated with delusions.  In summary, there is evidence that 
delusional distress improved following months of CBT, while the finding about 
change in conviction was inconsistent. 
 
1.6 The current thesis – Bridging different modalities 
of treatment 
Recent models of psychosis have suggested that psychosis is multi-factorial 
in origin (Broome et al., 2005; Garety et al., 2007; van der Gaag, 2006).  Among 
the processes that interact in the pathogenesis, this chapter has discussed the two 
key approaches of viewing psychosis: (i) a biological-neuro-chemical approach that 
centres around dopamine dysregulation and the use of antipsychotics; and (ii) a 
psychological-reasoning approach, focussing on appraisal of experiences and 
associated emotional processes, and providing a rationale for cognitive-behavioural 
treatments.  While previous research has shown that both antipsychotics and 
psychological intervention may reduce delusions, the response of psychological 
processes to these two modalities of treatment and their mechanisms of change 
remains largely unexplored. 
Studies on phenomenology, assessment and treatment of delusions have 
shown that: (i) delusion consists of several distinct dimensions/characteristics that 
may change independently over time; (ii) emotional processes such as anxiety are 
associated with delusions; (iii) psychosis is a state of aberrant salience attribution; 
(iv) delusions improve with both antipsychotic and psychological interventions, but 
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over a very different timescale; and (v) emotional aspects of delusions change more 
quickly than delusional conviction.  The critical questions then are: (i) How do 
dimensions of delusions (i.e. distress, preoccupation, conviction, disruption to life) 
change over the course of treatment over period of weeks to months? (ii) Do 
antipsychotics and psychological interventions modify some or all of these 
dimensions? (iii) How do these dimensions relate to psychological processes such 
as emotions and reasoning biases?  The current series of studies aims to investigate 
changes in delusional dimensions and the associated cognitive and emotional 
processes, as well as predictors of changes, during the course of treatment, over 
shorter (Studies 1 and 3) and longer (Study 2) time periods. 
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Chapter 2 
Reasoning biases associated with delusions and 
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 Delusions are the most common symptoms of psychotic disorders (Sartorius 
et al., 1986) and have often been the key targets of treatment.  Psychotic disorders 
are commonly treated with antipsychotics – which are undoubtedly effective for a 
significant proportion of patients (Kapur & Mamo, 2003) – and most antipsychotic 
treatment studies have examined the effects of these drugs using objective rating 
scales that measure positive and negative symptoms.  At the same time, most 
biological investigations of antipsychotics have focussed on examining the effects 
of antipsychotics on different neurochemical systems using a variety of in-vivo and 
ex-vivo methods.  Thus, most models of how antipsychotics act consist largely of 
examining the relationship between antipsychotic exposure, symptom reduction and 
neurochemical changes (Kapur & Mamo, 2003).   
On the other hand, psychological studies have reported that people with 
delusions often display various reasoning biases, the most researched being 
‘jumping to conclusions’, belief inflexibility, externalising attributional style, and a 
theory of mind deficit (definitions of these terms will be explained in detail in the 
following section).  These reasoning processes have been proposed to play 
important roles in the development and maintenance of delusions (Garety et al., 
2001, 2007), and are targets for change in cognitive behavioural therapy for 
psychosis (CBTp) (Zimmermann et al., 2005) and the newly emerging reasoning 
training (Moritz & Woodward, 2007; Ross et al., 2011). 
Thus, we have these two models of viewing psychosis – a biological-
neurochemical model into which antipsychotics fit in, and a psychological-
reasoning model which provides a basis of cognitive-behavioural treatments. Yet, 
both the modalities lead to an improvement in the same endpoint – psychotic 
symptoms. The critical questions then are – how do antipsychotics affect reasoning, 
and how do interventions like CBTp affect neurochemical systems. We focus this 
review on the former question. 
The hitherto divergent foci of studies in the pharmacology/biology and 
psychology of psychosis have recently converged with the advent of contemporary 
models of psychosis that explain psychosis in terms of biopsychosocial factors 
(Broome et al., 2005; Garety et al., 2007; Kapur, 2004; van der Gaag, 2006).  These 
 40 
models explicitly acknowledge the role and presence of reasoning biases in the 
origin of psychosis – however there is little known or said about the impact of 
antipsychotics on reasoning biases.  Several critical questions arise: Do reasoning 
biases, which contribute to delusion formation and maintenance, change with 
antipsychotics treatment?  Is the improvement in delusions mediated, moderated or 
independent of any changes in reasoning biases?  This review, therefore, aims to 
examine the current literature on the relationship between reasoning biases 
associated with delusions and antipsychotics-induced recovery. 
 
2.2 Reasoning in psychosis 
People with psychosis have been reported to have problems with both basic 
cognitive functions such as attention, concentration and planning as well as biases 
in reasoning.  While there is a wealth of literature on the effect of antipsychotics on 
cognitive functions such as memory, attention, and executive function (Houthoofd, 
Morrens, & Sabbe, 2008; Keefe et al., 1999; Sharma, 2002; Woodward et al., 2005), 
whether reasoning biases respond to antipsychotics is relatively less researched.  In 
this review we will focus on delusions and restrict the analysis to research on 
reasoning biases in the way individuals interpret experiences, gather information 
about the world, and develop and maintain beliefs. 
 
2.2.1 Jumping to conclusions cognitive bias (Data gathering) 
The “jumping to conclusions” (JTC) bias refers to a tendency to gather less 
data than controls to reach a decision (see Fine et al., 2007; Freeman, 2007 for 
reviews).  The beads task (Garety, Hemsley, & Wessely, 1991), or its variants, has 
been used as a measure of JTC in many studies.  In the original beads task, 
individuals are presented with two jars each containing 100 coloured beads.  In an 
easy version of the task, one of the jars contains 85 beads of colour A and 15 beads 
of colour B, while the other jar contains 85 beads of colour B and 15 beads of 
colour A.  (In more difficult versions the proportion of the different coloured beads 
are changed, for example, to 60:40.)  Individuals are told that beads will be drawn, 
one at a time, from one of the jars, and are then replaced.  They can see as many 
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beads as they like before deciding which jar the beads are drawn from.  The key 
variable of the beads task is the number of beads seen before making a decision.  
Extreme JTC responding is defined as reaching a decision after seeing two beads or 
less (Garety et al., 2005).  Variants of the beads task replace beads in a jar with self-
referent words (Dudley et al., 1997b), fish in a lake (Woodward et al., 2009), or 
using four jars instead of two (Moritz et al., 2008).  Other JTC studies used 
alternative tasks such as Wason’s 2-4-6 and card selection tasks (Peters et al., 2008) 
and the 20 questions game (John & Dodgson, 1994; Merrin, Kinderman, & Bentall, 
2007). 
Recent studies have shown that JTC occurs in one half to two-thirds of 
individuals with delusions (see Freeman, 2007 for a review).  The JTC bias has also 
been found in people ‘at risk’ for psychosis (Broome et al., 2007), in people scoring 
highly on delusional ideation scales (Colbert & Peters, 2002; Linney, Peters, & 
Ayton, 1998; Moritz & Woodward, 2005; Van Dael et al., 2006; Warman & Martin, 
2006) and in people who have remitted from delusions (Moritz & Woodward, 2005; 
Peters & Garety, 2006).  Studies investigating the specificity of the JTC bias 
showed that JTC (as measured by the beads task) cannot be explained by memory 
deficit (Broome et al., 2007; Menon et al., 2006), impulsivity (Dudley et al., 1997a; 
Menon et al., 2006; Young & Bentall, 1997), or general cognitive functioning e.g. 
Mortimer et al. (1996).  Therefore, the beads task is considered a specific and 
reliable measure of the JTC bias. 
 
2.2.2 Belief inflexibility (Evidence evaluation) 
Despite the high conviction with which delusional beliefs are held and their 
apparent incorrigibility, it is interesting to note that there is variation in degree of 
belief flexibility.  Garety et al. (2005) reported that almost half (47%) of patients 
with current delusions showed some degree of acceptance that they might be 
mistaken in their belief, although fewer (a quarter) are able to actually generate 
alternative explanations (Freeman et al., 2004).  Belief flexibility has been shown to 
be associated with lower delusional conviction, preoccupation and disruption, but 
not with delusional distress (Colbert, Peters, & Garety, 2010; Freeman et al., 2004; 
Garety et al., 2005). 
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2.2.3 Externalising attributional style 
  People with persecutory delusions have been found to attribute negative 
events to external causes (Fear, Sharp, & Healy, 1996; Kaney & Bentall, 1989) or, 
more specifically, external personal causes (Kinderman & Bentall, 1997).  Bentall 
and others originally argued that delusions function as a defense to protect the 
individual against low self-esteem (Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994; McKay, 
Langdon, & Coltheart, 2007).  However, findings on external attributional bias 
using attribution questionnaires have been inconsistent and some recent studies 
have suggested that attributional style is more closely related to affective processes, 
particularly depression, than to delusions (Fornells-Ambrojo & Garety, 2009; 
Fowler et al., 2006; Fraguas et al., 2008; Freeman et al., 1998, 2002; Jolley et al., 
2006; Smith et al., 2006). 
 
2.2.4 Theory of mind 
 Frith initially proposed that delusions of persecution and reference arise 
from an inability to represent the beliefs, thoughts and intentions of other people, a 
‘theory of mind’ (ToM) deficit (Frith, 1992).  While psychotic patients with 
negative and disorganised symptoms have performed worse on ToM tasks, patients 
with passivity symptoms or patients in remission have performed normally on ToM 
tasks (Brüne, 2005; Doody et al., 1998; Greig, Bryson, & Bell, 2004; Mitchley et 
al., 1998; Sarfati & Hardy-Bayle, 1999).  It has been suggested that difficulties with 
ToM may both be a trait factor associated with liability to psychosis (Janssen et al., 
2003; Langdon & Coltheart, 1999) and a state factor (Corcoran et al., 1995, 2008; 
Drury, Robinson, & Birchwood, 1998; Pickup & Frith, 2001). 
 
2.3 Effect of antipsychotics on reasoning – two 
potential pathways 
While there is robust evidence supporting the effect of antipsychotics in 
reducing psychotic symptoms (Miyamoto et al., 2005), whether these drugs modify 
any of the reasoning processes related to delusions remains unclear.    Two potential 
models are proposed.  In the first model (see Figure 2.1), reasoning biases may exist 
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before and after a psychotic episode, make the person susceptible to developing 
psychosis, and limit the effectiveness of the antipsychotics, but not change with 
antipsychotic treatment.  Reasoning would therefore be a moderating factor (Baron 
& Kenny, 1986) in psychosis, affecting the onset, course of the illness and the 
effectiveness of antipsychotic treatment; but a change in reasoning would not 
mediate the effect of antipsychotics.   
 
Figure 2.1  
Reasoning biases as a moderator of the relationship between antipsychotics 




Reasoning biases as a mediator of the relationship between antipsychotics 
and delusions  
 
In the second model (see Figure 2.2), reasoning processes may improve with 
















response to antipsychotics: that is, antipsychotics may improve psychotic symptoms 
through modifying reasoning. 
The best way to examine the direct relationship between antipsychotics-
induced symptom recovery and reasoning would be an experimental design with 
careful randomisation of participants into medicated and unmedicated conditions.  
This is ethically challenging and has never been done with patients with psychosis.  
Instead, the question of whether reasoning biases normalise in response to 
antipsychotics in patients with psychosis has been approached indirectly using two 
quasi-experimental methods.  One approach is a longitudinal observational design 
where the severity of psychosis is ‘manipulated’ with antipsychotic medication.  
This type of naturalistic study allows for measurement of changes in psychosis and 
reasoning before and after antipsychotic treatment takes place.  Another indirect 
approach, which is less powerful, is a cross-sectional design where the relationship 
between severity of psychosis and reasoning is recorded and analysed across a 
range of patients with varied symptom severity.  This type of study does not 
necessarily investigate the direct impact of antipsychotics on change of reasoning, 
but may help to show whether there is a relationship between symptom severity and 
intensity of reasoning biases.   
We systematically review cross-sectional and longitudinal studies on the 
relationship between reasoning and psychosis, and aim to determine whether 
reasoning biases respond to antipsychotics and predict treatment response.  While 
there are recent meta-analyses, e.g. Fine et al. (2007), and reviews e.g. Freeman 
(2007) on reasoning processes, the present review is the first to include all the major 
reasoning processes associated with delusions and to discuss how they change 
during treatment and symptom improvement. 
 
2.4 Methods 
In order to identify systematically any published studies of antipsychotic 
medication and reasoning in psychosis, we searched on the electronic databases 
Medline, PsycInfo and EMBASE (from 1806 to May 2009) as well as on PubMed 
with the following search terms either as key terms or as keywords: “neuroleptic*” 
or “antipsychotic*”, in combination with any of the following reasoning processes 
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(“reasoning”, “attribution”, “theory of mind”, “jumping to conclusions”, “need for 
closure”, “belief flexibility”, “cognitive bias”, “appraisal”, “self-serving bias”, 
“confirmatory bias”, and “confirmation bias”).  The search was limited to literature 
written in English.  A total of 302 papers were generated.  It was ascertained from 
the abstracts that 145 papers were not related to psychosis, and 129 papers were 
relevant to psychosis but not reasoning, and were therefore eliminated.  In order to 
examine whether reasoning changes with symptomatology of psychosis and during 
the course of antipsychotic treatment, this review only includes studies that reported 
and analysed the relationship between severity of psychotic symptoms and 
reasoning.  Out of the remaining 28 articles, 11 studies meet these criteria.  Six 
additional papers were identified through cross-referencing and personal 
communication.  A total of 17 papers are therefore included and discussed in detail 
in this review.  Studies are divided into two broad categories according to their 
design: (i) studies on reasoning in psychosis with a longitudinal design; and (ii) 




A total of 17 studies were identified that have reported and analysed the 
relationship between severity of psychosis and reasoning, among which three are 
longitudinal in design, 11 are cross-sectional in design, and three adopt both cross-
sectional and longitudinal analyses. 
 
2.5.1 Longitudinal studies on psychosis and reasoning 
 There are six studies available that investigated the changes in reasoning in 
patients with psychosis using a longitudinal observational design.  In these studies 
psychotic symptoms and reasoning were measured when patients were acutely 
psychotic, and when remitted or according to a fixed follow-up schedule.  Three of 
these studies were on JTC, and one each on belief flexibility, ToM and attribution.  
Details of these studies are listed in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1.   
Longitudinal studies on reasoning in psychosis 
Studies Diagnoses of 
patients 










Findings on the effect of 










On antipsychotics Tested while 
deluded and, in 16 
patients with 
Schizophrenia, also 
in remission (on 






The effect of both confirmatory 
evidence and potentially 
disconfirmatory evidence on 
probability judgement was stronger in 
remission than in the psychotic episode. 
No correlations between measures of 





















and when remitted 
(on average 17.4 
weeks in the 
deluded group, and 










Probability measures improved with 
symptom remission, but JTC bias 
persisted 
Initial certainty and number of beads 
drawn are related with delusion 
symptom scores  
There was an overall increase (across 
groups) in self-serving bias at follow-
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baseline & every 2 
weeks up to 6 
weeks 
ToM Hinting task ToM improved with antipsychotics, 
particularly during the first 2 weeks of 
treatment 
No relationship between change in 
ToM & change in symptoms 
Mizrahi et 














baseline & every 2 









Antipsychotics have little effect on 
attribution style in 6 weeks, with only a 
modest effect on externalising bias 
within 2 weeks 
Internalising style is associated with 








19 patients 12 drug-free 
7 started on 
atypical 
antipsychotics at 
most 48 hrs before 
the 1st interview 
after being drug 
free for at least 2 
weeks 
Interviewed at 
baseline, week 2 
and week 4 




of the task 
Draws to decision increased within 2 
weeks of treatment, & remained the 
same at week 4 
Baseline performance on the 
emotionally salient task predicted 
symptom improvement in response to 
antipsychotics 
No significant relationship between 
change in delusion/ symptom and 













On antipsychotics Assessed before 
and after 12 weeks 





JTC Fish task There is significant negative correlation 
between change in number of requested 
pieces of information and change in 
delusion scores over time.  The trend of 
earlier termination of information 
gathering from Time 1 to Time 2 is 
greater in individuals with increasing 
delusions relative to those with 
decreasing delusions. 
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2.5.1.1 Relationship between symptom change and JTC 
Using the beads task, Peters and Garety (2006) tested 17 patients, all on 
medication, while they were actively deluded and when they were remitted (on 
average after 17.4 weeks).  On remission of psychosis, the JTC bias persisted 
despite an improvement in probability judgements.  The authors suggested that the 
JTC bias is relatively stable and thus may be involved in the formation and 
persistence of delusion, but does not respond to antipsychotic treatment – consistent 
with our moderation hypothesis. 
Menon and colleagues (2008) measured JTC using the beads task and an 
emotionally salient version of this task (where comments about a person instead of 
beads were presented) when 19 psychotic patients began antipsychotic treatment, 
and at week 2 and week 4.  They found that while psychotic symptoms continued to 
improve at week 2 and week 4, JTC improved (indicated by an increase in draws to 
decision) within two weeks of treatment and then remained the same at week 4.  
The improvement was found in the emotionally salient version, but not the neutral 
version, of the task.  While baseline draws to decision predicted subsequent change 
in positive symptoms, there was no significant correlation between symptom 
changes and changes in draws to decision.  Therefore, the authors argued that JTC 
was a moderator, and not a mediator, of treatment outcome. 
Using a new version of the beads task to enhance task comprehension 
(where beads in a jar were replaced with fish from a lake), Woodward and 
colleagues (2009) measured change in JTC behaviour in 19 patients who showed a 
change in delusions over a period of 12 weeks (four with increasing delusions and 
15 with decreasing delusions).  They found an overall decrease in number of pieces 
of information requested at the later time point (i.e. an increase in JTC), which was 
considered as a repeated testing effect, where individuals request fewer pieces of 
information at the second testing due to familiarity with the task (Peters & Garety, 
2006; Woodward et al., 2009).  This earlier termination of information gathering 
was greater in patients with increasing delusions than in those with decreasing 
delusions, but this difference did not reach statistical significance, and the sample 
size in each group was too small for this result to be conclusive. 
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In summary, available data show that JTC does not improve consistently 
with symptom improvement, and there is some evidence that baseline JTC predicts 
outcome (Menon et al., 2008).  These data suggest, at best, a moderating, and not 
mediating role, for JTC on delusion symptomatology.  However, there are mixed 
results on stability of JTC over time.  While JTC persists despite further symptom 
reduction in Peters and Garety (2006), it improves in the emotionally salient version 
of the task in Menon et al. (2008), but worsens in Woodward et al. (2009).  One 
possible explanation of such discrepancy of findings is that JTC fluctuates during 
the state of psychosis.  However, most of these studies (except for Peters & Garety, 
2006) did not include a control group in the longitudinal analysis, and it is possible 
that some changes are due to a practice effect of the beads task, as found in the two 
control groups in Peters and Garety (2006).  It is also of note that, in Menon et al. 
(2008), patients were drug-free at baseline and had just begun antipsychotic 
treatment, while those in Peters and Garety (2006) and Woodward et al. (2009) 
were mainly chronic in-patients who had been on treatment for some time. 
2.5.1.2 Relationship between symptom change and belief 
flexibility 
Brankovic and Paunovic (1999) examined reasoning under uncertainty in 29 
currently deluded schizophrenia patients (when deluded and in remission), a healthy 
control group (n = 35), and a group of anxiety patients (n = 31) using a probabilistic 
inference task.  They reported that patients improved in flexible evaluation of their 
beliefs when they were in remission.  The change was similar for evaluation given 
for both confirmatory and disconfirmatory information.  In addition, remitted 
patients did not differ from healthy participants or anxious patients in the impact of 
both confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence on probability judgements.  The 
authors suggested that a less flexible belief evaluation under conditions of 
uncertainty may be specific to the delusional state of schizophrenia, although 
within-group variation in psychotic symptomatology did not correlate with 
reasoning (Brankovic & Paunovic, 1999). 
 Although not a longitudinal study, Ross et al. (2011) investigated the change 
in delusions and belief flexibility in a randomised experimental study on effect of 
reasoning training.  Seventeen patients with delusions were randomly assigned to 
one session of reasoning training or attention control.  After the training session, 
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four participants in the reasoning training condition and one in the attention control 
condition improved in belief flexibility, which was not statistically significant.  
Delusional conviction reduced in three participants in the reasoning training 
condition (and none in the control condition).  These data tentatively suggest a 
potential role of belief flexibility change in conviction change, although this small 
study was underpowered to formally analyse this relationship. 
2.5.1.3 Relationship between symptom change and attribution 
Using the Pragmatic Inference Task (Lyon, Kaney, & Bentall, 1994), Peters 
and Garety (2006) measured attributional style in 17 deluded patients when they 
were actively deluded and in remission, as well as in psychiatric and non-clinical 
control groups.  They found that although the deluded group displayed an excessive 
self-focus on the PIT at both time points, only a small sub-sample characterised by 
“bad-me” paranoia showed the expected depressive attributional style, which 
normalised at follow-up.  In another longitudinal study (Mizrahi et al., 2007), 17 
patients with psychotic disorders were assessed using the Internal, Personal and 
Situational Attributions Questionnaire (IPSAQ; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996) when 
they began antipsychotic treatment and then followed-up for six weeks.  Despite 
significant symptom improvement in the six weeks, attributional style did not 
change significantly, except for a modest increase in externalising bias within two 
weeks (Mizrahi et al., 2008).  A relationship was also reported between a low self-
serving bias and poorer response to antipsychotic treatment, suggesting that an 
internalising style may play a role as moderator to antipsychotic treatment. 
2.5.1.4 Relationship between symptom change and theory of 
mind 
Using a longitudinal design, Mizrahi and colleagues (2007) measured 
performance on the Hinting Task (Corcoran et al., 1995) in 17 drug-free psychotic 
patients, and then every two weeks thereafter until six weeks after initiation of 
antipsychotic treatment.  They found that ToM performance improved during the 
six weeks of treatment, particularly in the first two weeks of treatment.  There was 
no significant correlation between change in ToM and change in symptoms. 
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2.5.1.5 Summary of findings of the longitudinal studies 
 Longitudinal studies are useful in informing the relationship between change 
in symptoms and change in reasoning in response to medication.  Despite a vast 
literature on reasoning in psychosis, only six studies were longitudinal, three of 
which were conducted by the same research group.  The sample size in these studies 
tends to be relatively small and a control group is often absent, so results based on 
these studies are preliminary.  There is some evidence that belief flexibility and 
ToM improve over time during the treatment period, although the improvement did 
not correlate significantly with symptom change.  In contrast, there is preliminary 
evidence that JTC may act as a predictor of subsequent response to antipsychotics, 
but does not improve with symptom reduction in two of the three studies.  Findings 
on changes in attributional style remain inconsistent, with the study measuring 
explicit attribution showing no change and the study measuring implicit attribution 
showing some change. 
 
2.5.2 Cross-sectional studies on psychosis and reasoning 
 In order to investigate the impact of antipsychotics on reasoning processes, 
longitudinal studies measuring within-subject changes in reasoning and symptoms 
are obviously a more direct and sensitive method than cross-sectional studies.  
Nevertheless, it is still informative to include cross-sectional studies because (i) 
they are more prevalent in the literature; and (ii) studies comparing between-
participant differences in symptom severity and in reasoning characteristics may 
enhance our understanding of the relationship between symptom severity and 
reasoning.  Therefore, this review includes 14 studies that have reported and 
analysed the relationship between reasoning and severity of psychotic symptoms 
(especially delusions) using a cross-sectional design.  Six of these studies were on 
ToM, four each on attribution and belief flexibility, and three on JTC.  Details of 
these studies are listed in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2.   
Cross-sectional studies on reasoning in psychosis with data on severity of psychotic symptoms 
Studies Diagnoses of 
patients 






Measures  of 
reasoning 
Findings on the effect of antipsychotics on 
reasoning 





128 patients Medications not 
reported 
ToM Hinting task ToM performance was associated with PANSS positive, 
negative, and delusion scores, and most strongly with 
measures of thought disorder 
Freeman et 



















Patients who gave alternative explanations had lower 
delusional conviction than those who did not, but there was 
no difference in overall severity of psychosis 
Garety et 




















Beads task (neutral 
& salient versions) 
Belief flexibility (possibility to be mistaken) was correlated 
with PANSS delusion and hallucination scores, but not with 
PANSS negative or general symptomatology. 
JTC was associated with delusional conviction, and there 
was a trend for JTC to be associated with higher PANSS 




























Number of beads drawn was inversely correlated with the 
positive symptom and delusion scores and positively 
correlated with anxiety. 
Attributional style was not correlated with any clinical 
measures at baseline 
Deluded individuals made significantly more internal 
attributions overall than the non-clinical participants, but 
not the psychiatric control group 
More internal attributions were made for negative than 
positive events in the depressed group, but not in the 
deluded or non-clinical groups 
Individuals with the “bad me” paranoia showed more self-
serving bias whereas the “poor me” group showed a 
depressive attributional style 
Diez-
Alegría et 

























All groups except the depressed group showed an 
externalising bias for negative events. 
The personalising bias was significantly greater in the 
acutely deluded group than in the remitted group. 
The magnitude of the bias was significantly related to the 
severity of symptoms. 
Implicit attributions were more equivocal across groups. 




71 patients in 







Patients with persecutory and grandiose beliefs showed an 





psychosis Depression was related to a reduced self-serving bias and 
an externalising attributional style for positive events 
Persecutory beliefs on their own were not related to any 







36 actively deluded 
patients 
16 currently not 
deluded patients 
(14 with a history 
of delusions) 









Currently deluded patients were less responsive to 
disconfirmatory evidence than currently non-deluded 
patients for revealed-on-third scenarios, but they were able 
to integrate confirmatory evidence into their plausibility 
ratings. 







(10 fully remitted, 
5 partially remitted, 
6 acutely deluded) 
15 patients were 
on antipsychotics 
ToM Picture sequencing 
task 
ToM questionnaire 
There was no difference in ToM task performance between 














at least 4 months 
Most also on 
mood stabilisers 
or other Rx 
ToM 1st and 2nd order 
belief tasks 
Faux-pas task 
The Olanzapine and Clozapine groups performed similarly 
to Controls, but the Typicals and Risperidone groups did 













Affective ToM significantly correlated with SANS alogia, 
SANS attention and SANS total symptoms 
Cognitive ToM was not associated with SANS scores but 
correlated with PANSS positive score 
Mizrahi et 










ToM Hinting task Performance on the hinting task was correlated with 
PANSS negative symptoms, PANSS general symptoms and 


























Social version of 






Patients with current persecutory delusions, across 
diagnoses, tended to draw conclusions more hastily and 
score lower on the ToM tasks. 
JTC did not correlate with severity of delusions. 
ToM performance on the stories correlated significantly 
with delusional preoccupation and distress, but that on the 
picture-sequencing task did not 
JTC and ToM performance did not correlate with 
antipsychotic dosage. 
Mizrahi et 






86 patients 87% on 
antipsychotics 








Patients with less externalising bias had greater overall 
psychopathology 
Externalising bias and personalising bias were not 
associated with delusions 
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Colbert et 




















On the personally meaningful beliefs, whether delusions or 
other idiosyncratic beliefs, there was no group difference in 
conviction and belief flexibility. 
On the standard belief, the clinical groups showed less 
belief flexibility than the control group (with only the 
remitted group significantly so). 
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2.5.2.1 Relationship between symptom severity and JTC 
There is a wealth of literature on JTC and psychosis, but only three studies 
systematically analysed the relationship between severity of symptoms and JTC 
using a cross-sectional design.  With a large sample of 100 patients with active 
delusions, Garety and colleagues (2005) found that JTC correlated significantly 
with delusional conviction, and that there was a trend for JTC to be associated with 
higher positive and delusion symptom scores.  JTC was not associated with 
negative or general symptomatology.  In another study with 23 in-patients with 
delusions, Peters and Garety (2006) found that patients with higher delusion and 
positive symptom scores drew fewer beads before reaching a decision.  These 
studies suggest that JTC is related to severity of positive symptoms, and to 
delusions in particular.  In a large sample consisting of currently deluded, remitted 
deluded, deluded and depressed, and non-psychotic depressed individuals, Corcoran 
et al. (2008) did not find any significant relationship between performance on the 
beads tasks and severity of delusions, but current deluded status significantly 
predicted performance on one version of the beads task.  Together with data from 
longitudinal studies (Peters & Garety, 2006; Menon et al., 2008) and from studies 
of high-risk or delusion-prone individuals, who show an attenuated JTC (Broome et 
al., 2007; Colbert & Peters, 2002), the current literature suggests that JTC may be a 
trait factor associated with propensity for delusions that is exacerbated in acute 
states of psychotic delusions.  This is consistent with Van Dael et al. (2006), who 
found a dose-response relationship between JTC and level of psychosis liability 
(trait), in interaction with a dose-response relationship between JTC and delusional 
ideation (state). 
2.5.2.2 Relationship between symptom severity and belief 
flexibility 
A comparison of belief flexibility in psychotic patients with varying severity 
of symptoms has been conducted in four cross-sectional studies.  Freeman et al. 
(2004) and Garety et al. (2005) assessed 100 patients with current delusions using 
the Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Scale (MADS; Wessely et al., 1993), where 
patients were asked about any events and experiences that would support their 
belief, the possibility of being mistaken, and their reaction to hypothetical 
contradiction.  Freeman et al. (2004) measured belief flexibility based on patients’ 
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ability to give alternative explanations of events.  It was found that patients with 
lower belief flexibility had higher delusional conviction (Freeman et al., 2004) and 
were less likely to reduce their conviction in their belief in response to hypothetical 
contradiction (Garety et al., 2005).  Garety et al. (2005) also reported an inverse 
relationship between belief flexibility and severity of positive symptoms, delusions 
and hallucinations.  Taken together, these results suggest that belief flexibility is 
related to delusional conviction, and may be related to severity of positive 
symptoms. 
 Woodward and colleagues (2006) asked deluded patients, non-deluded 
patients and healthy controls to rate plausibility of interpretations of scenarios while 
being presented with an increasing number of items of confirmatory or 
disconfirmatory evidence.  They found that currently deluded patients were less 
responsive to disconfirmatory evidence than currently non-deluded patients, 
although they were able to take into account confirmatory evidence in their 
probability estimates.  Such a bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE) was 
significantly predicted by delusions, but not other psychotic symptoms (Woodward 
et al., 2006). 
 Colbert et al. (2010) assessed belief flexibility on delusions or on personally 
meaningful beliefs, as well as on a standard belief, in patients with current delusions, 
patients remitted from delusions, and non-clinical controls.  They found no 
significant group differences in belief flexibility for personally meaningful beliefs 
or delusions, suggesting that belief flexibility is characteristic of such beliefs.  
However, on the standard belief, the remitted group showed significantly less belief 
flexibility than the control group and there was a trend for lower belief flexibility in 
the deluded group than in the control group.  In addition, higher belief flexibility 
was related to lower delusional conviction in the clinical groups. 
These findings, together with findings from the longitudinal study 
(Brankovic & Paunovic, 1999), suggest that belief flexibility and evaluation of 
evidence is related to the active delusion state.  This result is consistent using 
delusion-related measures (Freeman et al., 2004; Garety et al., 2005) and delusion-
neutral materials (Brankovic & Paunovic, 1999; Colbert et al., 2010; Woodward et 
al., 2006).  The difference in belief flexibility between the remitted group and the 
control group in Colbert et al. (2010) tentatively indicates that belief flexibility may 
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also be a vulnerability factor.  However, this is a small study and the finding is yet 
to be replicated.  Woodward et al. (2006) found that such a bias was specific to 
disconfirmatory evidence, whereas Brankovic and Paunovic (1999) found a similar 
bias in integrating both disconfirmatory and confirmatory evidence for belief 
evaluation. 
2.5.2.3 Relationship between symptom severity and attribution 
 The relationship between an externalising attributional style and severity of 
psychosis was investigated in four cross-sectional studies.  Diez-Alegría and 
colleagues (2006) measured attribution using both explicit (IPSAQ; Kinderman & 
Bentall, 1996) and implicit (Pragmatic Inference task; Winters & Neale, 1985) 
measures.  On the IPSAQ, the acutely deluded group made more external-personal 
attributions for negative events (i.e. high personalising bias) than the patients 
remitted from delusions.  Depressed patients also showed a similar level of 
personalising bias, and the magnitude of the personalising bias was significantly 
correlated with the severity of psychiatric symptoms as measured by the total score 
on the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (Lukoff, Liberman, & Nuechterlein, 1986).  
Implicit attribution style, as measured on the PIT, was not significantly different 
across groups.  Using the same implicit attribution measure as Diez-Alegria et al. 
(2006), Peters and Garety (2006) also found no correlation between attributional 
style and clinical measures.  On the other hand, Mizrahi et al. (2008) found that 
patients who had greater overall psychopathology on the Positive and Negative 
Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay, Opler, & Fiszbein, 1987) tended to internalise more 
for negative events on the IPSAQ, but that there was no specific association 
between attributional bias and delusions.   Therefore, these findings suggest a non-
specific relationship between attributional style and general psychopathology on an 
explicit measure of attribution, although the direction of the relationship is not clear 
and no relationship was found using an implicit measure of attribution.  Jolley et al. 
(2006) compared attributional style in patients with four subtypes of persecutory 
delusions (no persecutory beliefs, persecutory beliefs only, persecutory and 
grandiose beliefs, persecutory beliefs and depression).  They found that patients 
with both persecutory and grandiose beliefs tended to make more external 
attributions for negative events than the not-persecutory or persecutory-depressed 
groups, while patients with persecutory beliefs and depression tended to make more 
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external attributions for positive events than the not-persecutory group and showed 
a reduced self-serving bias.  Therefore, the inconsistencies of findings may also be 
attributed to patient subgroups with different affective and delusional profiles. 
2.5.2.4 Relationship between symptom severity and theory of 
mind 
 Six cross-sectional studies are available that investigated the relationship 
between ToM and psychotic symptoms or antipsychotics.  Greig, Bryson and Bell 
(2004) measured ToM using the Hinting Task (Corcoran et al., 1995) where 
participants were asked to infer the real intentions behind people’s speech.  They 
reported that patients diagnosed with disorganised schizophrenia performed 
significantly more poorly than the other patients with schizophrenia.  They also 
found that ToM performance was correlated with the PANSS positive, negative, 
and delusion scores, and even more highly correlated with measures of thought 
disorder.  In Mizrahi et al. (2007), ToM performance was correlated with PANSS 
negative, general, and total scores, but not with PANSS positive score.  Shamay-
Tsoory et al. (2007) measured affective and cognitive ToM separately.  They found 
that affective ToM was associated with negative symptoms whereas cognitive ToM 
was associated with positive symptomatology.  These findings suggest that ToM 
performance is associated with general psychiatric symptoms, but more strongly 
with negative and thought disorder than positive symptoms.  
Two studies have analysed the relationship between ToM performance and 
delusions in particular.  Bömmer and Brüne (2006) compared ToM task 
performance among fully remitted, partly remitted and acutely delusional patients 
and found no group differences, suggesting that ToM is not specifically related to 
severity of delusions.  However, Corcoran et al. (2008) found that current paranoid 
status predicted performance on the ToM stories task but not performance on the 
false-belief picture-sequencing task.  More specifically, performance on the stories 
task correlated with delusional preoccupation and distress (but not conviction), 
whereas there was no correlation between symptomatology and the picture-
sequencing task performance.  Therefore, different measures of ToM may be more 
or less sensitive to indices of severity of delusions and diagnosis. 
Savina and Beninger (2007) compared performance on first and second 
order belief tasks and the faux-pas test among psychotic patients (77 with 
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schizophrenia and seven with schizoaffective disorder) on different types of 
antipsychotics (i.e. Typicals, Clozapine, Olanzapine, and Risperidone).  Mean score 
on the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (Overall & Gorham, 1962) was highest for the 
Clozapine group and lowest for the Typicals and Olanzapine groups with the 
Risperidone group in between.  They found that the Olanzapine and Clozapine 
groups performed similarly to controls in the ToM tasks, while patients on ‘typical’ 
antipsychotics and Risperidone had poorer performance.  Results stayed the same 
after co-varying out psychotic symptom scores.  The authors argued that ToM 
performance is influenced by the type of antipsychotics patients are taking.  With 
the caveat that medication groups were not randomly assigned in this study, the 
effect of different types of antipsychotics on ToM still warrants direct investigation 
using a randomised design.  All in all, Savina and Beninger (2007) and Mizrahi et 
al. (2007) offered some evidence that ToM improves with antipsychotic treatment. 
In summary, the relationship between reasoning processes and psychosis is 
complex.  Some cross-sectional studies have shown that severity of positive 
psychotic symptoms is associated with attributional style, whereas severity of 
negative and disorganisation symptoms are associated with ToM.  Belief flexibility 
is mainly associated with the delusional state, whereas JTC has been shown to be 
both a relatively stable trait and exacerbated with delusional state.  However, the 




In this review, we attempt to bring together the two disparate worlds of the 
biological-antipsychotic and the psychological-reasoning perspectives of psychosis, 
by investigating how reasoning biases change during treatment and symptom 
recovery.  The reasoning biases that have been proposed to be related to the 
development and maintenance of psychosis are JTC, belief inflexibility, 
attributional style and ToM.  Key findings of this review are as follows.  Different 
reasoning processes are related to different symptoms of psychosis.  JTC and belief 
flexibility are closely related to severity of delusions, whereas theory of mind is less 
related to positive symptoms of psychosis than with negative symptoms and 
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disorganisation.  Attributional style has a less clear-cut relationship with psychosis 
specifically, with studies using explicit measures showing a non-specific 
relationship with overall psychopathology (i.e. delusions and depression).  In terms 
of stability over time and changes in response to treatment, there is some evidence 
that belief flexibility and ToM improve with symptom remission.  JTC does not 
change in the majority of the studies, and the data for attributional style are mixed.   
Some methodological issues should be noted.  While a large number of 
studies (28 articles generated using the current search terms) have studied reasoning 
biases in psychosis – relatively few could be included. The major reason for 
exclusion was that the majority of the studies have considered schizophrenia as a 
homogenous group and provided no information on psychosis severity.  This is a 
major drawback in the field and should be addressed in future studies by evaluating 
and reporting multidimensional symptom severity.  To study whether reasoning 
biases normalise with antipsychotics, the ideal design would be the longitudinal 
assessment of drug-naïve patients being randomised to different treatment 
conditions.  None of the studies in this review has used such a design.  Longitudinal 
studies available are essentially naturalistic, and are able only indirectly to inform 
us on the association between change of reasoning and improvement of psychosis.  
Recent discussions on mediation analysis and causation analysis have specified 
strategies for designing studies for investigating direct and mediating relationships 
between variables (Gennetian, Magnuson, & Morris, 2008; MacKinnon, 2008), 
which would inform future studies on reasoning and psychosis. 
Studies that measured different dimensions of psychotic symptoms (e.g. 
conviction, distress, disruption to life, preoccupation) (Freeman et al., 2008; Garety 
et al., 2005) have found that some reasoning processes such as JTC and belief 
flexibility are specifically associated with delusion conviction.  Therefore, it is 
likely that some reasoning processes may be related to specific dimensions of 
psychotic symptoms rather than to overall severity of symptoms, as reflected on 
uni-dimensional measures of psychosis like PANSS and Brief Psychiatric Rating 
Scale.  Future research using a longitudinal design and both uni-dimensional and 
multi-dimensional measures of psychosis will be better able to delineate the role 
reasoning plays in symptom improvement and in psychological experience of the 
symptoms. 
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Despite the limitations of the foregoing literature, the review has three major 
implications.  First, it shows that reasoning biases are distinct and separable, with 
some (e.g. JTC) likely as fixed ‘trait’ variables, and others (e.g. belief flexibility) as 
potential mediating variables which may be relevant in symptom improvement.  
Second, the review highlights that despite a large number of overall studies, few 
record symptom severity.  Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, it raises the 
possibility that antipsychotic effect on symptoms may be mediated via effects on 
intervening reasoning biases such as ‘belief flexibility’.  Clearly there is insufficient 
data to be conclusive about this.  Nonetheless, the possibility that a psychological 
construct may mediate a drug induced symptomatic improvement is of significant 
interest – as it provides a point of contact between biological and psychological 
theories of psychosis, and also provides a practical rationale for additive and 
synergistic combination of these treatments.  Since both the antipsychotic and 
psychological modalities of treatment are likely to be further developed in the 
future – it is important that we understand how the two relate to each other, and also 
how the improvements induced by both antipsychotics and cognitive-behavioural 
treatments relate to the more ubiquitous cognitive deficits of the illness.  We hope 
that other researchers will examine and test this possibility more rigorously in future 
studies. 
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Preface to the empirical studies 
As discussed in this literature review and the introductory chapter, 
psychological processes including ‘jumping to conclusions’ (JTC) bias, lack of 
belief flexibility (BF), and negative affect are important in the development and 
persistence of delusions.  However, what is not known is how these processes 
change with treatment.  This thesis consists of a series of linked studies, using three 
samples of patients with delusions, which investigate how delusions and reasoning 
change over time and in response to antipsychotic treatment.  Study 1 will examine 
the differential changes in dimensions of delusions, affect and reasoning biases over 
eight weeks of antipsychotic treatment (N = 40).  Study 2 will examine the factor 
structure of and longitudinal relationship between delusional conviction, JTC and 
BF over 12 months, while patients were on antipsychotics with or without 
psychological intervention (N = 273).  Study 3, using experience sampling method 
and validated clinical measures, will assess moment-by-moment fluctuations and 
temporal changes in delusional dimensions, affect, BF and aberrant salience in 16 
patients over the first two weeks of antipsychotic treatment. 
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Chapter 3 
Study 1: Change in delusional dimensions, JTC, 
belief flexibility and emotions in the first eight weeks 
of antipsychotic treatment 
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3.1 Introduction 
Traditionally, delusions have been thought of as unchanging and persistent 
(Frances, First, & Pincus, 2005; Jaspers, 1963; Mullen, 1979).  However, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, research in the last two decades or more has shown that 
delusions consist of several dimensions or characteristics which may change 
independently over time and in response to treatment.  Although studies in this area 
have varied in the number of delusional dimensions and scales used, the major 
dimensions identified have recurrently consisted of conviction, distress, 
preoccupation and disruption to life (Garety & Hemsley, 1987; Lincoln, 2007; 
Peters et al., 2004).  This study aimed to investigate these four dimensions using 
both self-reported and interview-based assessments. 
A small number of studies, most of which were of psychological 
intervention with delusions, have reported changes in delusional dimensions over 
time.  Many of these studies were small single case series during the course of 
cognitive therapy (eight participants in Hole et al. (1979), nine in Brett-Jones et al. 
(1987), six in Chadwick and Lowe (1990), 12 in Chadwick and Lowe (1994), and 
six in Sharp et al. (1996)).  Although limited by small sample sizes, these studies 
suggested a lack of co-variation between delusional dimensions during the course of 
psychological intervention. 
How delusional dimensions respond to antipsychotics – the first-line 
treatment for psychosis – is under-researched.  Since antipsychotic response begins 
in the first week of treatment (Agid et al., 2003) and early response to medication 
predicts subsequent outcome (Correll et al., 2003), changes in the first few weeks of 
treatment are critical.  The only study to date that investigated early changes of 
psychotic dimensions in response to antipsychotic treatment was Mizrahi et al. 
(2006).  They suggested that, over the first few weeks of treatment, antipsychotics 
rapidly reduce the behavioural impact of and preoccupation with the principal 
psychotic symptom, without greatly altering the patients’ conviction in or 
perspective about their psychotic experience.  Nevertheless, this study measured 
‘principal psychotic experience’ rather than delusions and used the Dimensions of 
Psychosis Instrument (DIPI; Mizrahi et al., 2006), which is not a commonly used 
scale for delusional dimensions.  Using multiple established assessment measures, 
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the present study aims to investigate changes in delusional dimensions over eight 
weeks after initiation of antipsychotic treatment, and to explore further Mizrahi et 
al.’s (2006) suggestion of a ‘selective’ effect of antipsychotics on psychotic 
dimensions. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there is abundant evidence supporting the 
association between delusions and reasoning biases, namely “jumping to 
conclusions” (JTC) and a lack of belief flexibility (BF).  It has been shown that a 
lack of BF is closely related to the delusional state and is likely to improve with 
symptom remission, whereas JTC may be a trait factor associated with propensity 
for delusions, which is exacerbated in acute states of psychotic delusions (see 
Chapter 2; So et al., 2010).  However, the empirical literature on psychosis and 
reasoning largely rests on cross-sectional studies with patients with chronic 
psychosis.  There have been no longitudinal studies on the stability of BF, and only 
a few on JTC.  Therefore, how cognitive processes change in the early stage of 
antipsychotic treatment is still unknown.  The present study is the first to examine 
changes in JTC and BF in the early stages of antipsychotic treatment.   
Apart from JTC and lack of BF, “Beckian thinking biases” (e.g. 
catastrophising, emotion-based reasoning, dichotomous thinking, etc.) have been 
shown to be present in patients with psychosis, and are targeted in interventions 
such as cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) and metacognitive training (Moritz & 
Woodward, 2007).  The Cognitive Biases Questionnaire for Psychosis (CBQ-P; 
Peters et al., 2010) was designed to provide a reliable and efficient way of 
measuring five common cognitive biases associated with delusions.  The present 
study explores changes in appraisals and thinking biases among patients with acute 
delusions over eight weeks of antipsychotic treatment. 
Negative affect, especially depression and anxiety, has been shown to play a 
role in the development and maintenance of delusions (see Chapter 1).  It has been 
suggested that delusions reflect the emotional state of the individual, and that 
delusional distress is associated with emotional processes such as worry (Freeman 
et al., 2001; Freeman & Garety, 1999; Green et al., 2006).  However, it remains 
unclear whether negative affect improves together with delusional dimensions in 
response to antipsychotic treatment.  In the present study, we aimed to investigate 
changes in delusional dimensions, JTC bias, BF and emotions in the early phase of 
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antipsychotic treatment in patients with delusions.  The key research questions of 
the study were: (a) What is the impact of antipsychotic medication on dimensions 
of delusions over time? (b) What reasoning and emotional processes are involved in 
the antipsychotic-induced recovery process?  And (c) What are the predictors of 
symptomatic improvement? 
 
3.2 Study hypotheses 
The major hypotheses were as follows: 
1. Delusional distress, preoccupation and disruption will reduce before 
delusional conviction 
2. Depression, anxiety and subjective distress will reduce alongside 
improvements in delusional dimensions 
3. Belief flexibility, but not JTC, will improve with antipsychotics 




 Ethical approval for the study was granted by the Camden and Islington 
Community Research Ethics Committee (ref. 08/H0722/76) and a copy of the 
approval letter is included in Appendix 1.  The sample consisted of adult patients 
recruited from three in-patient acute wards in the South London and Maudsley 
(SLaM) National Health Services Foundation Trust, one of which was specifically 
for patients early in the course of psychosis.  Inclusion criteria are as follows: age 
15-65 years, case note diagnosis of a psychotic disorder (schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder, delusional disorder, schizophreniform disorder), current 
experience of delusions, having been prescribed with any type of antipsychotics for 
less than four weeks, and having been drug-naïve or drug-free for at least a month 
prior to admission.  Sufficient understanding of English was required to complete 
the study procedures.  Patients with drug-induced psychosis, organic psychosis or a 
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primary diagnosis of substance misuse were excluded, as their psychopathology 
might be different from other non-organic psychoses. 
 The sample size (N = 40) was based both on a statistical power calculation 
and with reference to previous studies.  In a study similar to this, Mizrahi et al. 
(2006) found significant decreases in dimensions of psychosis in 17 patients.  
However, the present study tested multiple hypotheses, many of which exploratory.  
Therefore, a sample size of at least double that used in Mizrahi et al. (2006) was 
selected, to increase statistical power.  Furthermore, Peters et al. (1999) found that 
patients with delusions had baseline scores of approximately 74 on delusional 
distress and 88 on delusional conviction on the Peters et al.’s Delusions Inventory, 
with an average standard deviation of approximately 40.  It would be expected that, 
after eight weeks of antipsychotic treatment, distress would reduce by about 20 
points and conviction approximately ten points (cf. Mizarhi et al., 2006), hence a 
differential effect size of 0.6.  Based on these data, using a significance level of 0.05 
and expecting a power of 95% to reject the null hypothesis, at least 32 participants 
would be required.  Assuming 15-20% of participants drop-out, the aim was to 
recruit 40 participants in this study.   
 
3.3.2 Measures 
 Copies of all measures are included in Appendix 3. 
3.3.2.1 Clinical symptom ratings 
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) (Kay et al., 1987, 
2000).  PANSS is a 30-item, 7-point (1-7) rating scale developed for assessing 
phenomena associated with schizophrenia.  Potential total scores range from 30 to 
210.  Symptoms over the past week are rated.  PANSS has four scores: positive 
(seven items), negative (seven items), general psychopathology (16 items), and total 
(30 items).  It has been reported that each item within the positive and negative 
scales correlates strongly within the scale total (Kay et al., 1987), and that inter-
rater reliability is between 0.83 and 0.87 for the four scales (Kay, Opler, & 
Lindenmayer, 1988).  PANSS is widely used in treatment studies and is considered 
the ‘gold standard’ measure in efficacy studies of antipsychotic medication 
(Rabinowitz, Mehnert, & Eerdekens, 2006).  See Appendix 3 (p. 271) for the scale 
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items. 
Clinical Global Impressions (CGI) (Guy, 1976).  CGI describes a 
patient’s overall clinical state as a global impression by the rater.  It consists of a 
severity of illness item (“Considering your total clinical experience with this 
particular population, how ill is the patient at this time?”) and a global improvement 
item (“Compared to his/her condition at admission to the hospital, how much has 
the patient changed?”).  Clinical impression on the day of assessment is rated.  The 
severity score ranges from 1 (normal/not ill) to 7 (among the most extremely ill 
patients), and the improvement score ranges from 1 (very much improved) to 7 
(very much worse).  Despite its brevity, CGI is considered to provide more readily 
understood clinical information than PANSS (Nierenberg & DeCecco, 2002).  In 
this study, CGI was rated by the psychiatrist in charge of the day-to-day care of the 
participant.  See Appendix 3 (p. 263) for the CGI items. 
3.3.2.2 Dimensions of delusions  
Three measures, one interviewer-rated and two self-report, were included to 
assess the most important variables in this study – delusional dimensions.  
Psychotic Symptom Rating Scale (PSYRATS) (Haddock et al., 
1999).  PSYRATS is a semi-structured interview measuring psychological 
dimensions of hallucinations and delusions.  The auditory hallucinations scale has 
11 items (including frequency, intensity, duration, distress, negative content, 
disruption and beliefs about origin and control), and the delusions scale has six 
items (including conviction, distress, preoccupation, and disruption to life).  The 
items are rated by the interviewer on a 0-4 ordinal scale.  Potential total scores 
range from 0 to 44 for the auditory hallucinations scale, and from 0 to 24 for the 
delusions scale.  High inter-rater reliability estimates of the two subscales have been 
reported (Haddock et al., 1999), and the PSYRATS scales have been used as 
outcome measures in clinical trials aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of 
psychological interventions for psychosis (Durham et al., 2003; Garety et al., 2008; 
Lewis et al., 2002).  Since symptom dimensions can change independently during 
therapy (Brett-Jones et al., 1987; Chadwick & Lowe, 1994), and there is a need for 
reliable factors reflecting the symptom dimensions, it is preferable to report the 
PSYRATS data with reference to key single items of relevance to particular 
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research questions (as well as the total cumulative scores) (Freeman et al., 2004; 
Steel et al., 2007).  See Appendix 3 (p. 272) for the PSYRATS items. 
Personal Questionnaire (PQ) (Shapiro, 1961).  PQ is a technique that 
measures changes in psychological experiences using the patient’s own words, and 
allows for comparisons between different variables within the same patient (Shapiro, 
1961).  A different personal questionnaire is constructed for each patient so that the 
questionnaire reflects the idiosyncratic nature of the patient’s experience.  The PQ 
technique has been used in other studies that have investigated changes in 
delusional dimensions (Brett-Jones et al., 1987; Chadwick & Lowe, 1990, 1994; 
Garety, 1985; Sharp et al., 1996). 
In the first interview, the statements in PQ were jointly decided between the 
participant and the interviewer.  For example, for the ‘distress’ item, the interviewer 
discussed with the participants how they would describe their emotional reaction to 
the delusional belief (X).  The wording that participants chose was then 
incorporated into the question and used in subsequent assessments: “When thinking 
about X I feel distressed/angry/fearful/worried/restless/frustrated, etc”.  For each of 
the four dimensions (conviction, distress, preoccupation, and disruption to life), 
participants were asked to choose from five statements which represent varied 
levels of intensity, and were scored from 0 to 4.  For example, for disruption to life, 
4 – “X affects my life completely”; 3 – “X affects my life greatly”; 2 – “X affects 
my life quite a bit”; 1 – “X affects only some parts of my life”; and 0 – “X doesn’t 
affect my life (anymore)”.  See Appendix 3 (p. 270) for the PQ items. 
Visual analogue scale (VAS).  Using the same wordings as in PQ, the 
participant was asked to rate the intensity of each of the four delusional dimensions 
on a 0-100 visual analogue scale.  For example, “How strongly do you believe in 
X?”, “To what extent do you feel angry when thinking about X?”  While both PQ 
and VAS share the same items and are sensitive to the idiosyncratic nature of the 
individual’s delusions, VAS provides a continuous measure of the dimensions and 
has a broader range of ratings.  See Appendix 3 (p. 270) for the VAS items. 
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3.3.2.3 Reasoning 
Belief Maintenance section of the Maudsley Assessment of 
Delusions Schedule (MADS) (Wessely et al., 1993; Taylor et al., 1994).  
The complete MADS has eight sections and is an in-depth standardised interview 
covering various aspects of delusional phenomenology and action, including 
conviction, belief maintenance, affect, action, preoccupation, systematisation, and 
insight.  The belief maintenance section of MADS enquires about the evidence for 
the delusion, and two of its items have been used to measure aspects of belief 
flexibility (the possibility of being mistaken [PM], and the reaction to hypothetical 
contradiction [RTHC]).  These items were originally devised by Brett-Jones et al. 
(1987) to assign change over time in single cases, and have been used in more 
recent studies (Garety et al., 2005; Freeman et al., 2004).  The evidence for the 
delusion cited by participants is discussed sensitively, and they are asked whether it 
is at all possible for them to be mistaken about their delusional belief.  The 
interviewer then asks how they would react in a hypothetical situation if some new 
evidence were to be generated which contradicts the delusion.  If they report that 
this would alter their belief in any way, this is recorded as belief flexibility, each 
item scored dichotomously (yes/no).  MADS has very good inter-rater reliability 
(Wessely et al., 1993), and kappas for these two items have been reported as 
excellent (PM: kappa = 0.91; and RTHC kappa = 0.90).  See Appendix 3 (p. 269) 
for the scale items. 
Cognitive Biases Questionnaire for Psychosis (CBQ-P) (Peters 
et al., 2010).  CBQ-P was designed to measure respondents’ misinterpretation of 
events, or thinking biases.  These include dichotomous thinking, emotional 
reasoning, catastrophising, intentionalising and jumping-to-conclusions.  CBQ-P 
consists of 30 items, each describing a hypothetical scenario in day-to-day life, half 
of which relate to ‘threatening events’, and the other half to ‘anomalous 
perceptions’.  Respondents are asked to choose from a list of three explanations as 
to why that scenario happened, which are scored as 1 (absence of bias), 2 (presence 
of bias with some qualification), or 3 (presence of bias).  The potential range of 
scores is between 15 and 90.  In a pilot study with patients with psychosis and 
depression, as well as healthy participants, CBQ-P showed good internal 
consistency (α = 0.89), test-retest reliability (r = 0.92), and criterion validity (Peters 
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et al., 2010).  See Appendix 3 (p. 264) for the scale items. 
Beads task (Garety, Hemsley, & Wessely, 1991).  The beads task 
was designed to examine individuals’ data-gathering reasoning style (Garety et al., 
1991; Phillips & Edwards, 1966).  In the beads task, individuals are presented with 
two jars, each containing 100 coloured beads.  In one (easy) version there are 85 
beads of one colour (e.g. black) and 15 beads of another (e.g. yellow) in one jar, 
while the other jar contains beads in opposite proportions (i.e. 15 black and 85 
yellow).  In a more difficult version the proportion of the different coloured beads 
are changed from 85:15 to 60:40 (Dudley et al., 1997a).  The jars are then removed 
from view.  Upon request from the participant, beads are presented, one at a time, 
from one of the jars in a seemingly random (but in fact predetermined) order.  All 
the beads drawn are replaced so the proportions of the coloured beads stay the same.  
Participants can view as many beads as they want until they decide with certainty 
from which jar the beads are drawn.  The key variable is the number of beads 
requested before making a decision, with two beads or fewer classified as a 
‘jumping to conclusions’ bias (Garety et al., 2005).  In this study, the harder 60:40 
version (i.e. 60 beads of one colour and 40 of another colour in a jar) was used, 
since it is more sensitive to change than the easy version.  The beads task was 
presented on a laptop computer.  In order to minimise memory load on the 
participants, an array of the previously drawn beads was shown throughout the task 
(as in Dudley et al., 1997a). 
Cards task (Linney & Peters, 2007).  This task was used to assess 
specific core beliefs by looking at participants' appraisals of a real-life anomalous 
experience (i.e. a card trick).  This trick was adapted from a task that is available on 
the Internet (http://sprott.physics.wisc.edu/pickover/esp2.html). In this 
computerised task, the participants are shown six playing cards (all face cards), 
from which they are asked to choose one and commit it to memory.  They are then 
told that the card they have chosen would be selected and removed from the pile.  
Once they have pressed a key to continue, they are briefly shown a series of five 
cards (also all face cards).  This trick relies on the fact that people only scan for the 
card they have chosen and do not notice that all the cards are different. 
Following the presentation of the card trick, the participants are initially 
asked an open-ended question about their explanation of the task (in order to avoid 
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priming): “Why do you think it happened?”.  They are then asked to rate their 
conviction on a visual analogue scale (0-100) for six probed explanations 
characterising different beliefs.  While the explanations originally used in Linney 
and Peters (2007) focused on mind permeability, the card trick task included six 
new questions in this study, tapping into appraisals of mind permeability, 
persecution, intentionality, and personalisation.  See Appendix 3 (p. 262) for the 
questions.  Participants are asked to rate how much they believe in each of the 
explanations, and whether they think the explanations apply to them only or to 
everybody else. 
3.3.2.4 Emotion 
Beck Depression Inventory – II (BDI-II) (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 
1996).  BDI-II is a 21-item self-report inventory that assesses symptoms of 
depression.  The symptom content of BDI-II reflects the diagnostic criteria for 
major depressive disorders that are described in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders – IV (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 
1994).  Participants are asked to rate for the past week.  Each item is scored on a 
four-point scale (0-3).  Scores can range from 0 to 63, with higher scores reflecting 
greater symptom severity (0 to 13 = no to minimal depression, 14 to 19 = mild 
depression, 20 to 28 = moderate depression, and > 29 = severe depression) (Beck et 
al., 1996).  BDI-II has been found to demonstrate high internal consistency (α = 
0.92 to 0.93), adequate validity and diagnostic discrimination (Beck et al., 1996).  
See Appendix 3 (p. 261) for the BDI-II items. 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) (Beck et al., 1988).  BAI is a 21-item 
measure designed to assess the severity of self-reported physiological manifestation 
of anxiety.  Each item describes a common symptom of anxiety.  On a four point 
scale ranging from 0 (“not at all”) to 3 (“severely – I could barely stand it”), the 
respondent is asked to rate how much he/she has been bothered by each symptom 
over the past week.  The total score ranges from 0 to 63.  Beck et al. (1988) 
reported a high internal consistency (α = 0.92) and satisfactory test-retest reliability 
(correlation = 0.75, df = 81).  Item-total correlations ranged from 0.30 to 0.71 
(median = 0.60).  See Appendix 3 (p. 260) for the BAI items. 
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Subjective Unit of Distress Scale (SUDS).  SUDS provides a quick 
and straightforward subjective measure of mood states.  At each interview in this 
study, participants were asked “How upset have you been in the last week?”.  They 
were asked to rate the intensity of their emotion on a 0-100 visual analogue scale.  
Caution was taken to present the SUDS question separately from the discussion of 
the delusion, so that it tapped into general subjective distress rather than delusional 
distress.  See Appendix 3 (p. 278) for the SUDS item. 
 
3.3.3 Procedures 
Table 3.1.  
Timetable of assessment  
Variables  Measures Week 0 Week 1 Week 2 Week 4 Week 8 
PANSS *  * * * Symptom 
ratings 
CGI *  * * * 
PSYRATS * * * * * 
PQ * * * * * 
Dimensions 
of delusions 
VAS * * * * * 
MADS *   * * 
CBQ-P *   * * 
Beads task *    * 
Reasoning 
 
Cards task *    * 
BDI *   * * 
BAI *   * * 
Emotion 
SUDS * * * * * 
 Consenting participants were interviewed by the same researcher five times 
over a period of eight weeks (week 0, week 1, week 2, week 4, and week 8).  The 
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first interview took place as soon as patients were admitted to the hospital, and 
within one month of the start of antipsychotic treatment.   
In order not to over-burden the patients, not all measures were included at 
all assessment time points (see Table 3.1).  Delusional dimensions and subjective 
distress were assessed at all time points as they are central to the key hypotheses.  
Symptom ratings were included at week 0, week 2, week 4, and week 8 in order to 
capture the potentially rapid change in the first few weeks.  Questionnaires on 
reasoning and emotions were completed at a four-week interval as they were 
expected to change less quickly, whereas experimental tasks were included in the 
first and last interviews only. 
Most of the measures were incorporated into systematic clinical interviews, 
whereas questionnaires (BDI-II, BAI, and CBQ-P) were completed by the 
participants on their own with guidance from the interviewer if necessary.  The 
interviews began with symptom ratings and ended with less distressing tasks such 
as the CBQ-P and Cards task.  The interviews lasted from 30 minutes to 1.5 hours 
each; breaks were given when necessary.  Flexibility was given to the duration and 
content of the interviews, depending on the mental state of the participants.  £10 per 
interview hour was given to the participants as remuneration for their time. 
 
3.4 Statistical analysis 
 Statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS 15.0 for Windows (SPSS, 
2006).  Due to the intensive nature of the study not all participants were able or 
willing to complete all assessment time points.  Twenty nine participants (72.5%) 
attended all five interviews, four (10.0%) attended four interviews, five (12.5%) 
attended three interviews and two (5.0%) attended one interview.  There were no 
differences (p > .05) in age, baseline symptom scores, or reasoning variables 
between the completers and those who had missing data.  Missing values were dealt 
with in different ways for different hypotheses in this study (see below).   
For hypothesis 1 (modelling the effect of time, delusional dimensions and 
their interaction) and hypothesis 2 (examining changes of emotion measures), a 
mixed model for repeated measures (Twisk, 2006) was used.  For each research 
question a series of models were tested and their model fit indices were compared.  
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The model with the lowest Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz’s 
Bayesian Criterion (BIC) was chosen as the best model.  The mixed model 
approach was used because: (a) it includes fixed and random effects of modelling; 
(b) it models the effect of time as a continuous predictor, which is of importance as 
participants were assessed at irregular intervals; (c) it can handle unbalanced 
datasets (e.g. when missing values appear in some but not all dimensions within 
each individual); and (d) it allows a flexible way to model the correlation of 
errors.  The mixed model method makes use of all the data available in the whole 
sample (N = 40).  In the current dataset, residuals for all delusional dimensions and 
time points are normally distributed, hence mixed modelling is suitable.   
For examining changes in repeated measures of dichotomous variables (i.e. 
JTC and BF), the McNemar and Cochran Q tests are recommended for analysing 
changes between two and more than two time points respectively (Bryman & 
Cramer, 2005).  Only individuals with complete data at all time points for the 
particular variable were included in the analysis.  Since missing values occurred in 
different variables at different time points, the sample size for each analysis, table 
and figure are stated clearly. 
Three measures of delusional dimensions were included in this study – 
PSYRATS, PQ and VAS.  Since results on changes in delusional dimensions were 
consistent across measures, the analyses reported in the results section pertain to 
one measure only for the sake of succinctness.  VAS was chosen as it is more 
sensitive to the idiosyncratic nature of individuals’ delusions, provides a continuous 
measure, and has the greatest range of ratings.  Similar analyses were conducted for 
the other two measures, and are reported in Appendix 4.   
Regression analyses were used to investigate the relationship between 
baseline reasoning biases and change in conviction. 
 
3.5 Results 
A total of 81 patients who presented with current delusions and had taken 
antipsychotics for less than a month were approached, but 41 declined to participate 
in the study.  Therefore, a total of 40 consented participants were included in this 
study.  
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3.5.1 Demographic and clinical data 
Sixty-two percent (n = 25) of the sample was female and the mean age was 
32.2 years (range 18 to 62).  The sample was drawn from the following ethnic 
groups: White British (12.5%), White Irish (7.5%), White other (2.5%), Black 
African (25%), Black Caribbean (17.5%), Black other (2.5%), Mixed (22.5%), 
Asian (5%), Chinese (2.5%) and Other (2.5%).  The major psychiatric diagnoses 
were Schizophrenia (25.0%), Bipolar affective disorder (20.0%), Psychosis (17.5%), 
Schizoaffective disorder (10.0%), Acute and transient psychotic disorder (10.0%), 
Depression with psychotic features (10.0%), Delusional disorder (5.0%) and 
Schizophreniform disorder (2.5%).  They had an average of 2.4 admissions for 
psychosis (SD = 2.73, range 1-15).  Twenty six patients (65%) were admitted for 
their first episode of psychosis.   
Eight participants (20.5%) had not started antipsychotic treatment when they 
were interviewed, and 27 participants (69.2%) had received antipsychotic treatment 
for less than 14 days.  On average, patients were assessed 5.90 days (range 0-27) 
after the beginning of their antipsychotic treatment.  The majority of the participants 
(92.3%) were on atypical antipsychotics (Olanzapine, Risperidone, Aripiprazole, 
Amisulpiride, and Quetiapine); one (2.56%) was on a typical antipsychotic 
(Trifluoperazine) and two (5.13%) were on both typical and atypical antipsychotics.  
The mean starting dose of antipsychotics in chlorpromazine equivalents (Andreasen 
et al., 2010) was 195.6mg/day (SD = 119.1). 
 Although PANSS (Kay et al., 1987) and CGI (Guy, 1976) were both 
measured, only the PANSS data will be reported here due to a high percentage of 
missing values in the CGI: 37.5% (week 0), 57.5% (week 2), 70% (week 4), 77.5% 
(week 8). 
Table 3.2 
Mean (SD) PANSS total and positive scores at different time points 
 PANSS total score PANSS positive score 
Week 0 (n= 40) 69.30 (17.78) 21.75 (5.40) 
Week 2 (n= 38) 54.32 (15.09) 16.08 (4.81) 
Week 4 (n= 31) 54.29 (15.96) 15.71 (5.31) 
Week 8 (n= 33) 51.70 (20.19) 13.45 (4.57) 
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The PANSS scores (Kay et al., 1987) are shown in Table 3.2.  According to 
Leucht et al. (2005b), the mean PANSS total score at baseline (69.30) would be 
considered as “mildly ill” to “moderately ill”, while the mean PANSS total score at 
week 8 (51.70) would be considered as “borderline mentally ill” to “mildly ill”.  
 Most individuals showed a decline in the PANSS scores over eight weeks.  
However, among the 33 individuals who completed PANSS at both week 0 and 
week 8, only five (15.2%) showed a >50% reduction in the PANSS total score, and 
11 (33.3%) showed a 25-50% reduction, – i.e. a total of 16 (48.5%) showed a 
reduction of at least 25%, while ten (30.3%) reduced by 5-24%, four (12.1%) had a 
decrease or increase of <5%, two (6.1%) increased in the PANSS total score by 5-
24%, and one (3.0%) increased by ≥25%.  According to Leucht et al. (2005b), the 
average change in the PANSS total score (n = 33, mean = -17.27, SD = 19.05) over 
eight weeks would be considered as less than “minimally improved”.  For the 
PANSS positive score, eight individuals (24.2%) showed a >50% reduction over 
eight weeks, 14 (42.4%) showed a 25-50% reduction, eight (24.2%) reduced by 5-
24%, two (6.1%) had a decrease or increase of <5%, none increased by 5-24%, and 
one (3.0%) increased by ≥25%. 
 Paired-sample t-tests were used to compare change in the PANSS scores in 
the first two weeks and that in the next two weeks.  The percentage change of the 
PANSS positive score in the first two weeks (mean = -6.25%, SD = 8.78%) was 
significantly greater than the percentage change of the PANSS positive score in the 
next two weeks (mean = -1.55%, SD = 7.51%) (t = -2.00, df = 30, p = .05).  The 
difference between percentage change in the PANSS total score in the first two 
weeks (mean = -14.54%, SD = 24.18%) and that in the second two weeks (mean = -
2.22%, SD = 23.13%) did not reach statistical significance (t = -1.66, df = 30, p 
= .11).  
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3.5.2 Hypothesis 1: Delusional distress, preoccupation and 
impact on functioning will reduce before delusional 
conviction 
3.5.2.1 Delusional dimensions at each time point 
 Mean scores of delusional dimensions on VAS at different time points are 
shown in Figure 3.1.  Pearson correlations of the four dimensions at each time point 
are shown in Table 3.3. 
 As shown in Table 3.3, delusional dimensions at each time point were 
correlated with each other, and especially strongly at the later time points.  At week 
0, all dimensions were correlated (p < .05) except for Preoccupation and Disruption.  
At week 1, all dimensions were correlated (p < .05) except for Conviction and 
Distress.  From week 2 onwards, all dimensions were significantly correlated with 
each other (p < .01).   
 
Figure 3.1 
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Table 3.3 
Pearson correlations of delusional dimensions at each time point 
  Week 0 (n = 36) 
  Conviction Preoccupation Distress Disruption 
Week 0 Conviction 1    




















  Week 1 (n = 34) 
  Conviction Preoccupation Distress Disruption 
Week 1 Conviction 1    




















  Week 2 (n = 35) 
  Conviction Preoccupation Distress Disruption 
Week 2 Conviction 1    




















  Week 4 (n = 29) 
  Conviction Preoccupation Distress Disruption 
Week 4 Conviction 1    
 Preoccupation 0.73 1   
    83 
p<.01  















  Week 8 (n = 32) 
  Conviction Preoccupation Distress Disruption 
Week 8 Conviction 1    




















3.5.2.2 Changes in delusional dimensions 
 Using the maximum likelihood method, the effects of Time and Dimension, 
and the Time x Dimension interaction on the VAS scores were tested in a linear 
mixed model (AIC = 6323.38, BIC = 6417.75).  There was a significant effect of 
Time (F = 9.22, df = 1, p < .01) and Dimension (F = 8.87, df = 3. p < .01).  
However, the Time x Dimension interaction effect was not significant (F = 1.08, df 
= 3, p = .36).  Therefore, the interaction effect was removed and a second model 
with the effects of Time and Dimension on the VAS scores was tested.  The model 
fit indices of the second model (AIC = 6320.60, BIC = 6401.48) indicated a better 
fit of the data.  Again, the effects of Time (F = 9.01, df = 1, p < .01) and Dimension 
(F = 10.57, df = 3, p < .01) were both significant.  In order to check whether the 
effect of Time is non-linear, a third model with the effects of Dimension, Time, and 
a quadratic term of time (squared Time) was tested.  The model fit indices of the 
third model (AIC = 6313.10, BIC = 6398.48) indicated a better fit of the data than 
the previous two models.  In this model, the effects of Time (F = 15.79, df = 1, p 
< .01), Squared Time (F = 10.00, df = 1, p < .01), and Dimension (F = 10.55, df = 
3, p < .01) were all significant.  In other words, all dimensions declined over time, 
and the reduction became smaller over time.  There was a significant difference 
between dimensions but there was no interaction between dimensions and time.  
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Therefore, the hypothesis that delusional conviction reduces more slowly or to a 
lesser degree than the other dimensions, was not supported.  
 Pair-wise comparisons between dimensions were tested based on estimated 
marginal means in the same model (i.e. the third model).  With Bonferroni 
adjustment for multiple comparisons, level of Conviction was significantly higher 
than Preoccupation (difference = 13.715, SE = 2.534, df = 164.978, p < .01) and 
Distress (difference = 8.04, SE = 2.78, df = 166.01, p = .03), and was comparable 
with Disruption (difference = 4.81, SE = 2.62, df = 166.08, p = .40). 
3.5.2.3 Does early change in delusional dimensions predict 
subsequent change? 
 Linear regression was performed to test whether change in delusional 
dimensions in the first two weeks predicts change in delusional dimensions over 
eight weeks, using all available data in the whole sample (N = 40).  Percentage 
change in the first two weeks predicted percentage change over eight weeks for 
Conviction (B = 0.81, SE = 0.17, p < .01) and Preoccupation (B = 0.14, SE = 0.03, p 
< .01), but not Distress (p = .36) or Disruption (p = .44).  Percentage change in the 
first week predicted percentage change over eight weeks in three delusional 
dimensions: Preoccupation (B = 0.47, SE = 0.20, p = .03), Distress (B = 0.47, SE = 
0.15, p < .01), Disruption (B = 0.40, SE = 0.11, p < .01).  
Linear regression was also performed to test whether the percentage change 
in the PANSS scores in the first two weeks predicted the percentage change in the 
PANSS scores over eight weeks.  Using all available data in the whole sample (N = 
40), the percentage change in the PANSS total score in the first two weeks 
predicted the percentage change in the PANSS total score over eight weeks (B = 
0.52, SE = 0.14, p < .01).  Similarly, the percentage change in the PANSS positive 
score in the first two weeks predicted the percentage change in the PANSS positive 
score over eight weeks (B = 0.63, SE = 0.14, p < .01). 
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3.5.3 Hypothesis 2: Depression, anxiety and subjective 
distress will reduce alongside improvements in delusional 
dimensions 
 Mean scores on BDI-II, BAI, and SUDS at different time points are shown 
in Table 3.4 and Figures 3.2 and 3.3.   
 
Table 3.4 
Mean levels (SD) of depression, anxiety and subjective distress 


































According to Beck et al. (1996), the average BDI-II scores indicated 
moderate depression (20-28) at baseline, and mild depression (14-19) at week 8, 
although the mean score change was modest.  The average BAI scores fell within 
the levels of moderate anxiety (16-25) at baseline, and mild anxiety (8-15) at week 
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Figure 3.2 






































3.5.3.1 Change in depression, anxiety and subjective distress 
 Changes in mood were analysed using both Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
and mixed modelling approaches.  This is because ANOVA was used in previous 
studies reporting change in mood during antipsychotic treatment (e.g. Nakaya et al., 
1997) and using the same statistical approach allows comparison with other studies.  
Additionally, mixed models use all cases even in the presence of missing data and is 
a method consistently used in this study for other hypotheses involving continuous 
data measured repeatedly. 
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 In individuals with complete data on BDI-II (n = 26), a repeated-measures 
ANOVA revealed a trend only in score difference across the three time points (F = 
2.79, df = 2, p = .07).  On BAI (n = 26), there was a significant difference across the 
three time points (F = 5.70, df = 2, p = .01).  Paired-sample t-tests found a 
significant reduction in BAI between week 0 and week 4 (t = 2.37, df = 25, p = .03), 
and no significant change between week 4 and week 8 (t = 1.18, df = 25, p = .25).  
In individuals with complete data on SUDS (n = 27), repeated-measures ANOVA 
revealed a significant difference across the five time points (F = 2.99, df = 4, p 
= .02).  Paired-sample t-tests showed a significant decrease in SUDS between week 
4 and week 8 (t = 2.91, df = 26, p = .01), a trend reduction between week 0 and 
week 1 (t = 1.89, df = 26, p = .07), and no significant change between week 1 and 
week 2 (t = -1.58, df = 26, p = .13) and between week 2 and week 4 (t = -0.54, df = 
26, p = .13). 
 Three mixed models examining the effect of Time on the BDI-II, BAI and 
SUDS ratings respectively were tested, using the maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimation.  In the model with the BDI-II scores as the dependent variable (DV) and 
Time as a fixed independent variable (IV) (AIC = 788.74, BIC = 798.99), the effect 
of Time was not significant (F = 0.44, df = 2, p = .65).  In the model with the BAI 
scores as the DV and Time as a fixed IV (AIC = 782.57, BIC = 792.82), the effect 
of Time was at trend level only (F = 2.55, df = 2, p = .08).  In the model with 
SUDS as the DV and Time as a fixed IV (AIC = 1726.43, BIC = 1745.35), the 
effect of Time was not significant (F = 1.60, df = 4, p = .18).   
 In summary, ANOVAs revealed significant improvements in anxiety and 
subjective distress over time, and a trend for depression, using data from 
participants with complete data.  However, when a mixed modelling approach was 
used, including all available data, a trend effect of time was found for anxiety, and 
no effect for subjective distress or depression. 
3.5.3.2 Relationship between change in depression and change in 
delusional dimensions 
 The relationship between change in BDI-II and change in delusional 
dimensions over time was tested using linear mixed modelling, with the maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimation.  A series of models was tested and the model with the 
lowest Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion 
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(BIC) was chosen as the best model.  The first model tested the effect of Time on 
BDI-II, with four delusional dimensions included as fixed covariates (AIC = 727.76, 
BIC = 747.66).  In this model, the effect of Time was not significant (F = 0.34, df = 
2, p = .71).  The effect of delusional preoccupation (F = 4.61, df = 1, p = .03) as a 
covariate was significant, whereas that of other dimensions were not (p > .05).  
Since the delusional dimensions were strongly correlated (see Table 3.3), four more 
models were tested with BDI-II as the DV, Time as the IV, and each dimension as a 
covariate.  The model fit indices of these four models are as follows: model with 
Conviction as a covariate (AIC = 749.27, BIC = 761.83); model with Preoccupation 
as a covariate (AIC = 725.45, BIC = 737.90); model with Distress as a covariate 
(AIC = 735.84, BIC = 748.34), and model with Disruption as a covariate (AIC = 
744.96, BIC = 757.52).  Therefore, the model with Preoccupation as a covariate in 
predicting the effect of time on BDI-II was the best model.  In this model, Time was 
not a significant predictor of BDI-II (F = 0.35, df = 2, p = .71) and Preoccupation 
was a significant covariate (F = 9.96, df = 1, p < .01) in the relationship between 
BDI-II and time.  An additional model with both Preoccupation and Preoccupation 
x Time interaction as covariates was also tested, but it showed a poorer fit of the 
data (AIC = 727.68, BIC = 745.10) than the model without the interaction term.  In 
summary, delusional preoccupation covaried with depression; its effect as a 
covariate did not change over time. 
3.5.3.3 Relationship between change in anxiety and change in 
delusional dimensions 
The relationship between change in BAI and change in delusional 
dimensions over time was tested using linear mixed modelling, with the ML 
estimation.  A series of models was tested and the model with the lowest AIC and 
BIC was chosen as the best model.  The first model tested the effect of Time on 
BAI, with four delusional dimensions included as fixed covariates (AIC = 707.83, 
BIC = 727.74).  In this model, the effect of Time was not significant (F = 2.11, df = 
2, p = .13).  The effects of Conviction (F = 4.25, df = 1, p = .04) and Preoccupation 
(F = 6.46, df = 1, p = .01) as covariates were significant.  Distress and Disruption 
were not significant covariates (p > .05).  Since the delusional dimensions were 
strongly correlated (see Table 3.3), four more models were tested with BAI as a DV, 
Time as an IV, and each dimension as a covariate.  The model fit indices of these 
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four models are as follows: model with Conviction as a covariate (AIC = 739.77, 
BIC = 752.33); model with Preoccupation as a covariate (AIC = 707.97, BIC = 
720.41); model with Distress as a covariate (AIC = 717.21, BIC = 729.71), and 
model with Disruption as a covariate (AIC = 736.36, BIC = 748.91).  Therefore, the 
model with Preoccupation as a covariate in predicting the effect of time on BAI was 
the best model.  In this model, Time was not a significant predictor of BAI (F = 
1.80, df = 2, p = .17), and Preoccupation was a significant covariate (F = 18.71, df = 
1, p < .01) in the relationship between BAI and time.  An additional model with 
both Preoccupation and Preoccupation x Time interaction as covariates was also 
tested, but it showed a poorer fit of the data (AIC = 711.70, BIC = 729.12) than the 
model without the interaction term.  While the model with BAI as the DV, Time as 
the IV, and Preoccupation as a covariate was the best model, the model with four 
dimensions as covariates should also be discussed as its AIC almost equalled the 
best model and its BIC was only seven units greater than the best model.  In 
summary, delusional preoccupation (and conviction) covaried with anxiety; their 
effects as covariates did not change over time. 
3.5.3.4 Relationship between change in subjective distress and 
change in delusional dimensions  
The relationship between change in SUDS and change in delusional 
dimensions over time was tested using linear mixed modelling, with the ML 
estimation.  A series of models were tested and the model with the lowest AIC and 
BIC was chosen as the best model.  The first model tested the effect of Time on 
SUDS, with four delusional dimensions included as fixed covariates (AIC = 
1543.50, BIC = 1574.44).  In this model, the effect of Time was not significant (F = 
2.22, df = 4, p = .07).  The effects of Conviction (F = 4.76, df = 1, p = .03), Distress 
(F = 15.01, df = 1, p < .01), and Disruption (F = 16.11, df = 1, p < .01) as covariates 
were significant, whereas that of Preoccupation was not significant (F = 2.26, df = 1, 
p = .14).  Four more models were tested with SUDS as the DV, Time as the IV, and 
each dimension as a covariate.  The model fit indices of these four models are as 
follows: model with Conviction as a covariate (AIC = 1643.03, BIC = 1664.82); 
model with Preoccupation as a covariate (AIC = 1574.72, BIC = 1596.38); model 
with Distress as a covariate (AIC = 1565.43, BIC = 1587.13), and model with 
Disruption as a covariate (AIC = 1591.80, BIC = 1613.54).  Therefore, the model 
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with all four dimensions as covariates in predicting the effect of time on SUDS was 
the best model.  An additional model with delusional dimensions and dimension x 
Time interaction as covariates was also tested, but it showed a poorer fit of the data 
(AIC = 1555.66, BIC = 1636.10) than the model without the interaction terms, and 
none of the interaction terms was significant (p > .05).  In summary, delusional 
conviction, distress and disruption, but not preoccupation, covaried with subjective 
distress, and their effects as covariates did not change over time. 
 




Beads task performance of individuals with complete data (n = 27) 































Note: Individuals who requested 2 beads or fewer were classified as showing the 
JTC bias (Garety et al., 2005) 
Table 3.5 shows the beads task performance of the 27 participants who 
completed the task at both week 0 and week 8.  At baseline, 21 individuals (77.77%) 
showed a JTC bias (requesting two beads or fewer), whereas 20 (74.07%) jumped 
to conclusions at week 8.  Among the 27 completers, 70.4% and 63.0% gave the 
correct answer at baseline and week 8 respectively.  The mean number of beads 
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drawn was 2.67 (SD = 3.61) and 3.15 (SD = 5.13) at baseline and week 8 
respectively. 
Table 3.6 
Cross-tabulation comparison of beads task performance among individuals 
with complete data (n = 27) 
Week 8 JTC   
 No Yes Total 
No 3 3 6 Week 0 JTC 
Yes 4 17 21 
Total 7 20 27 
 Table 3.6 shows the within-subject changes of beads task performance 
across time points.  The McNemar test, a non-parametric test for categorical 
variables in two related samples, showed no significant difference in JTC at week 0 
and week 8 (p = 1.00).  A paired-sample t-test also found no change in the number 
of draws to decision (t = -0.55, df = 26, p = .59). 
 
3.5.4.2 Belief flexibility 
 Possibility of being mistaken (PM).  Among the 30 participants who 
had complete data on the PM measure, nine (30.0%), 16 (53.3%), and 18 (60.0%) 
considered that they might be mistaken about their delusional belief at baseline, 
week 4 and week 8 respectively.   
 
Table 3.7 
Cross-tabulation comparison (week 0 vs. week 4 & week 8) of PM among 
participants with complete data (n = 30) 
Week 4 PM Week 8 PM  
-ve +ve Total -ve +ve Total 
-ve 10 11 21 8 13 21 Week 0 PM 
+ve 4 5 9 4 5 9 
Total 14 16 30 12 18 30 
 
 




Cross-tabulation comparison (week 4 vs. week 8) of PM among participants 
with complete data (n = 30) 
Week 8 PM  
-ve +ve Total 
-ve 11 3 14 Week 4 PM 
+ve 1 15 16 
Total 12 18 30 
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 show the within-subject changes of PM across time 
points.  The Cochran Q test, a non-parametric test for categorical variables in more 
than two related samples, showed a significant difference (p = .02) in PM across 
time points.  Pair-wise comparisons using the McNemar test found a significant 
difference in PM between week 0 and week 8 (p = .05), but not between week 0 
and week 4 (p = .12), or between week 4 and week 8 (p = .63).  
 
Reaction to hypothetical contradiction (RTHC).  Among the 29 
participants who had complete data on the RTHC measure, 12 (41.4%), 15 (51.7%), 
and 16 (55.2%) gave a positive response (i.e. showed flexibility) to a hypothetically 
contradictory evidence at baseline, week 4 and week 8 respectively.  Tables 3.9 and 
3.10 show the within-subject changes of RTHC across time points.  The Cochran Q 
test showed no significant difference (p = .44) in RTHC across time points. 
 
Table 3.9 
Cross-tabulation comparison (week 0 vs. week 4 & week 8) of RTHC among 
participants with complete data (n = 29) 
Week 4 RTHC Week 8 RTHC  
-ve +ve Total -ve +ve Total 
-ve 9 8 17 8 9 17 Week 0 
RTHC +ve 5 7 12 5 7 12 
Total 14 15 29 13 16 29 




Cross-tabulation comparison (week 4 vs. week 8) of RTHC among 
participants with complete data (n = 29) 
Week 8 RTHC  
-ve +ve Total 
-ve 11 3 14 Week 4 
RTHC +ve 2 13 15 
Total 13 16 29 
 
3.5.4.3. Cognitive Biases Questionnaire for Psychosis (CBQ-P) 
Fifteen individuals had complete data on CBQ-P across three time points.  
The mean total scores were 51.60 (SD = 13.45), 49.27 (SD = 10.46), and 43.40 (SD 
= 10.38) at baseline, week 4, and week 8 respectively.  Repeated-measures ANOVA 
showed a significant difference (F = 4.00, df = 2, p = .03) in the CBQ-P score 
across time points.  Paired-sample t-test showed a significant difference in CBQ-P 
between week 4 and week 8 (t = 2.76, df = 14, p = .02), and a difference at trend 
level between week 0 and week 8 (p = .06), but not between week 0 and week 4 (p 
= .39). 
 
3.5.4.4. Cards task 
 Twenty seven individuals had complete data on the cards task at both 
baseline and week 8 (see Table 3.11 for mean scores and SDs).  Paired-sample t-
tests showed significant improvement in items 1 (i.e. mind permeability) (t = 2.99, 
df = 26, p = .01) and 2 (i.e. intentionality) (t = 2.08, df = 26, p = .05), but not the 









Mean levels (SD) on Cards task items in participants with complete data (n 
= 27) 
 Week 0 Week 8 






2: “It is not the computer that guessed; there is someone 























Note: Scores range from 0 (Do not believe this at all) to 100 (Totally believe this) 
 
3.5.5 Hypothesis 4: Baseline reasoning biases will moderate 
changes in conviction 
3.5.5.1 Do individuals with and without reasoning biases differ in 
delusional conviction at baseline? 
 Independent t-tests showed no significant difference (t = 0.91, df = 33, p 
= .37) in baseline conviction (as measured by VAS) between individuals with the 
JTC bias (n = 27, mean = 83.07, SD = 26.26) and those without the JTC bias (n = 8, 
mean = 73.13, SD = 30.35).  However, individuals who responded positively to the 
Possibility of being mistaken (PM) item at baseline (n = 11, mean = 55.09, SD = 
31.29) had significantly lower conviction at baseline (t = -5.07, df = 34, p < .01) 
than those who responded negatively to the item (n = 25, mean = 92.88, SD = 
13.94).  Similarly, individuals who responded positively to the Reaction to 
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hypothetical contradiction (RTHC) at baseline (n = 12, mean = 63.00, SD = 33.67) 
had significantly lower conviction at baseline (t = -3.27, df = 34, p < .01) than those 
who responded negatively to the item (n = 24, mean = 90.50, SD = 17.23).  There 
was no significant correlation between VAS conviction and CBQ-P score at 
baseline (n = 24, r = 0.20, p = .34). 
3.5.5.2 Do baseline reasoning biases predict change in 
conviction, after controlling for baseline conviction? 
 Linear regression was performed (N = 40) with the baseline reasoning 
measures as the IV, change in VAS conviction between week 0 and week 8 as the 
DV, and baseline VAS conviction as a covariate.  After controlling for baseline 
conviction, none of the reasoning measures at baseline predicted change in 
conviction: JTC (β = -0.16, SE = 17.07, p = .36), PM (β = 0.14, SE = 20.60, p 
= .52), RTHC (β = -0.06, SE = 17.93, p = .75), CBQ-P (β = 0.10, SE = 0.73, p 
= .63).  This result remained the same when PSYRATS and PQ were used to 
measure delusional conviction. 
 
3.6 Discussion 
 This is the first study, to our knowledge, investigating changes in delusional 
dimensions, reasoning and affect in response to antipsychotic treatment.  Forty 
patients with a high level of delusional conviction (mean >80%) were assessed five 
times over eight weeks, as soon as they began antipsychotic treatment for their 
current psychotic episode.  Sixty five percent of this sample had a first episode of 
psychosis.  The key findings are as follows.  Delusional dimensions were correlated 
with each other at each time point, and improved together over time.  While the 
level of delusional conviction was higher than other dimensions, the hypothesis that 
conviction reduces more slowly or to a lesser degree was not supported.  Depression 
did not improve over eight weeks of antipsychotic treatment, whereas there was 
modest evidence that anxiety and subjective distress improved (although this 
improvement was not significant on an analysis of all available data using mixed 
modelling).  Depression and anxiety co-varied with delusional preoccupation over 
time, whereas subjective distress co-varied with conviction, distress and disruption.  
The hypothesis that belief flexibility (but not JTC) would improve was partially 
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supported.  JTC did not improve over eight weeks, while one of the measures for 
belief flexibility – Possibility of being mistaken (but not Reaction to Hypothetical 
Contradiction) – as well as the Cognitive Biases Questionnaire score, improved.  
The hypothesis that baseline reasoning biases would moderate changes in 
conviction was not supported. 
 Our finding that delusional conviction did not change more slowly or to a 
lesser degree than other delusional dimensions is not consistent with Mizrahi et al. 
(2006), which suggested that antipsychotics rapidly reduce the behavioural impact, 
preoccupation, and distress relating to the principal psychotic symptom, without 
greatly altering the patients’ conviction in, or perspective about their psychotic 
experience in the early weeks of treatment.  While Mizrahi et al. (2006) found that 
conviction reduced for 6.4% at two weeks and 24.9% at six weeks, we found a 
notable improvement in conviction early on (26.1% over 2 weeks and 25.5% over 
eight weeks).  It is of note, however, that the level of conviction was higher than 
other dimensions across time points, and the mean level of conviction remained 
over 50% at week 8.  The difference in findings may be attributed to the fact that 
this study assessed delusions only, while Mizrahi et al. (2006) assessed the 
‘principal psychotic experience’.  More importantly, the Dimensions of Psychosis 
Instrument (DIPI) used by Mizrahi et al. (2006) includes two questions on 
conviction, one of which is as follows: “Do you sometimes think X is true but then 
think it is part of an illness?”  While the other question (“How sure are you about X, 
any doubts about it? Are you certain it is true?”) is similar to our assessment of 
conviction, the former is more related to insight than to conviction.  Although these 
two items loaded onto one factor in Mizrahi et al. (2006)’s confirmatory factor 
analysis, it is not clear whether responses to these items changed differentially.  It 
remains a possibility that patients reduced in conviction but still did not recognise 
their belief as part of a psychiatric illness.  Using measures purely focusing on 
delusional conviction (without referring to insight or reflection on the belief), we 
found that conviction changed similarly to other dimensions, and this finding was 
consistent across three multi-dimensional measures.   
There was a quadratic relationship of time in the change in delusional 
dimensions, i.e., reductions in the dimensions became smaller over time.  There was 
also a greater reduction in the PANSS positive score in the first two weeks 
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compared to the next two weeks.  Early improvements in the first two weeks 
predicted the overall changes over eight weeks for two delusional dimensions and 
the PANSS scores.  These findings support the ‘early onset’ hypothesis suggested 
by Agid et al. (2003), which argues that antipsychotic effect begins to take place in 
the first week (even days) of treatment.  While a large number of studies showed 
evidence for the ‘early onset’ hypothesis using PANSS scores, the present study is 
the first to reveal the ‘early onset’ of antipsychotic effects on delusional dimensions.  
However, one should be mindful of the fact that our sample was not drug-free and 
had begun antipsychotic treatment for a few days on average.  Based on the finding 
that treatment effects took place early on, Study 3 of this thesis aims to further 
investigate changes in delusional dimensions within a shorter timeframe (i.e. 
moment-by-moment changes in 14 days of the start of antipsychotic treatment). 
The current sample consisted of individuals with strong delusional 
conviction and a strong tendency to JTC across time points.  Approximately 77% 
and 74% showed a JTC style (defined as two or fewer beads) at baseline and week 8 
respectively.  Seventy percent (n = 19 and 18 at baseline and week 8 respectively) 
decided after only one bead.  These rates are higher than previous studies using the 
beads task (see Chapter 2), including studies using the easier 85:15 ratio version, 
and also including Menon et al. (2008), which measured deluded patients at their 
early stage of antipsychotic treatment.  It is possible that, despite repeating the 
instructions, some of the participants did not understand the beads task thoroughly 
enough for the assessment to be reliable.  For example, one patient commented that 
“Normally it is orange, but I’ll choose black”, and another patient said that “How do 
I know? It’s got to be the second one”.  Two other patients refused to do the task 
because they did not think the task was relevant to their current experience.  
Nevertheless, since we did not formally assess participants’ understanding of the 
task, the reason behind the unusually high rate of JTC in this sample remains a 
speculation.   
The proportion of individuals showing belief flexibility at baseline on 
RTHC (41%) is comparable with previous studies, although that on PM (30%) is 
relatively low.  We found that JTC was not associated with level of conviction at 
baseline, and did not predict change in conviction.  These results confirm that JTC 
is highly prevalent in deluded patients, but suggest that it is not closely associated 
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with the delusional state and do not directly support the role of JTC in the 
maintenance of delusions as proposed in Garety et al.’s (2005) model.  However, 
the fact that JTC was very common in this sample may have limited the power of 
this study to examine the relationship between JTC and conviction.  Therefore, our 
finding needs to be replicated in a larger sample with a wider range of JTC and 
conviction level before any firm conclusions can be made.  As hypothesised in this 
study, and as reported in previous studies (e.g. Peters & Garety, 2006), JTC did not 
change after eight weeks of antipsychotic treatment.  The only study that reported a 
change in JTC within weeks was Menon et al. (2008), where the change was in the 
emotionally salient version of the beads task which was not used in the current 
study. 
This is the first study showing evidence for a change in BF following 
antipsychotic treatment.  In support of our hypothesis, individuals were more likely, 
at week 8 than at baseline, to see the possibility of being mistaken about their 
delusional belief.  Cognitive biases (as measured by the Cognitive Biases 
Questionnaire for Psychosis) and some of the appraisals on the Cards task also 
changed over time, becoming less pathological.  In contrast to the traditional view 
that delusions are persistent and unchanging, these findings suggest that cognitive 
biases underlying delusions, including BF, are capable of improving after only eight 
weeks in the early stage of antipsychotic treatment, despite JTC remaining prevalent.  
The mechanism of change of cognitive biases following antipsychotic treatment 
remains an open question.  However, our data showed a strong association between 
BF and delusional conviction.  The mean levels of conviction were 55% for 
individuals who recognised the possibility of being mistaken about their delusion 
and 92% for individuals who did not.  Similarly, the mean levels of conviction were 
63% for individuals who changed their belief in response to hypothetical 
contradiction and 90% for those who did not.  This may explain why baseline BF 
did not predict change in conviction when baseline conviction was controlled for, 
since there was little room for improvement in the more flexible group.  While a 
close relationship between conviction and BF is consistent with previous studies 
and Garety et al. (2005)’s model, this raises the question as to whether BF is simply 
another way of measuring conviction.  Also, it would be of interest to further 
investigate whether the various measures of BF represent the same construct, given 
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the differences in changes in the two measures included in this study.  Study 2 aims 
to examine these questions with multiple measures of reasoning biases and 
conviction, using a longitudinal factor analysis approach.  
This sample had a moderate level of depression and a moderate-to-severe 
level of anxiety at baseline.  Contrary to our hypothesis, subjective distress, 
depression and anxiety did not improve significantly over eight weeks.  This is 
inconsistent with previous studies that reported a reduction of anxiety following 
antipsychotic treatment (see Chapter 1).  However, when the current sample was 
analysed using repeated-measures ANOVA, which is a less robust method than 
mixed modelling approach but one that has been used in previous studies, anxiety 
and subjective distress improved over time.  Intriguingly, delusional preoccupation 
co-varied with depression and anxiety, whereas other delusional dimensions (but 
not preoccupation) co-varied with subjective distress.  These results suggest that 
subjective distress was more closely linked to participants’ immediate symptomatic 
status than depression and anxiety.  The finding that SUDS did not co-vary with 
preoccupation was not expected.  However, given that all dimensions were strongly 
correlated across time points, and that three dimensions co-varied with subjective 
distress at a highly significant level, the non-significance of preoccupation as a 
covariate should not be over-interpreted. 
The specific link between delusional preoccupation and anxiety and 
depression is intriguing.  There is much evidence that repetitive thought processes 
(rumination in depression, and worry in anxiety), may maintain emotional disorders 
(see Watkins (2008) for a review).  The present findings suggest that repetitive 
thoughts around delusions may also be linked to depression and anxiety.  Such a 
relationship would be consistent with the rationale behind a recent intervention for 
delusions which focused specifically on reducing worry (Foster et al., 2010). 
A caveat of the current findings is that although delusional dimensions 
improved over time, the amount of change was not extensive and patients retained a 
high level of delusional conviction.  Furthermore, there was only modest change in 
affect.  Therefore, this study might not be the most suitable for investigating the 
temporal relationship between affect and delusions.  This study is also limited by 
the fact that its main focus was on antipsychotics and did not include data about 
other medications such as anti-depressants and anxiolytics. 
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To conclude, this study demonstrated improvement in all delusional 
dimensions over eight weeks during an early phase of antipsychotic treatment, with 
most of the change occurring in the first two weeks, which was predictive of later 
change.  This improvement occurred without a significant change in affect.  
Importantly, the psychological response to antipsychotic treatment included 
cognitive changes such as delusional conviction, belief flexibility and appraisals, 
but not the JTC reasoning style.   
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Chapter 4 
Study 2: Jumping to conclusions, a lack of belief 
flexibility and delusional conviction in psychosis: A 
longitudinal investigation of the structure, frequency 




This chapter is published as the following article: 
So, S.H., Freeman, D., Dunn, G., Kapur, S., Kuipers, E., Bebbington, P., Fowler, D., 
& Garety, P.A. (2012). Jumping to conclusions, a lack of belief flexibility and 
delusional conviction in psychosis: A longitudinal investigation of the structure, 
frequency and relatedness of reasoning biases. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 
121, 129-139. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual defines delusion as ‘A false belief 
based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained despite 
what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible 
and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary’ (APA, 2000).  Thus a delusional 
belief is incorrect; it is based on erroneous judgements about the world; and it is 
unresponsive to countervailing evidence.  Biases of reasoning have been invoked to 
understand the process of delusion formation, and limited data-gathering (‘jumping 
to conclusions’; JTC) and a failure to think of alternative accounts to the delusion (a 
lack of ‘belief flexibility’) have previously been shown to be related to how 
strongly a delusion is held (delusional conviction) (e.g. Freeman et al., 2004; Garety 
et al., 2005).  In this study, the single largest study of its type, we wanted to: (a) 
examine the prevalence of the reasoning biases, JTC and lack of belief flexibility, in 
individuals with delusions; (b) evaluate the structure of delusional conviction, JTC, 
and belief flexibility and whether they are distinct processes; and (c) assess whether 
delusional conviction would vary in response to levels of JTC bias and belief 
flexibility.  
 
4.1.1 Reasoning processes associated with delusions 
The most replicated reasoning bias in delusion research is JTC, a tendency 
to gather less data than controls to reach a decision (reviewed by Fine et al., 2007; 
Garety & Freeman, 1999; Freeman, 2007).  Limited decision-making encourages 
the rapid acceptance of erroneous beliefs.  Research published so far has involved 
relatively small numbers of participants, with JTC being apparent in between one 
third and two-thirds of individuals with delusions (e.g. Garety et al., 1991, 2005; 
Moritz & Woodward, 2005; Startup, Freeman & Garety, 2008; Van Dael et al., 
2006).  It has also been reported in people ‘at risk’ for psychosis (Broome et al., 
2007), and, to an attenuated degree, in the relatives of people with psychosis and in 
people scoring highly on delusional ideation scales (e.g. Colbert & Peters, 2002; 
Freeman et al., 2008; Van Dael et al., 2006; Warman & Martin, 2006).  In cross-
sectional studies, it is greatest in patients with current delusions (e.g. Lincoln et al., 
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2010; Van Dael et al., 2006).  There have been few longitudinal investigations of 
JTC: in a systematic review (So et al., 2010), three such studies are reported (Peters 
& Garety, 2006; Menon et al., 2008; Woodward et al., 2009).  The available data 
show that JTC does not improve consistently over time or with symptom 
improvement, but there is some evidence that baseline JTC predicts outcome.  For 
example, JTC was shown to moderate the response to anti-psychotic treatments in a 
drug naïve group of patients with a first episode of psychosis: those with an extreme 
JTC bias showed a poorer treatment response (Menon et al., 2008).  Taken as a 
whole, the evidence suggests that it is likely that JTC is a relatively stable trait 
increasing susceptibility to the development of delusions and which may predict 
change over time.  
Belief flexibility (BF) in psychosis refers to ‘a meta-cognitive process about 
thinking about one’s own delusional beliefs, changing them in the light of reflection 
and evidence and generating and considering alternatives’ (Garety et al., 2005, p. 
374).  It has been assessed with the Possibility of Being Mistaken (PM) and 
Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction (RTHC) items of the Maudsley Assessment 
of Delusions Schedule (MADS; Wessely et al., 1993).  These items assess, in the 
context of an interview about delusional beliefs, whether the individual can consider 
it ‘at all possible’ that they might be mistaken in their belief, however unlikely, and 
also to consider a hypothetical but plausible piece of evidence that might counteract 
their belief.  We have since developed a further item which we also consider taps 
belief flexibility, in the Explanation of Experiences assessment (Freeman et al., 
2004).  In this, persons with delusions are asked if they can think of any possible 
alternative explanation for the evidence they cite in support of their delusion, other 
than the delusional explanation (Alternative Explanations AE).  Contrary to the 
traditional view of delusions as fixed and unresponsive to countervailing evidence, 
approximately one quarter to one half of individuals with delusions demonstrate BF 
on any one of these assessments (e.g. Buchanan et al., 1993; Colbert et al., 2010; 
Freeman et al., 2004).  For example, Garety et al. (2005) found that half of those 
with delusions acknowledged that there was a possibility that they were mistaken, 
while Freeman et al. (2004) reported that a quarter of individuals with delusions 
could generate alternative explanations for their experiences even if they did not 
agree with them.  There have been no longitudinal studies of BF, as measured in 
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this way, although, in one study, we found evidence of improvement over time in 
evidence evaluation, suggesting that belief flexibility may change as delusions remit 
(So et al., 2010).  There is also some evidence that it might predict change. 
Flexibility, as assessed by the Possibility of Being Mistaken item, predicted 
successful response to psychological therapy for psychosis in a randomised 
controlled trial (Garety et al., 1997).  We therefore hypothesised that change in 
delusions may be facilitated by a willingness to consider that a delusion may be 
mistaken and that alternative explanations might be possible.  It has further been 
argued that JTC influences delusional conviction via a lack of BF (Garety et al., 
2005).  Limited data-gathering (JTC) may preclude the consideration of alternative 
explanations (BF) and therefore strengthen belief in a delusional account.  In our 
cognitive model of psychosis, we propose, in common with cognitive models for 
other disorders, that appraisals are key to the development and persistence of 
psychosis. We argue that reasoning biases, such as JTC and a lack of BF, are 
important in that they may influence the appraisal of anomalous experiences, 
adverse events and distressing emotions (by limited data gathering or generation of 
alternatives) and thus contribute to symptom formation and maintenance (Garety et 
al., 2001, 2007). 
 
4.1.2 The measurement of delusional conviction and 
reasoning processes 
 Both more limited data-gathering and less belief flexibility have been shown 
to be associated with stronger delusional conviction (e.g. Colbert et al., 2010; 
Freeman et al., 2004, 2008; Garety et al., 2005).  However, this raises the issue of 
whether these concepts are truly distinguishable from delusional conviction.  This is 
especially so for the concept of BF, where people need to acknowledge that they 
could be mistaken about their delusional belief, even if they think this is highly 
unlikely.  In other words, is BF simply an indirect measure of delusional conviction? 
To our knowledge, only one study has formally examined belief flexibility (using 
the PM measure) in people with delusions, using non-delusional, neutral material  - 
in this case, the belief that ‘the sun will rise tomorrow, that is, that there will be 
another day tomorrow’ (Colbert et al., 2010).  In this study, delusional participants 
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showed less willingness than a non-clinical control group to consider that they 
might be mistaken on this standard ‘neutral’ belief; suggesting that a lack of BF 
may be characteristic of the reasoning style of people with delusions rather than 
restricted to and confounded by their conviction in their delusional beliefs. However, 
further examination of this is clearly warranted. 
 The measurement of these concepts is therefore key to further investigation.  
A variety of measures have been used to assess delusional conviction, JTC and BF.  
Standard psychiatric assessments – the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale 
(PANSS; Kay et al., 1987) and the Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms 
(SAPS; Andreasen, 1984) – have typically been used to assess delusions, with 
conviction as an important scoring criterion.  Conviction has been measured using 
multi-dimensional scales including the Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales 
(PSYRATS; Haddock et al., 1999), the MADS (Wessely et al., 1993) and the 
Explanations of Experiences interview (EoE; Freeman et al., 2004).  Most studies 
of delusional conviction have used single measures.  While these measures are 
likely to be highly correlated, we do not know how effectively they capture the 
degree of belief conviction.  A similar situation applies to the measurement of 
reasoning biases.  The probabilistic reasoning task used to assess JTC has easy and 
difficult versions, and the content of the task also varies (e.g. Dudley et al., 1997a, 
1997b).  BF has been measured variously with assessment of the possibility of 
being mistaken (PM: Wessely et al., 1993), the reaction to hypothetical 
contradiction (RTHC: Wessely et al., 1993), and the generation of alternative 
explanations (AE: Freeman et al., 2004).  There has been no formal investigation of 
whether these represent aspects of a common reasoning bias or how they are related 
to JTC. 
 
4.2 The current study 
Multivariate approaches such as structural equation modelling and factor 
analysis allow exploitation of the richness of multiple measurements and direct 
investigation of the relationships between latent constructs, controlling for the 
effects of measurement error in the observed responses (Bentler, 1980).  Our current 
understanding of delusional conviction and reasoning biases in psychosis clearly 
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lends itself to the establishment of latent factors drawn from different instruments 
relating to similar constructs.  For example, Bentall et al. (2009) recently used 
structural equation models with latent variables to determine the structure of 
relationships among psychological mechanisms potentially contributing to paranoia 
which found that both cognitive (including JTC) and emotion-related processes 
were related to paranoia.  In the present study we analyse data from the 
Psychological Prevention of Relapse in Psychosis Trial (Garety et al., 2008), in 
which patients with a recent relapse of psychosis were assessed at different time 
points, on multiple measures of delusional conviction, JTC and BF.  Two earlier 
cross-sectional studies (Freeman et al., 2004; Garety et al., 2005) drew on the first 
100 participants in this trial.  As discussed in those two studies, it was our a priori 
plan to replicate the cross-sectional findings in the larger sample reported here and 
to examine changes over time.  In the current study, we aimed first to examine the 
prevalence of JTC and of a lack of BF in this group of currently deluded patients 
following a recent relapse, and then to test hypotheses about their relationships with 
each other and with delusional conviction and over time. 
 The three hypotheses derived from our review of the literature were as 
follows: 
1. Delusional conviction, JTC and belief flexibility are distinct but inter-
related processes. 
2. Conviction and a lack of belief flexibility will decline over time, whereas 
JTC is relatively stable. 
3. Baseline JTC and lack of belief flexibility will predict persistence of 




Participants were 301 patients from the Psychological Prevention of Relapse 
in Psychosis (PRP) Trial (ISRCTN83557988).  Participants were recruited by 
approaching consecutive patients who had recently relapsed, whether or not they 
had been admitted.  Two hundred and seventy three of the participants had 
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presentations that included delusions; 28 had hallucinations but no delusions.  The 
PRP Trial was a United Kingdom multi-centre randomised controlled trial of 
cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) and family intervention for psychosis (Garety et 
al., 2008).  It was designed to answer questions both about outcome and the 
psychological processes associated with psychosis over time.  Inclusion criteria for 
the PRP Trial were the following: a current diagnosis of non-affective psychosis 
(schizophrenia, schizoaffective psychosis, delusional disorder), age between 18 and 
65 years, a second or subsequent episode starting not more than three months before 
consent to enter the trial, and a rating of at least 4 (moderate severity) on the 
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay et al., 1987) on at least one 
positive psychotic symptom at first time of meeting.  Exclusion criteria were a 
primary diagnosis of alcohol or substance dependency, organic syndrome or 
learning disability, an inadequate command of English, and unstable residential 
arrangements.  Patients were randomised into treatment as usual, treatment as usual 
plus CBT, and treatment as usual plus family intervention.  In this treatment trial, in 
which Cognitive Behavioural Therapy and Family Intervention were investigated 
and compared with Treatment As Usual, there were no significant treatment effects 
on delusional outcomes or other psychotic symptoms, or on JTC and BF: only 
depression improved in response to CBT (Garety et al., 2008). The whole sample is 
therefore grouped together in the current study. This report uses symptom and 
psychological assessments carried out at baseline, 3 months, and 12 months.  
 
4.3.2 Measures 
4.3.2.1 General psychopathology and delusions 
Several clinical rating scales were used as measures of psychopathology.  
The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay et al., 1987) is a 30-item 
rating scale developed for assessing phenomena associated with schizophrenia.  
Symptoms are rated over the past week.  The Scale for the Assessment of Positive 
Symptoms (SAPS; Andreasen, 1984) is a 35-item rating instrument.  Symptoms are 
rated over the past month.  The Psychotic Symptom Rating Scale (PSYRATS) 
(Haddock et al., 1999) is a 17-item scale measuring multiple dimensions of auditory 
hallucinations and delusions.  Symptoms are rated over the past week.  Good 
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psychometric properties have been reported for PANSS (e.g. Kay, 1990), SAPS 
(Andreasen, 1984; Kay, 1990), and PSYRATS (Haddock et al., 1999).  Four scale 
items were selected to derive the delusional conviction factor: the PANSS delusion 
item, the SAPS global delusion item, the PSYRATS delusional conviction item, and 
the conviction score (0-100%) on the Explanations of Experiences interview 
(Freeman et al., 2004). 
4.3.2.2 Jumping to conclusions (JTC) 
In this study, three versions of the beads task were used.  In the first version, 
individuals are presented with two jars each containing 100 coloured beads.  One of 
the jars contains 85 beads of colour A and 15 beads of colour B, while the other jar 
contains 85 beads of colour B and 15 beads of colour A.  Participants are told that 
the jars will be hidden from view and then beads will be drawn, one at a time, from 
just one of the jars, and will be replaced in the same jar, so that the proportions 
remain the same.  They can see as many beads as they like before deciding which of 
the jars the beads are drawn from.  The current study also included a more difficult 
version with beads in the ratio 60:40 (Dudley et al., 1997a), and a version using 
salient words (positive and negative) in the ratio 60:40 (Dudley et al., 1997b).  In 
the salient version of the task, the beads are replaced by words ostensibly generated 
by a survey of the opinions of two groups of 100 about an individual.  Participants 
are told that one group makes 60 positive comments and 40 negative comments, 
while the reverse is true for the other group.  They have to decide which survey the 
words have been selected from.  The variable is the number of pieces of information 
the participant selects before making a decision.  In order to identify people with an 
extreme reasoning bias, the “jumping to conclusions” (JTC) bias has been defined 
as making a decision with two pieces of information or  fewer (Garety et al., 2005).  
We have previously adopted this categorical (dichotomous) method of assessing 
JTC (Garety et al., 2005), since, firstly,  evidence suggests that it is the extreme bias, 
of gathering very limited data, which particularly characterises people with 
delusions (Garety et al., 1991) and secondly, the alternative method employed by 
researchers, the number of draws to decision, is not a normally distributed 
continuous scale, since the information value of each additional bead varies 
according to the colour of the bead presented and the sequence employed.  However, 
we explored the use of both scoring methods in our factor analyses (see below). 
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4.3.2.3. Belief flexibility (BF) 
The Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Scale (MADS; Wessely et al., 1993) 
is a standardised interview that assesses eight dimensions of delusional experience.  
The belief maintenance section of the MADS enquires about the evidence for the 
delusion, and two of its items have been used to measure aspects of BF (the 
possibility of being mistaken, PM, and the reaction to hypothetical contradiction, 
RTHC).  The evidence for the delusion cited by participants is sensitively discussed, 
and they are asked whether it is at all possible for them to be mistaken about their 
delusional belief.  The interviewer then asks how they would react in a hypothetical 
situation if some new evidence were to be generated which contradicts the delusion.  
If they report that this would alter in any way their level of belief, this is recorded as 
have BF, each item dichotomously scored (yes/no).  The scale has very good inter-
rater reliability (Wessely et al., 1993), and kappas for these two items are reported 
as excellent (PM: kappa = 0.91; and RTHC kappa = 0.90). 
 The Explanations of Experiences measure (EoE; Freeman et al., 2004) is a 
structured interview designed to assess whether people can envisage alternative 
explanations for the evidence cited for their delusion.  Once the evidence for the 
delusion is established, they are asked ‘Can you think of any other explanations for 
the experiences that you have described?  Are there any other reasons — other than 
[the delusional belief] — that could possibly account for these experiences even if 
you think they are very unlikely?’  The generation of any alternative explanation 
(AE) (scored yes/no) is taken as a measure of BF.  The current strength of the 
delusional explanation is rated on a conviction rating scale ‘How strongly do you 
believe X?’ (0-100%), which forms one of the conviction measures in the current 
study. Since this item is so similar to the MADS item, ‘How sure are you about X?’, 
the MADS conviction item was not included in the assessment battery. 
 
4.3.3 Inter-rater reliability of clinical assessments 
 All assessments were conducted by research workers, after consent had been 
obtained. Interviews were tape-recorded for reliability and quality control purposes. 
Research workers met regularly with a supervisor throughout the study to maintain 
reliability of procedures and ratings. Reliability of clinical interview ratings was 
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assessed using the PANSS positive symptom score.  At least one other assessor 
(selected from a panel of 15 raters – excluding the rater responsible for the initial 
assessment) re-rated 55 assessments.  The number of re-ratings varied between 1 
and 6, and the total number of ratings made by the 15 raters varied between 2 and 
27.  A linear one-way random effects model (with participant identification as the 
explanatory factor) was fitted by restricted maximum likelihood using Stata's xtreg 
procedure (version 8 for Windows) and yielded an intraclass correlation of 0.88 
(95% CI 0.82–0.92).  This indicates very acceptable inter-rater reliability.  We also 
checked the reliability of ratings of the PSYRATS.  The PSYRATS conviction 
rating simply requires the assessor to categorize the patient’s percentage response 
into one of five ordinal categories defined by percentage numbers.  There is no 
clinical judgement required, and inter-rater variability would not be expected.  In 
the development of the scale, six assessors each re-rated six interviews and there 
was perfect reliability for the delusion conviction item (Haddock et al., 1999).  In 
the current study, seven PSYRATS interviews were re-rated and again there was 
perfect reliability. 
 
4.4 Statistical Analysis 
 First, descriptive reports of the frequency of individual measures of 
reasoning biases (JTC and BF) and of levels of conviction, and their associations 
with each other, were generated with SPSS 15.0 for Windows (SPSS, 2006).   
 For the first hypothesis, that conviction and these reasoning biases are 
distinct but inter-related processes, both exploratory and confirmatory factor 
analyses were conducted using Mplus 5.2 (Muthén & Muthén, 2007) to identify and 
confirm the structure of conviction and reasoning biases.  In order to establish the 
factor structure of conviction, JTC and BF, baseline measures of these variables 
were entered into an exploratory factor analysis (using data only from the 273 
patients with delusions).  The measures (‘items’) entered into the factor analysis 
were specified in Mplus as being either quantitative (the default) or categorical.  For 
conviction, the following quantitative measures were used: PANSS delusion item 
(range 1-7), SAPS global delusion item (range 0-5), PSYRATS conviction item 
(range 0-4), and conviction score on the EoE interview (range 0-100).  The 
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categorical (dichotomous) JTC measures were presence/absence of JTC bias on the 
three versions of the beads task, and the continuous measure of JTC, which we also 
explored, was number of beads/words drawn.  For BF, binary (positive/negative) 
responses to the ‘possibility of being mistaken’ and ‘reaction to hypothetical 
contradiction’ items in the MADS interview and the ‘generation of alternative 
explanations’ item in the EoE interview were entered.  A higher JTC factor score 
indicated a more limited data-gathering style, whereas a high BF factor score meant 
greater belief flexibility.  In exploratory factor analysis all loadings were freely 
estimated, but the variances of each of the factors were constrained to be 1.  
 To test the second hypothesis, concerning change over time, for each of the 
constructs (conviction, JTC and BF), a longitudinal (repeated measures) factor 
analysis model was separately fitted.  At each of the three time points we specified 
the same underlying factor. For each time point, the loading for the first variable 
entered into the model was set to 1 (to determine the scale).  The loadings of each of 
the other variables (items) were freely estimated but were constrained to be the 
same across time points (after first establishing that these constraints did not lead to 
any significant loss of fit).  No constraints were imposed on any of the residual 
(error) variances.  Temporal trends in the factor scores were estimated and tested 
using two orthogonal contrasts created by the ‘model constraint’ option in Mplus – 
(a) C1: the difference between 3 and 12 month scores, and (b) C2: the difference 
between the baseline score and the average of the 3 and 12 months scores.  An 
equivalent (global) test of trends was generated by constraining the factor scores to 
be equal for the three time points and comparing the chi-squares for the constrained 
and unconstrained models. 
 The third and final hypothesis was that change in conviction is predicted by 
JTC and BF.  The same estimated factor scores were correlated with change scores 
for delusional conviction.  
As in most longitudinal studies, there were missing data in this sample.  The 
sample size available for each variable at each time point is specified in section 
4.5.1; descriptive statistics based on these sample sizes are reported.  The 
exploratory factor model was estimated using all available data on the component 
variables at baseline.  The percentages of missing values in the sample (N = 273) on 
the key variables at baseline are as follows: 0% (PANSS delusion score), 0% (SAPS 
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global delusion score), 1.8% (PSYRATS conviction), 25.3% (EoE conviction), 
31.5% (85:15 beads task), 32.6% (60:40 beads task), 34.8% (words task), 20.9% 
(possibility of being mistaken), 24.9% (reaction to hypothetical contradiction), 
24.9% (alternative explanations).  Mplus uses maximum likelihood (ML) estimator 
for continuous variables (e.g. conviction measures), and WLSMV estimator 
(weighted least-squares with mean and variance adjustment) for categorical 
variables (i.e. JTC and BF measures).  ML imputes the model parameters using all 
available data even for cases with some missing responses, whereas WLSMV 
considers all available data for each pair of variables when estimating the sample 
statistics.  There are therefore fewer missing values for the factors than for raw 
scores: 0% (conviction factor), 13.6% (JTC factor), and 14.7% (BF factor). 
 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Demographic and Clinical Data 
 A total of 273 patients with delusions were included in this study.  Seventy 
percent (n = 193) of the sample was male and the mean age was 37.7 years (range 
19 to 65).  The sample was drawn from the following ethnic groups: White (72.2%), 
Black African (9.2%), Black Caribbean (7.3%), Black other (2.2%), Indian (1.8%), 
and other (7.3%).  The major psychiatric diagnoses were schizophrenia (85.0%), 
schizoaffective disorder (13.6%) and delusional disorder (1.6%).  They had an 
average length of illness of 10.78 years (SD = 8.96, range 0-44 years).  The mean 
scores for the psychotic symptom measures at baseline and at the follow-ups are 
shown in Table 4.1, and indicate a moderately high level of psychotic symptoms.   
At baseline, 110 (41%) participants with delusions had 100% conviction in 
their belief, 109 (40.7%) held the delusion with conviction between 50-99%, and 49 
(18.2%) participants had less than 50% conviction in their delusion.  The 
percentages of the sample (N = 273) rated 3 (moderate) or above on the SAPS for 
each subtype of delusions were as follows: persecutory delusions (57.5%), 
delusions of reference (55.6%), grandiose delusions (24.2%), delusions of mind 
reading (23.5%), religious delusions (17.6%),  somatic delusions (17.2%), thought 
insertion (13.5%), delusions of being controlled (12.9%), thought withdrawal 
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(12.8%), thought broadcasting (10.6%), delusions of guilt or sin (8.4%), and 
delusions of jealousy (1.8%). 
 
Table 4.1.  
Mean scores (SD) of psychotic symptom and delusional conviction 
measures at each time point 




































































PANSS – Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale 
SAPS – Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms 
PSYRATS – Psychotic Symptom Rating Scale 
EoE – Explanation of Experiences 
Reasoning biases were common.  The percentages of participants who 
jumped to conclusions on the 85:15 beads task at baseline, 3 month and 12 month 
were respectively 52.4% (n = 98 out of 187), 61.8% (n = 89 out of 144), and 55.0% 
(n = 82 out of 149).  The equivalent values for the 60:40 beads task were 40.2% (n 
= 74 out of 184), 44.4% (n = 64 out of 144), and 41.2% (n = 61 out of 148), 
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respectively.  The percentages for the 60:40 words task were 38.2% (n = 68 out of 
178), 43.6% (n = 61 out of 140), and 41.9% (n = 62 out of 148). 
The percentages of participants who thought it was impossible that they 
could be mistaken about their belief at baseline, 3 month and 12 month were 
respectively 49.5% (n = 107 out of 216), 43.6% (n = 78 out of 179), and 42.6% (n 
= 66 out of 155).  The percentages of participants who reacted negatively to the 
hypothetical contradiction (i.e. not allowing of a potential decrease in conviction if 
the hypothetical event were to occur) at the three time points were: 67.3% (n = 138 
out of 205), 56.3% (n = 94 out of 167) and 46.2% (n = 66 out of 143).  The 
percentages of individuals who did not give alternative explanations for their belief 
were 76.1% (n = 156 out of 205), 73.9% (n = 133 out of 180) and 70.7% (n = 106 
out of 150). 
The relationships between the individual measures at baseline are shown in 
Table 4.2.  It can be seen that the measures of conviction are all highly significantly 
correlated with each other, although unsurprisingly the conviction rating from the 
Explanation of Experiences assessment has a relatively weaker relationship with the 
PANSS and the SAPS measures.  There is no evidence of a relationship between the 
individual indicators of conviction with JTC measures, while there is evidence that 
higher conviction is associated with less belief flexibility.  It can also be seen that 
the individual indicators of JTC are all highly significantly related to each other, as 
are those of BF; but it is clear that the relationships between the individual measures 
of JTC with measures of BF are generally not significantly related, with the 
exception of significant relationships between two of the indicators of JTC with 
RTHC. 
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Table 4.2 
















PM RTHC AE 
PANSS delusion 1          
SAPS delusion 0.79 
p<.01 
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PANSS – Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale 
SAPS – Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms 
PSYRATS – Psychotic Symptom Rating Scale 
EoE – Explanation of Experiences 
JTC – Jumping To Conclusions 
PM – Possibility of being Mistaken 
RTHC – Reaction To Hypothetical Contradiction 
AE – Alternative Explanations 
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4.5.2 Hypothesis 1: Delusional conviction, JTC and belief 
flexibility are distinct but inter-related processes 
Table 4.3.  
Comparison of factor models on conviction and reasoning 
Model fit indices 1-factor model 2-factor model 3 factor model 
x
2
 goodness of fit 778.25 (p<.01) 138.11 (p<.01) 28.24 (p=.06) 
Comparative fit index (CFI) 0.50 0.92 0.99 
Root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) 
0.28 0.13 0.05 
 
 
Table 4.4.  
Exploratory factor analysis of baseline measures of conviction, JTC and BF 
– Geomin rotated factor loadings 
Baseline measures Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
PANSS delusion 0.91 0.10 -0.01 
SAPS global delusion 0.92 -0.00 0.16 
PSYRATS conviction 0.70 0.01 -0.23 
EoE conviction 0.72 -0.02 -0.29 
JTC on 85:15 beads 0.02 0.76 -0.01 
JTC on 60:40 beads -0.01 0.96 0.15 
JTC on words -0.03 0.91 -0.01 
PM 0.30 0.00 1.41 
RTHC -0.05 -0.32 0.60 
AE 0.01 -0.10 0.53 
Note:  
Factor loadings > ±0.4 are in boldface 
 
Exploratory factor analysis was performed on the four measures of 
conviction, the three measures of JTC and the three measures of BF.  (For JTC, we 
initially performed the EFA using both our preferred dichotomous method of 
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scoring (JTC: two beads or fewer; no JTC: over two beads) and a continuous 
measure (number of beads drawn), but found that the dichotomous scoring method 
resulted in a better chi square test of model fit. We have therefore used the factors 
from the dichotomous scoring of JTC in all the following analyses.)  As shown in 
Table 4.3, a three-factor model fitted the data best.  Moreover, the factor loadings 
shown in Table 4.4 indicate that the three factors clearly represent delusional 
conviction, JTC, and BF respectively.   
For the conviction factor, since the PSYRATS and EoE items are specific 
measures of delusional conviction but the PANSS delusion item and the SAPS 
global delusion score are measures that combine several dimensions of delusional 
experience along with conviction, the residuals of the last two items were set to be 
correlated in the factor model, so that the resultant factor reflects level of delusional 
conviction.  The model fit indices showed that the conviction factor model with 
correlated residuals is a better fit than the model without the correlations (see Table 
4.5).   
 
Table 4.5.  
Comparison of measurement models on baseline conviction 






 goodness of fit 90.55 (p < .01) 1.71 (p = .19) 
Comparative fit index (CFI) 0.90 1.00 




Confirmatory factor analysis was then performed on the baseline conviction 
and reasoning bias variables.  Figure 4.1 shows the new structure of the three 
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Figure 4.1 
Final factor structure and loadings (standardised estimates) of conviction, 
JTC and belief flexibility following confirmatory factor analysis 
 
Based on the structure of the three factors, factor scores across time points 
were estimated using longitudinal factor analysis models for each of the three 
concepts separately.  The mean factor scores for each factor at the three time points 
are as follows: Conviction (n = 273) (4.64, SD=1.10; 3.91, SD=1.21; 3.73, 
SD=1.18); JTC (n = 236) (0.17, SD=1.04; 0.61, SD=1.03; 0.29, SD=1.28); BF (n = 
233) (0.08, SD=1.70; 0.40, SD=1.55; 0.60, SD=2.04).  Correlations between the 
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strong correlations within the JTC and BF factors across time points, consistent 
with their being stable over time, whereas the correlations within the conviction 
factor over time, while significant, are lower, indicating less stability (see below).  
Conviction factor scores are correlated with BF factor scores at all time points (i.e. 
greater conviction is associated with less belief flexibility), but not with JTC factor 
scores at any time point.  There is a weak correlation between BF factor score at 
baseline and JTC factor scores at baseline and 12 month (i.e. greater JTC bias is 
associated with less belief flexibility; see Table 4.6). 
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Table 4.6.  
Correlation between factor scores at each time point (N = 273) 
Conviction Jumping to conclusions Belief flexibility  
0m 3m 12m 0m 3m 12m 0m 3m 12m 
0m          
3m .53**         
Conviction 
12m .31** .55**        
0m .03 .05 .07       
3m .09 .07 .04 .88**      
Jumping to 
conclusions 
12m .10 .05 .07 .84** .93**     
0m -.40** -.40** -.30** -.14* -.12 -.14*    
3m -.34** -.51** -.33** -.11 -.11 -.13 .87**   
Belief flexibility 
12m -.29** -.43** -.47** -.11 -.10 -.12 .79** .86**  
Note:  
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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4.5.3 Hypothesis 2: Conviction and a lack of belief flexibility 
will decline over time, whereas JTC is relatively stable 
Changes in factor scores over time were analysed by creating two contrast 
parameters in the longitudinal factor analysis models: (1) the contrast between factor 
means at 3 months and 12 months; and (2) the contrast between baseline factor mean 
and the average of 3 months and 12 months.  Tests of contrasts showed that there was 
no significant change in the conviction factor score between 3 and 12 months (mean 
change 0.19; s.e. 0.12; p= .12) but that there was a highly-significant change between 
baseline and the average of the two follow-up values (mean change 0.81; s.e. 0.10; 
p< .01).  In this case the equality constraints for the factor loadings over time were not 
supported by the data.  This had practically no effect on the conclusions, however 
(mean factor change between 3 and 12 months 0.19; s.e. 0.12; p= .12, and the mean 
change between baseline and the average of 3 and 12 months 0.81; s.e. 0.10; p< .01).  
But note that although the model with time-varying factor loadings fitted reasonably 
well according to the CFI (0.97) and RMSEA (0.08) criteria, the fit was not good 
according to the chi-square value (135.73 with 48 degrees of freedom).  On the 
PSYRATS, 38.4% of the sample showed a decrease in delusional conviction, 42.7% 
showed no change, and 18.9% showed an increase over the year of follow-up.  34.4% 
(n = 31) participants maintained 100% conviction in their beliefs throughout the 12 
months.  
 Tests of contrasts showed no significant change in the JTC factor score 
between 3 and 12 months (mean change 0.33; s.e. 0.24; p= .17), or between baseline 
and average of the 3 and 12 months values (mean change -0.29; s.e. 0.20; p= .16) – 
the chi-square test for the equality of factor scores at the three times being 3.91 with 2 
d.f. (p> .05).  The fit of the model with time-invariant factor loading was very good – 
indicated by a CFI of 1, an RMSEA of 0 and a chi-square of 20.90 with 28 degrees of 
freedom. 
 Likewise, there was no significant change in BF factor scores between 3 and 
12 months (mean change -0.21; s.e. 0.37; p= .58), or between baseline and the 
average of 3 and 12 months (mean change -0.49; s.e. 0.30; p= .10).  The chi-square 
for constraining for the factor scores to be the same for all three time points was 3.22 
with 2 d.f. (p> .05).  The fit of the model with time-invariant factor loading was good 
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as indicated by a CFI of 0.98, an RMSEA of 0.06 but some lack of fit suggested by a 
chi-square of 40.81 with 24 degrees of freedom. 
In summary, there was some evidence of an overall decline in delusional 
conviction, but none in either JTC or BF. 
 
4.5.4 Hypothesis 3: Baseline JTC and lack of belief flexibility 
will moderate change in conviction over time 
As shown in Table 4.6, the baseline JTC factor score did not significantly 
correlate with the conviction factor score at any time point (p = .65 [baseline], .41 [3 
months], .28 [12 months]).  In contrast, the baseline BF factor score correlated 
negatively with conviction factor score at all time points (p < .01 at all time points) i.e. 
individuals with inflexible beliefs at baseline had higher levels of conviction at all 
time points. 
Calculation of Pearson correlations indicated that changes in the factor scores 
for conviction were not significantly correlated with baseline values of the JTC factor, 
r = 0.03 (p = .65) and r = 0.04 (p = .56), for the changes between 0 and 3 months and 
between 0 and 12 months, respectively, or the BF factor for the change between 0 and 
12 months, r = -0.04 (p = .52), though the correlation between baseline BF and 
change in conviction in the first three months reached trend level, r = -0.13 (p < .06). 
 
4.6 Discussion 
  Cognitive models of delusions have placed an emphasis on reasoning 
processes, and this is the largest study so far on this topic.  Almost three hundred 
people with delusions were repeatedly assessed on multiple measures of delusion 
conviction, jumping to conclusions and belief flexibility.  The sample was of patients 
who had had at least two acute episodes, and these individuals typically had a lengthy 
history of psychotic symptoms.  If, as cognitive models assert, delusions are 
maintained by biased reasoning, such biases should be especially apparent.  This was 
confirmed.  At the first assessment, 50% of participants showed jumping to 
conclusions on the standard beads task, while a similar proportion thought they could 
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not be mistaken in their belief.  These proportions are consistent with the smaller 
studies reported previously.    
 While previous studies have reported correlations between delusional 
conviction and reasoning biases, this is the first time that multiple measures have been 
put together to examine their factor structure.  Three distinct factors of conviction, 
JTC and BF emerged, suggesting that the measures used here, along with many of the 
different measures reported previously, are tapping distinct and coherent constructs.  
Method variance may have played some part in these results and possibly inflated the 
effects – two of the constructs were assessed by binary variables and one by 
quantitative scoring; and JTC was assessed by a delusion-unrelated cognitive task 
rather than by delusion-focussed interview.  Whether other methods would so clearly 
replicate these three constructs is an empirical question.  Another limitation was the 
amount of missing data.  Clearly, a more complete data set would have been 
preferable, and replication of the results is necessary, but the way in which factor 
analysis models make allowance for missing data is a strength of this statistical 
method. 
  We have also clarified the relationship between these constructs.  The inability 
to think that the delusion could be at all incorrect and to generate alternative 
explanations for events is distinct from high levels of belief conviction.  Belief 
flexibility is therefore not merely a refined method of assessing delusional conviction.  
Belief flexibility was nevertheless associated at all time points with the degree of 
delusional conviction, and especially highly negatively correlated at baseline, 
consistent with our earlier report (Garety et al., 2005).  Conviction and belief 
inflexibility, at least when assessed directly with regards to the delusions, are 
understandably linked and share common variance.  How then are they different? We 
can illustrate the point by considering the proportion of the 110 people in our sample 
with 100% conviction at baseline who affirmed that they may or may not be mistaken 
on the Possibility of being Mistaken (PM) measure.  Approximately one quarter (23%) 
with 100% conviction scored positively on PM: ‘I am fully convinced but can 
concede that I may be mistaken’; this differs from: ‘I am fully convinced and it is 
impossible that I am mistaken’ which was found in the remaining 77%.  People can be 
equally convinced that they are correct in asserting a given belief, but differ in their 
relationship to that conviction.  
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Contrary to our previous report, we did not find that jumping to conclusions 
was associated with higher level of delusional conviction (Garety et al., 2005).  This 
may be because JTC is simply only one of many processes contributing to delusional 
conviction over time. JTC is clearly related to the presence of delusions, but these 
data suggest that levels of conviction may be more closely related to and possibly 
influenced by the relatively independent processes of belief flexibility.    The main 
finding in relation to JTC is that in a large group, prone to enduring high conviction 
beliefs, there were significant levels of JTC. There were also indications of modest 
relationships between belief flexibility and JTC, as was expected.  
 The study group had all experienced a recent relapse of psychosis, and it is 
striking that the delusions and reasoning biases were so persistent over the period of 
follow-up.  Although conviction was less stable, in that there was a significant 
decrease in the conviction factor score in the first three months, the decrease was 
small, and substantial levels of symptoms remained.  Despite receiving treatment, 
one-third of the group held their delusions with 100% certainty throughout the year of 
assessment and only about one-third of participants showed a decrease in delusional 
conviction.  Moreover there were no significant changes in both the reasoning biases.  
Reasoning biases and conviction were thus hardly affected by a year’s treatment with 
medication and, for some in this study, psychological therapy.  No previous studies 
have reported on the stability of belief flexibility, while our findings concerning the 
stability of JTC are consistent with other reports (e.g. Peters & Garety, 2006).  It is 
noteworthy here that both JTC and belief flexibility are stable whereas conviction 
may change – an inflexible way of thinking or limited data gathering do not improve 
as the delusional conviction reduces, but are enduring.  There is, however, some weak 
evidence, that belief flexibility predicts conviction change, in that there was a 
marginally significant association between baseline belief flexibility and change in 
conviction at 3 months, consistent with earlier research findings (e.g. Garety et al., 
1997).  Flexible thinking may render the person more open to experiences or ideas 
which change their conclusions.  However, a limitation of this study is that what could 
be learned about the relationships between changes in delusional conviction, belief 
flexibility and jumping to conclusions was unexpectedly severely curtailed by the 
relative stability of the variables of interest.   
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How can this work be taken forward?  There are two clear routes.  One is to 
carry out a similar observational study in patients more likely to show change over 
time, for instance, in individuals with at risk mental states, patients in early contact 
with services, or patients entering a prodromal phase.  It would be of interest to assess 
JTC and belief flexibility for delusion-related and neutral materials and to address the 
limitations of method variance noted above.  Assessment of meta-cognitive beliefs 
about decision-making and executive functioning abilities to learn about the cognitive 
factors related to reasoning biases would also be of interest.  The second route is more 
clinically relevant, and that is to alter reasoning biases using precisely targeted 
interventions and examine the effects on delusional beliefs.  That is, to take a 
manipulationist or interventionist – causal model approach (Kendler & Campbell, 
2009), thereby potentially providing stronger causal evidence for a role of reasoning 
biases in delusion maintenance.  Reasoning biases are clearly evident in the sample, 
and even for those not showing the extreme forms, it is likely that if more careful 
data-gathering and consideration of alternative explanations could be encouraged then 
this may help produce a shift from a delusional perspective.  The study indicates that 
increasing data-gathering may be one of several potential techniques that will assist in 
enabling greater belief flexibility, which is the reasoning process most closely tied to 
degree of belief in the delusional idea.  Potentially appropriate techniques are 
currently being developed (e.g. Moritz et al., 2010b; Ross et al., 2011; Waller et al., 
2011). 
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Addendum to Chapter 4 – Comparison of JTC bias in 
psychotic patients with and without delusions 
Chapter 4 was an investigation of factor structure and longitudinal 
relationship between delusional conviction, JTC and BF.  Since the hypotheses 
focussed on changes in delusional conviction, only the 273 patients with delusions 
in the Psychological Prevention of Relapse in Psychosis (PRP) trial were included.  
Following the publication of this study (So et al., 2012), an additional analysis was 
performed which was relevant to the overall aim of the thesis i.e. role of JTC in the 
development of delusions.  Previous studies (e.g. Garety & Freeman, 1999; Garety 
et al., 2005) have suggested that JTC is associated with delusions.  Therefore, the 
aim of this analysis was to compare the level of JTC bias in psychotic patients with 
and without delusions, with the hypothesis that JTC bias is greater in psychotic 
patients with delusions than in those without.  The sample consisted of the same 
273 patients with delusions as in Chapter 4 and the rest of the PRP trial sample (n = 
28) who had hallucinations but did not have delusions at any of the time points 
throughout the 12-month study period. 
In order to test this hypothesis, the longitudinal JTC factor model which was 
used to estimate JTC factor scores (see section 4.5.2) was fitted to the data in the 
total sample (N = 301), where a new dummy variable was created to represent the 
absence of delusion (0 = deluded; 1 = non-deluded).  Using this model, the absence 
of delusions was used to predict JTC factor score at each of the three time points (at 
baseline, and at 3 and 12 months follow-up).  
The mean JTC factor scores for the group with delusions were: 0.19 (SD = 
1.05) at baseline, 0.62 (SD = 1.02) at 3 months, and 0.20 (SD = 1.13) at 12 months.  
The mean JTC factor scores for the patients without delusions were: -0.16 (SD = 
1.08) at baseline, 0.13 (SD = 1.06) at 3 months, and -0.47 (SD = 1.14) at 12 months.  
The absence of a delusion significantly predicted JTC factor scores at 3 (β = -1.13, 
SE = 0.57, p = .05) and 12 (β = -1.880, SE = 0.783, p = .02) months but not at 
baseline (β = -0.62, SE = 0.58, p = .29), indicating that the deluded group showed a 
hastier decision-making style at two of the three time points. 
Although JTC was not associated with a higher level of conviction (see 
section 4.5.2), it was generally higher in those with current delusions.  This 
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indicates that JTC contributes to the development of delusions.  While many JTC 
studies compared deluded individuals with non-deluded psychiatric controls 
(Dudley et al., 1997a; Fear & Healy, 1997; Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988; Peters 
& Garety, 2006), this analysis is a more stringent test of the specific role of JTC in 
delusions because multiple measures were analysed in a multivariate approach and 
the comparison group also had active psychotic symptoms, i.e. hallucinations.  Our 
finding also supports the view that JTC is specifically related to the presence of 
delusions and not the diagnosis of schizophrenia (Moritz & Woodward, 2005; 
Peters & Garety, 2006; Peters et al., 2008; Van Dael et al., 2006).   
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Chapter 5 
Study 3: Changes in delusions, belief flexibility and 




In this thesis, changes in delusions have been examined in 40 participants in 
an acute phase over eight weeks of antipsychotic treatment (Study 1), and in 273 
participants following a recent relapse of psychosis over a 12 months’ period (Study 
2).  Consistent with a large-scale meta-analysis and randomised trials (Agid et al., 
2003; Leucht et al., 2005a), Study 1 found that delusions improved most markedly 
in the early weeks of antipsychotic treatment and that changes in the first two weeks 
predicted overall symptom improvement.  Study 1 also found an improvement in all 
delusional dimensions (including conviction) over time, which was not consistent 
with Mizrahi et al. (2006).  As discussed in Chapter 3, one possible explanation for 
the discrepancy in results was the use of different measures of conviction.  
Considering that the greatest symptom improvement takes place in the first two 
weeks of antipsychotic treatment, and that having a good multi-dimensional 
assessment of delusions is crucial, the present study (Study 3) aimed to focus on the 
process of change in delusional dimensions over the two-week critical period, with 
a more fine-grained analysis using both clinical ratings and the experience sampling 
method (ESM; Delespaul, 1995; Myin-Germeys et al., 2009). 
The literature review and Studies 1 and 2 in this thesis found a strong 
association between belief flexibility (BF) and delusional conviction, and some 
improvement in BF during treatment (see also Freeman et al., 2004; Garety et al., 
2005).  While improvement in BF during treatment has been measured using the 
Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Scale (MADS; Taylor et al., 1994), it is an open 
question whether BF fluctuates within a day.  Given that BF is closely associated 
with the level of conviction, and conviction varies across environments (Myin-
Germeys et al., 2001a; Peters et al., 2011), it is of interest to explore the possibility 
of measuring momentary levels of BF in the flow of daily life and to examine the 
temporal relationship between BF and conviction over two weeks in the initial 
phase of antipsychotic treatment.   
While delusional conviction is associated with BF, it has been suggested that 
delusional distress and preoccupation may be associated with aberrant salience (see 
Chapter 1, Section 1.3.1).  Kapur (2003; Kapur et al., 2005) suggested that 
psychosis is “a somewhat novel and perplexing state marked by exaggerated 
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importance of certain percepts and ideas”, and delusions are “a ‘top-down’ 
cognitive explanation that the individual imposes on these experiences of aberrant 
salience in an effort to make sense of them” (Kapur, 2003, p. 15).  According to this 
theory, antipsychotics “block dopamine and dampen the salience of the 
preoccupying symptoms”, so that new aberrant salient experiences are less likely to 
form and previously acquired aberrant salient experiences are more likely to 
extinguish (Kapur & Mamo, 2003).  Antipsychotics do not change delusional ideas 
primarily, and patients work through their symptoms towards a “psychological 
resolution” (Kapur et al., 2006).  In keeping with this “salience hypothesis”, 
patients reported that antipsychotics helped by “detaching” them from the psychotic 
symptoms rather than “eradicating” the symptoms per se (Mizrahi et al., 2005).  
Therefore, it would be expected that both aberrant salience and delusional distress 
and preoccupation would improve with antipsychotics.  Aberrant salience has been 
assessed in patients with schizophrenia using an experimental paradigm, the 
Salience Attribution Test (SAT) (Roiser et al., 2009).  In this reward learning task, 
aberrant salience was calculated by the difference between response latency and 
subjective reinforcement probability ratings for task-irrelevant stimuli.  Roiser et al. 
(2009) found greater aberrant salience in patients with delusions than in patients 
without delusions.  However, change in aberrant salience in response to 
antipsychotic treatment has not been examined before.  The present study aimed to 
develop a self-report assessment of aberrant salience based on Kapur and 
colleagues’ (2005, 2006) notion of the concept, and to examine changes in aberrant 
salience and its relationship with delusional distress and preoccupation during 
antipsychotic treatment. 
Studies 1 and 2 reported that the ‘jumping to conclusions’ (JTC) bias did not 
respond to antipsychotic and did not improve over a 12 months’ period.  This is 
consistent with other studies, which have suggested that JTC is a stable trait (e.g. 
Peters & Garety, 2006).  However, the finding that JTC was not associated with 
delusional conviction and did not predict improvement in conviction was not fully 
consistent with previous studies (e.g. Garety et al., 2005; Menon et al., 2008).  
Based on patients’ performance on probability tasks including the ‘beads’ task, it 
has been suggested that individuals who jump to conclusions have a lower threshold 
for making decisions and tend to revise decisions/ probability estimates when 
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confronted with potentially disconfirming information (Garety et al., 1991; Moritz 
et al., 2009; Moritz & Woodward, 2005; Peters & Garety, 2006; Rubio et al., 2011).  
Using ESM, the role of JTC as a predictor of change and fluctuations in conviction 
will be examined. 
 
5.2 Experience sampling method (ESM) 
ESM is a structured diary technique, assessing current context and 
psychological experiences in the realm of daily life (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 
1987; Delespaul, 1995; deVries, 1992; Myin-Germeys et al., 2009).  A general 
description of this methodology is available in Chapter 1 (Section 1.4.2).  This 
method is particularly well-suited for investigating delusions, since they may 
fluctuate over time and in response to internal and contextual stimuli.  Fluctuations 
in delusional experiences have been reported by Myin-Germeys et al. (2001a), who 
asked participants to describe their spontaneous thought (just before the signal went 
off), and to rate on the following on ESM: preoccupation (“I’m preoccupied by my 
thoughts right now”), suspicion (“My thoughts are suspicious”), and feeling 
controlled (“My thoughts are being influenced”).  The content of the thought was 
also coded as pathological or not.  A moment was identified as delusional if the 
thought content was coded as pathological or if the response to any of the three 
ESM items was above cut-off.  Using these criteria, Myin-Germeys et al. (2001a) 
found that chronic patients with schizophrenia experienced delusions around one-
third of the time.  However, it is possible that a moment was defined as delusional if 
preoccupation was high even though the content of the thought was not pathological, 
i.e. the participant may have been preoccupied with other, non-delusional thoughts.  
To examine fluctuations in the same delusion over time, a potentially superior way 
would be to elicit the specific content of the belief in an interview and phrase the 
ESM items according to the wording used by the participant.  Using this method, 
Peters et al. (2011) assessed dimensions of hallucinations and delusions in 12 out-
patients with psychosis over six days.  They found that conviction and appraisals of 
psychotic symptoms were highly variable, and that delusional dimensions were 
associated with each other (although the associations between other dimensions and 
conviction were the weakest).  The present study aimed to use a similar 
methodology in an acute sample. 
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The present study is novel in several ways.  While delusional dimensions 
have been measured using ESM before (Peters et al., 2011), BF and aberrant 
salience have not.   Therefore, new ESM measures of these constructs have been 
developed.  In addition, the present study is to our knowledge the first ESM study 
with in-patients during an acute delusional episode, at the beginning of their 
antipsychotic treatment.  The duration of assessment period (two weeks) is also the 
longest among ESM studies on patients with psychosis which typically cover six 
days (see Myin-Germeys et al., 2003a, 2009; Oorschot et al., 2009, for reviews).     
 
5.3 Study aims and hypotheses 
The current study aimed to explore the feasibility and validity of using ESM 
as a method to measure delusional dimensions, BF and aberrant salience in patients 
with acute psychosis.  It also aimed to examine fluctuations of these constructs and 
their inter-relationships over two weeks at the beginning of antipsychotic treatment.   
Primary hypotheses were as follows: 
1. Delusional distress and preoccupation (but not delusional conviction) will 
reduce significantly over two weeks of antipsychotic treatment 
2. Delusional distress and preoccupation will be associated with aberrant 
salience cross-sectionally and over time 
3. Change in delusional conviction over time will be associated with a higher 
level of belief flexibility 
This study will also examine the following exploratory, secondary 
hypotheses: 
4. Within the same day, there will be an association between conviction at one 
assessment point and belief flexibility at the next assessment point, and vice 
versa 
5. There will be an association between JTC bias at baseline and fluctuations in 





 Ethical approval for the study was granted by the South East London 
Research Ethics Committee 4 (ref. 10/H0807/44) and a copy of the approval letter is 
included in Appendix 1.  In-patients with acute delusions (scoring 4 or above on at 
least one of the PANSS delusion items) and a clinical diagnosis (based on clinical 
notes) of schizophrenia spectrum disorder or bipolar disorder were recruited.  
Sufficient understanding of English and ability to use a Personal Digital Assistant 
(PDA) was required to complete the study procedures.  Patients with drug-induced 
psychosis or organic psychosis, and patients with a primary diagnosis of substance 
misuse were excluded.  The first assessment took place as soon as patients were 
admitted to the hospital, and no longer than two weeks after the start of 




 This section introduces the ESM measures used (see Table 5.1) as well as 
the issues that were considered when designing the study.   
Table 5.1 
ESM items  
Section Question Response 
Environment The following question concerns where you 
are right now. 
1. Where are you right now? 
□ In my home or hospital 
room 
□ Public area in the hospital 
□ At someone else’s home 
□ Outside e.g. street, shop 
□ Other 
Affect The following questions ask about how you 
are feeling at this moment. 
2. How cheerful do you feel right now? 
3. How irritated do you feel right now? 
 
 
1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
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4. How relaxed do you feel right now? 
5. How content do you feel right now? 
6. How low do you feel right now? 
7. How tense do you feel right now? 
1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
Psychotic 
symptoms 
The following questions ask about your 
thoughts or experiences at this moment. 
8.  Other than conversations with other 
people, do you hear voices right now? 
9.   Do you see images right now? 
10. How suspicious do you feel right now? 
11. How well can you concentrate right 
now? 




1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
 
1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
Delusion The following questions concern the 
problem discussed with your researcher, in 
particular the thought or idea that … (to be 
suffixed as agreed at the baseline interview) 
13. At this moment, to what extent do you 
believe this concern is true? 
14. At this moment, how much does this 
concern upset you? 
15. At this moment, to what extent does this 
concern go round and round in your 
mind? 
16. At this moment, to what extent does this 
concern interfere with what you are 
doing? 
17. At this moment, to what extent do you 
think there are other possible 
explanations for this concern? 
18. At this moment, to what extent do you 
think you may be mistaken about this 
concern? 
19. Since the last signal, have you noticed 







1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
 
1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
 
 
1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
 
 
1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
 
 
1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
 
 
1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
 
 




The following questions concern how you 
are experiencing different thoughts or events 
right now. 
20. At this moment, how much do things 
around you grab your attention? 
21. At this moment, how much do you feel 
that everything seems to have some 
meaning? 
22. At this moment, how much do you 






1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
 
 
1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
 
 
1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
Company The following questions concern who you 
are with right now. 
23. Who is with you right now? 
□ Nobody (you are alone) 
□ Family or friends 
□ Hospital staff 
□ Other patients  
□ Strangers or other people 
Activity The following questions concern the most 
significant or important activity you 
performed since the last signal. 
24. Which of your activities do you feel was 
the most important? 
 
25. To what extent did you find this activity 
pleasant? 
26. To what extent did you find this activity 
stressful? 
□ Nothing or sleeping 
□ Eating or personal hygiene 
□ Ward activity/seeing 
doctors 
□ Going out of hospital  
□ Other activity 
 
1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
 
1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
Reactivity to 
ESM (only 
in the last 
diary of the 
day) 
Please give us your opinion about 
responding to these questionnaires today. 
27. To what extent did completing these 
questionnaires influence your mood 
today? 
28. To what extent did responding to these 
questions change your regular activities 
today? 






1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
 
 
1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
 
1 (not at all) – 7 (very much) 
 137 
Since the sample consisted of patients in an acute psychotic episode who 
had not been stabilised with antipsychotics, care was taken to make sure that the 
self-assessment forms were easy to complete, with each diary entry taking no longer 
than three minutes to complete.  The ESM questions were carefully constructed and 
phrased so as to facilitate self-assessment of momentary experiences.  Items were 
organised into sections on positive and negative affect, psychotic symptoms, 
delusional dimensions, belief flexibility, and aberrant salience (see Table 5.1 for the 
list of items).  The name of the sections did not appear in the questionnaire, and 
labels such as delusions and hallucinations were not used in the questionnaire or 
interviews.  In order to orientate participants between sections of items, each section 
began with a statement introducing what the following questions were about, e.g. 
“The following questions ask about how you are feeling at this moment”.  Each 
diary consisted of the same set of questions, while three additional questions were 
asked at the last report of each day about the participant’s reactivity to conducting 
the ESM assessment.   
The ESM items on psychotic symptoms and affect were determined with 
reference to previous ESM studies (e.g.  Kimhy et al., 2006; Myin-Germeys et al., 
2001a, 2001b, 2005).  Items on delusional dimensions (conviction, distress, 
preoccupation, disruption) were worded according to each participant’s delusional 
belief, as agreed in the baseline interview.   These four dimensions were selected 
because they have been reported as major dimensions of delusions (Garety & 
Hemsley, 1987; Lincoln, 2007; Peters et al., 2004) and are also measured on 
PSYRATS (Haddock et al., 1999).  This section began with the statement: “The 
following questions concern the problem discussed with your researcher, in 
particular the thought or idea that…” followed by the exact wording of the ‘problem 
or main concern’ as described by the participant.  Only one ‘problem or main 
concern’ was selected and rated on throughout the study period.  The wording of the 
dimensions was similar to that used in Peters et al. (2011). 
As suggested by Palmier-Claus et al. (2011b), items on contextual 
information (e.g. ‘where am I’?, ‘who am I with?’) were also included so as to 
ensure that the participant was not solely focusing on his/her symptoms and that the 
diary was not only about emotionally salient information.  Both positively and 
negatively worded items (e.g. pleasant, stressful) were used.   
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New items were devised to assess belief flexibility (BF) and aberrant 
salience.  One item on BF, i.e. Possibility of being Mistaken (PM), was drawn from 
the Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Scale (MADS) which has been used in this 
thesis and previous studies (Freeman et al., 2004; Garety et al., 2005).  However, 
the item Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction (RTHC), which was included in the 
MADS interview, was not included in the ESM diary because this item involves 
reflective evaluation of a hypothetical scenario suggested by the researcher and is 
not an appropriate item for ESM.  Therefore, the ESM assessment of BF included 
the following three items: Possibility of being Mistaken (PM), generation of 
alternative explanations (AE), and experience of event(s) disconfirming the belief.  
AE has been used as a measure of BF in the Explanation of Experiences interview 
(Freeman et al., 2004), and was also included in Study 2 of this thesis (see section 
4.1.2).  Experience of events disconfirming the belief was included because it has 
been shown that patients with delusions were less responsive to disconfirmatory 
evidence than controls (e.g. Woodward et al., 2006), and discarding 
disconfirmatory evidence was considered in Freeman et al’s (2002) model as an 
important factor maintaining persecutory delusions. 
For aberrant salience, a list of items was generated based on the descriptions 
of the construct in Kapur et al.’s papers (2003, 2005, 2006) (i.e. attention-grabbing, 
novelty, exaggerated importance), which were then narrowed down and refined by a 
panel of experts (SK, PG, EP), which included the proponent of the salience 
hypothesis.  By the time this study began, the Aberrant Salience Inventory (ASI; 
Cicero, Kerns, & McCarthy, 2010) was developed.  Although the ASI included the 
concepts described in Kapur’s work, it had 29 items and was designed to measure 
“trait aberrant salience which can be used in non-clinical samples” (p. 689).  The 
items were phrased in a reflective way, e.g. “Do you sometimes feel…”, “Do you 
ever notice that…”  Therefore, this scale was not suitable for assessment of 
moment-by-moment changes of aberrant salience.  It was decided that, as a first 
ESM study investigating changes in aberrant salience, this study would include only 
three items tapping into attention-grabbing, novelty, and exaggerated importance 
respectively, with the items phrased in a way that was suitable for momentary 
assessments.   
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The full list of items was reviewed in detail by experts in the areas of 
reasoning and the ESM methodology.  Wording for some items was changed and 
the items were re-ordered so that the assessment began with a situational question 
so as to draw the participant’s attention to the here-and-now, and ended with 
questions involving evaluation of the activity preceding the beep.  The revised 
version was then piloted with two individuals from the general population for 
feasibility and clarity, after which wording of the items was further simplified to 
ease comprehension.  The final list of items is shown in Table 5.1. 
5.4.2.1.2 Protocol 
In order to obtain time-stamped data and avoid back-filling of reports 
(Broderick et al., 2003; Stone et al., 2003), the assessment was conducted 
electronically on a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) rather than using pen-and-
paper booklets.  The modified version of the Purdue Momentary Assessment Tool 
software (version 2.1.2) (Weiss et al., 2004) was used to present questions and 
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A signal-contingent protocol was used where participants were asked to 
complete a diary entry by a signal at various times throughout the day.  Signal-
contingent protocols are recommended for assessing experiences that are on-going, 
susceptible to retrospective memory bias or cognitive regulation (Conner 
Christensen et al., 2003).  In order to capture various moments during the day and 
to avoid clustering of responses, time points were randomised within a block period.  
Specifically, the 12 target hours each day were divided into seven blocks of 
approximately 90 minutes.  One signalling time was selected for every block using 
random numbers generated by the computer, with the proviso that no signals should 
occur within 20 minutes of each other.  Since participants woke up at different 
times in the day, the beep schedule was adjusted according to individual lifestyle.  
An early schedule was from 9am to 9pm, while a late schedule was from 11am to 
11pm.  Since the aim of the study was to assess momentary experiences, the PDA 
programme permitted responses to be provided only within 20 minutes following 
the signal (and two minutes following each question), and all data entries were 
time-stamped.  If they did not complete the report within this time window, the 
PDA was programmed to turn off automatically until the next activation.  In this 
way it was not possible for participants to rate their experiences in retrospect, hence 
avoiding memory bias. 
Most of the items were rated on seven-point Likert scales (from 1 “not at 
all” to 7 “very much) where the participant had to indicate their responses on a 
graphical slider (see Figure 5.1).  For contextual questions, the participants were 
asked to respond by ticking one of the several boxes (see Figure 5.1).  The 
questions and response options were arranged in a way that only one item appears 
on the screen each time and that participants did not have to scroll up or down the 
screen to read all the information on that item.  In order to save the battery, all other 
functions/ programmes in the PDA were disabled during the study period.  
5.4.2.2 Symptomatology and delusional dimensions 
Apart from ESM, psychotic symptoms were also measured using three well-
validated symptom scales, namely the Schedule for the Assessment of Positive 
Symptoms (SAPS; Andreasen, 1984), the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale 
(PANSS; Kay et al., 1987), and the Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales (PSYRATS; 
Haddock et al., 1999).  PANSS and PSYRATS have been described in detail in 
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Chapter 3 (p. 70), and the items are in Appendix 3 (p. 271-272).  SAPS is a 35-item 
interview-based scale of 32 positive symptoms of schizophrenia (see Appendix 3, p. 
275).  The SAPS consists of four areas: hallucinations, delusions, bizarre behaviour 
and positive formal thought disorder.  Each area includes ratings of specific 
symptoms and a global rating.  Symptoms over the past week are rated.  Each 
symptom is rated on a six-point (0-5) scale, and total scores range from 0 to 175.  
The SAPS has been reported to have good inter-rater reliability and test-retest 
reliability, and moderate to high internal consistency (for global summary scores 
and total scores respectively) (Schuldberg et al., 1990).  
5.4.2.3 Belief flexibility 
Belief flexibility (BF) was measured at three time points (baseline, week 1, 
and week 2) using the two items from the Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Scale 
(MADS; Garety et al., 2005; Wessely et al., 1993) – Possibility of being Mistaken 
(PM) and Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction (RTHC) (See Chapter 3, p. 73, for 
items). 
5.4.2.4 Jumping to conclusions reasoning bias 
This study included both the easier (85:15) and the harder (60:40) versions 
of the beads task (see Chapter 3, p. 74 for detail of the task).  In order to reduce the 
demand on working memory and prevent any potential confound with memory 
function, the tasks included a memory aide, in which the previous beads drawn 
were shown (Dudley et al., 1997a).  Informed by Study 1 about the stability of JTC, 
the construct was measured at baseline only in this study.  
 
5.4.3 Procedures 
As shown in Figure 5.2, participants were interviewed as soon as they began 
antipsychotic treatment (baseline), one week and two weeks after.  In addition, they 






Assessment schedule for study 3 
 
After providing written informed consent, participants were interviewed and 
completed the baseline measures.  In this interview, the researcher agreed with the 
participant on the index delusional belief (labelled as “the problem or main 
concern”) to be rated on the delusion-related ESM questions.  The participant also 
decided whether they would opt for the early or late beeping schedule.   
After the baseline assessment, the participant was trained to conduct the 
computerised ESM procedure, including the operation of the PDA and the meaning 
of all questions and response choices.  The researcher completed at least one 
practice diary entry together with the participant.  Participants were told that they 
should carry around the PDA with them and complete the report as soon as possible 
after each signal.  Typical situations in which this might be difficult (e.g. in a 
shower, meeting the doctors) were discussed, and the importance of responding to 
all the beeps was emphasised.   
Once the participants expressed confidence in completing the assessment on 
their own, the individually designed questionnaire was then programmed onto a 
Palm Tungsten E2 PDA (Palm OS® version 5.2.1).  Participants were given the 
PDA and a charger to carry with them and the ESM measurements began right 
away.  The maximum number of potential signals a participant would receive was 
98 (seven signals per day for 14 days).  However, since the assessment began right 
after the baseline interview which took place at different times of the day, some 
participants received more signals than the others on the first day.  Previous studies 
have set the criterion that participants’ data were excluded from data analysis if they 
completed fewer than 33% of the experience sampling activations (Delespaul, 1995; 
Baseline Week 2 Week 1 














Myin-Germeys et al., 2001a, 2001b).  In this study, the minimum compliance 
criterion was rounded to 30. 
In order to ensure that the participant understood and complied with the 
procedure, the researcher contacted the participant at least twice in the first week to 
offer support.  Individuals who demonstrated difficulty in understanding assessment 
questions or operating the device were given additional training.  Participants were 
interviewed at one week and two weeks after the beginning of the ESM assessment, 
and were encouraged to contact the researcher by phone if they encountered any 
problems during the assessment period.   
 
5.5 Statistical analysis 
Statistical analysis of this study involved clinical data at three time points 
and ESM data across 14 days, capturing both within- and between-individual 
differences.  Unilevel analyses of changes in clinical ratings were performed using 
paired-sample t-tests on the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 15.0 
(SPSS, 2006).   
The ESM data sets contain repeated observations nested within participants.  
Since observations from the same individual are more similar than observations 
from different individuals, the residuals are not independent.  Therefore, 
longitudinal relationships of variables across levels (beep and person) were 
evaluated using multilevel linear regression modelling (Goldstein, 1987; Snijders & 
Bosker, 1999), which is a standard method for analysing ESM data (Gable, Reis, & 
Elliot, 2000).  Regression models were tested using the multilevel XTREG 
command in STATA 10 (StataCorp, 2007) and the hierarchical linear and nonlinear 
modelling in HLM 7 (Raudenbush, Bryk, & Congdon, 2010).  While multilevel 
linear models were used for continuous outcomes (e.g. delusional dimensions), 
Bernoulli models were used for dichotomous outcomes (e.g. missingness of 
variables).  These analyses take into account the variance components of two 
different levels, adjusting for dependencies among observations generated by each 
individual.  The B coefficient from these models is the fixed regression coefficient 
of the predictor in the multilevel model, and can be interpreted in the same way as 
in the conventional unilevel regression analysis.  All analyses adjusted for the 
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effects of age and gender.  Whenever mean levels of ESM scores are presented (e.g. 
in graphs), scores were calculated for each participant and then averaged. 
The first set of multilevel modelling analysis aimed to investigate changes in 
psychotic symptoms and delusional dimensions over time (Hypothesis 1).  Separate 
regression models were estimated with each of the symptoms/dimensions as 
dependent variables (DV) respectively and day as an independent variable (IV).   
For Hypothesis 2, the relationship of aberrant salience with distress and 
preoccupation was tested cross-sectionally and over time.  To text the cross-
sectional relationship between aberrant salience and delusional dimensions, the first 
multilevel linear regression model included the summary score of aberrant salience 
as the DV, and delusional distress and preoccupation as IVs.  The second model 
tested the effect of time on aberrant salience, with the aberrant salience summary 
score as the DV and day as the IV.  The next two models tested the longitudinal 
relationship with the aberrant salience summary score as the DV and the following 
IVs: Model 1 – day, distress, day x distress interaction; Model 2 – day, 
preoccupation, day x preoccupation.  For all models including an interaction effect, 
main effects will be reported only when the interaction effect is not significant.  
This is because main effects represent the independent effect of each independent 
variable controlling for other independent variables.  In models where the 
interaction effect is significant, main effects will not be interpretable.  
In order to test Hypothesis 3, i.e. that fluctuations in delusional conviction 
were associated with a higher level of BF, two approaches to the analysis were 
taken.  The first was to examine the relationship between momentary levels of 
conviction and BF as measured by the two dichotomous items in the MADS at 
baseline, namely Possibility of being Mistaken (PM) and Reaction to Hypothetical 
Contradiction (RTHC), rated as 1 = positive/flexible, and 0 = negative/not flexible).  
Two separate Bernoulli regression models were fitted with the ESM level of 
conviction as the DV, and PM/RTHC, day, and their interactions as IVs.  The 
second approach was to examine the association between momentary ESM levels of 
conviction and BF in the flow of daily life.  A linear regression model was 
estimated with conviction as the DV, and day, BF summary score, and day x BF 
interaction as IVs.  In order to further investigate the direction of prospective 
association between conviction and belief flexibility (Hypothesis 4), ESM responses 
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were time-lagged so that models of change were tested with the IV at any given 
assessment (T0) predicting the DV at the subsequent assessment on the same day 
(T1), controlling for the score of the DV at T0.  The prospective association 
between BF and conviction was examined using a multilevel regression model with 
conviction at T1 as the DV, BF summary score at T0 as the IV, and conviction at 
T0 as the covariate.  Prospective associations in the reverse direction (i.e. 
conviction at T0 predicting BF at T1) were also tested in a separate model.   
For Hypothesis 5, participants were grouped by their performance on the 
beads task.  To test the effect of baseline JTC on fluctuations in conviction over 
time, two separate multilevel linear regression models were estimated with JTC, 
day, and JTC x day interaction as IVs, and the level of conviction and within-day 
standard deviation (day-SD) of conviction as DVs respectively.  Two other linear 
regression models were also tested with the level and day-SD of BF summary score 
as DVs, and JTC, day, and JTC x day interaction as IVs. 
 
5.6 Results 
5.6.1 Demographic and Clinical Data 
 A total of 68 in-patients who had delusions and were at the beginning of 
their antipsychotic treatment were approached, among whom 26 consented to 
participate in this study.  Half of the sample was male and half female.  Mean age 
was 36.12 years (range 20-63 years).  Psychiatric diagnoses from the case notes 
were available for 22 patients as follows: nine patients were diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, five with unspecified psychosis, three with mood disorder with 
psychotic symptoms, two with schizoaffective disorder, one with schizophreniform 
disorder, one with delusional disorder, and one with acute and transient psychotic 
disorder.  The average number of admissions (including the current one) was 1.72 
(SD = 1.54; range = 1-7).  The average number of days on antipsychotics at the time 
of the first assessment was 4.91 (SD = 2.93; range 0-13); 20 of the 26 patients were 
assessed within the first week of treatment.  The average baseline rating of delusion 
on the SAPS was 3.96 (SD = 0.53), indicating a moderate to marked level of 
severity (Andreasen, 1984).  Data on medication type were available for 21 patients 
as follows: 19 were on atypicals (Risperidone, Olanzapine, Aripiprazole, Quetiapine, 
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Amisulpiride, and Clozapine), while two were on typical antipsychotic (Clopixol 
and Piportil).  The mean starting dose of antipsychotics in chlorpromazine 
equivalents (Andreasen et al., 2010) was 162.1mg/d (SD = 88.1).  Reasons for the 
lack of medication information for the other five patients include patients’ refusal to 
permit the researcher access to their case notes and medication charts not being 
available. 
Baseline mean scores on the PANSS were as follows (N = 26): Positive = 
20.88 (SD = 4.19), Negative = 11.85 (SD = 5.38), General = 31.50 (SD = 9.04), 
Total = 64.23 (SD = 14.41), indicating a “mildly ill” to “moderately ill” level of 
severity (Leucht et al., 2005).   
Nineteen participants (valid percentage 76.0%) showed a ‘jumping to 
conclusions’ (JTC) bias on the 85:15 beads task, making a decision after seeing two 
beads or fewer.  On the 60:40 version of the beads task, 15 participants (valid 
percentage 65.2%) showed the JTC bias.  52% and 65% made a decision after 
viewing one bead only on the 85:15 and 60:40 tasks respectively.  Mean number of 
beads drawn before decision was 2.68 (SD = 3.87) on the 85:15 task, and 3.96 (SD 
= 5.63) on the 60:40 task.  Twenty two participants (valid percentage 88.0%) gave 
the correct response on the 85:15 task, and 20 (valid percentage 87.0%) gave the 
correct response on the 60:40 task. 
For belief flexibility, 15 participants (57.7%) were rated negative (i.e. not 
flexible) on both Possibility of being Mistaken (PM) and Reaction to Hypothetical 
Contradiction (RTHC) as measured by the MADS at baseline, four participants 
(15.4%) were rated positive (i.e. flexible) on both, three (11.5%) were positive on 
PM and negative on RTHC, three (11.5%) were positive on RTHC and negative on 
PM, and one (3.8%) was positive on PM but did not complete RTHC.   
 
5.6.2 Feasibility, validity and reliability of the ESM 
assessment 
5.6.2.1 Feasibility 
 Out of the 26 participants, five refused to complete the ESM assessment 
after one day and discontinued from the study.  Respective reasons for refusal were 
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as follows: the beeps were considered annoying, the PDA was lost, glasses went 
missing and the participant could not read properly, physical illness, and being 
paranoid about the assessment.  Out of the 21 participants who then continued on 
the ESM and interviews, five completed only 2 to 23 entries, and were therefore not 
included in the analysis.  The remaining 16 participants met the minimum 
compliance criterion, completing 30 or more diary entries.  There was no significant 
difference between the 16 participants who met the minimum compliance 
requirement for ESM completion and the ten participants who did not in age, 
duration and dosage of medication, number of admissions, and all scale scores in 
the PANSS, SAPS and PSYRATS (p > .10).  Responses to the MADS measures of 
BF and the beads task (both versions) were also not different between the groups (p 
> .05).  Diagnoses in the two groups were: Schizophrenia (35.7% in ESM 
completers and 50% in non-completers), Unspecified psychosis (21.4% in 
completers and 25% in non-completers), Mood disorder with psychotic symptoms 
(14.3% in completers and 12.5% in non-completers), Schizoaffective disorder 
(14.3% in completers and 0% in non-completers), Delusional disorder (7.1% in 
completers and 0% in non-completers), Acute and transient psychotic disorder 
(7.1% in completers and 0% in non-completers), and Schizophreniform disorder 
(0% in completers and 12.5% in non-completers). 
Among the 16 participants who completed ESM, the mean number of entries 
per participant was 59 (range 34-89), out of a potential maximum of 98.  The mean 
rate of compliance was 70.7% (range 40.2-94.6%).  The total number of 
observations available for multi-level models was 1,306.   
To the question “To what extent did completing these questionnaires 
influence your mood today?”, the average rating was 3.40 (SD = 2.11) on a 1-7 
point scale.  To the question “To what extent did responding to these questions 
change your regular activities today?”, the average rating was 2.98 (SD = 2.23) on a 
1-7 point scale.  Fatigue effect was examined using a Bernoulli model with the 
logit-link function with missingness as dependent variable, and Day as independent 
variable.  There was no significant change in missingness over time (B = 0.02, SE = 
0.02, p > .10). 
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5.6.2.2 Internal consistency 
 Since this was the first study using ESM in patients with acute delusions for 
as long as 14 days, and assessing psychological constructs such as belief flexibility 
and aberrant salience, an analysis was conducted to examine the inter-item 
consistency within and between constructs (see Table 5.1).  The internal 
consistency of the ESM items for each construct was examined using the 
participants’ mean values on Day 1.  The mood adjectives ‘Cheerful’, ‘Relaxed’ and 
‘Content’ formed a Positive Affect scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.91), and the items 
‘Irritated’, ‘Low’ and ‘Tense’ formed a Negative Affect scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.79).  
The items ‘Alternative explanations’, ‘Possibility of being Mistaken’ and 
‘Disconfirming experience’ formed a BF scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.93), and items 
‘Attention grabbing’, ‘Meaning’ and ‘Novelty’ formed an Aberrant salience scale 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.77).  These Cronbach’s α indicate acceptable to excellent inter-
item consistency (George & Mallery, 2003).  Therefore, a summary score was 
generated for each of these constructs and analyses were done using summary 
scores.  Delusional dimensions were not grouped as one construct because of the 
evidence for the multi-dimensionality of delusions and for associations between 
specific dimensions with psychological processes (see Chapter 1).   
5.6.2.3 Divergent validity  
As a test of the divergent validity of the ESM assessment, associations 
between scores of items from opposite constructs were tested using multi-level 
linear regression modelling.  A significant and negative association was found 
between Cheerful and Low (B = -0.09, SE = 0.03, df = 1306, p < .01) and between 
Relaxed and Tense (B = -0.09, SE = 0.03, df = 1306, p < .01).  Although the 
negative association between these items was expected, the regression coefficients 
indicate a weak association. 
5.6.2.4 Convergent validity 
 An analysis was conducted to examine the within-individual association 
between ESM scores for hallucinations and delusions on Day 1 and the clinical 
ratings at the baseline interview for specific psychotic symptoms (n = 15).  ESM 
scores for each variable were averaged within the day.  The mean ESM level of 
Voices on Day 1 did not correlate with the SAPS Auditory Hallucinations (AH) 
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item (r = 0.24, p = .39) or the PSYRATS AH subscale at baseline (r = 0.27, p 
= .32).  The mean ESM level of Images on Day 1 correlated with SAPS Visual 
Hallucinations item at trend level (r = 0.50, p = .06).  Correlation of the mean ESM 
level of Suspiciousness on Day 1 was positive and significant with the SAPS 
Persecutory delusions item (r = 0.56, p = .03) and with the PANSS Suspiciousness 
item (r = 0.51, p = .05).   
 Pearson correlation coefficients between PSYRATS ratings at baseline and 
ESM ratings on Day 1 for each of the delusional dimensions were as follows: 
Conviction (r = -0.29, p = .29), Distress (r = -0.35, p = .21), Preoccupation (r = 0.12, 
p = .67), and Disruption (r = 0.49, p = .07). 
For BF, participants who showed positive and negative BF on the MADS at 
the baseline interview were compared on their mean level of ESM belief flexibility 
summary score on Day 1.  Independent-samples t-test showed that individuals 
grouped by their responses to the MADS Possibility of being Mistaken (PM) item 
showed no significant difference in the ESM level of BF (t = -0.57, df = 12, p 
= .58).  However, there was a trend that individuals who responded positively (i.e. 
more flexible) on the MADS Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction (RTHC) item 
at baseline actually had a lower level of BF (i.e. less flexible) on the ESM (t = -2.07, 
df = 12, p = .06).   
In summary, ESM assessment and interview ratings at baseline were 
consistent for suspiciousness, partially consistent for images, and not consistent for 
voices, delusional dimensions and BF.  Although the association was not significant, 
it was in the predicted direction for voices and two of the four dimensions.  Peters et 
al. (2011) also reported that ESM measures of psychotic symptoms were not 
completely comparable to PSYRATS scores.  They argued that ESM is more 
sensitive and ecologically valid than interview-based assessments, as it captures 
psychological functioning as it unfolds in the natural environment.  Therefore, a 
lack of consistency between measures does not necessarily indicate a lack of 
validity for ESM items.  On the other hand, the inverse relationship between ESM 
level of BF and the two interview-based assessments of BF (one of which was of 
trend significance and the other not significant) cast doubt about the validity of the 
participant ESM items on BF. 
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5.6.3 Changes in psychotic symptoms over two weeks 
5.6.3.1 Clinical ratings 
 As shown in Table 5.2, there was a significant improvement in PANSS 
positive, general and total scores between the two assessment time points, as well as 
in delusions as assessed on the PANSS, SAPS and PSYRATS.  Changes in 
hallucinations were inconsistent, with improvement shown in ratings on PANSS 
and PSYRATS, but not on SAPS. 
 
Table 5.2 
Mean levels (SD) of symptom ratings at baseline and week 2 (N = 16) 
 Baseline 2 weeks Paired-sample t-test 
PANSS Positive 20.63 (4.52) 16.25 (3.72) t = 4.01, p < .01 
PANSS Negative 11.88 (5.24) 10.00 (3.58) t = 1.57, p = .17 
PANSS General 33.25 (10.51) 24.75 (5.16) t = 3.78, p < .01 
PANSS Total 65.75 (16.10) 51.00 (10.91) t = 4.06, p < .01 
PSYRATS Delusions 17.25 (3.92) 13.69 (3.63) t = 3.20, p < .01 
SAPS Delusions 4.00 (0.52) 3.13 (1.15) t = 3.22, p < .01 
PANSS Delusions 5.38 (1.03) 4.31 (1.01) t = 3.44, p < .01 
PANSS Hallucinatory behaviour 3.19 (1.94) 2.31 (1.70) t = 3.05, p = .01 
PSYRATS Auditory hallucinations 13.38 (18.02) 9.06 (14.24) t = 2.23, p = .04 
SAPS Voices 2.19 (2.29) 1.63 (2.36) t = 1.78, p = .10 
SAPS Images 0.63 (1.03) 0.88 (1.71) t = -0.85, p = .41 
 
5.6.3.2 ESM 
 Multilevel regression modelling showed a significant increase over time in 
Voices (B = 0.03, SE = 0.01, p = .02) and Images (B = 0.03, SE = 0.01, p = .01), but 
no change in Suspiciousness (p > .10). 
 
 151 
5.6.4 Hypothesis 1: Delusional distress and preoccupation 
(but not delusional conviction) will reduce significantly over 
two weeks of antipsychotic treatment 
5.6.4.1 Clinical ratings 
As shown in Table 5.3, there was a significant reduction in Distress and 
Disruption.  Change in Conviction or Preoccupation was not significant. 
 
Table 5.3 
Mean scores (SD) on PSYRATS (N = 16) 
 Baseline 2 weeks Paired-sample t test 
Conviction 3.38 (0.62) 3.25 (1.07) t = 0.46, p = .65 
Distress 3.03 (1.24) 2.13 (1.38) t = 2.52, p = .02 
Preoccupation 2.31 (0.93) 1.91 (0.69) t = 1.71, p = .11 
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ESM levels of delusional dimensions are shown in Figure 5.3.  Multilevel 
linear regression models showed a significant decrease in Distress (B = -0.04, SE = 
0.01, p < .01) and Disruption (B = -0.03, SE = 0.01, p = .01), but not in Conviction 
or Preoccupation (p > .10).  This is consistent with the finding using PSYRATS.  
Models with a quadratic term for time (i.e. squared Day) were tested, and the 
quadratic effect of time was not significant (p > .10).  Therefore, there was a linear 
decrease in distress and disruption across days.  
 
5.6.5 Hypothesis 2: Delusional distress and preoccupation 
will be associated with aberrant salience cross-sectionally 
and over time 
 The mean levels of the Aberrant salience summary score (i.e. average of the 
three ESM items on Aberrant salience), and Delusional distress and Delusional 
preoccupation as a function of time are presented in Figure 5.4. 
 
Figure 5.4 
Changes over time in aberrant salience, delusional distress and 
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 Cross-sectionally, Aberrant salience was positively associated with Distress 
(B = 0.20, SE = 0.03, p < .01) and Preoccupation (B = 0.25, SE = 0.03, p < .01).  In 
the model predicting Aberrant salience by Day, change in Aberrant salience over 
time was not significant (p > .10).  In the model where Aberrant salience was 
predicted by Day, Distress and Day x Distress interaction, there was a significant 
interaction effect of Day and Distress on Aberrant salience (B = 0.02, SE = 0.004, p 
< .01), indicating that the association between Aberrant salience and Distress 
became stronger over time.  Similarly, in the model where Aberrant salience was 
predicted by Day, Preoccupation and Day x Preoccupation interaction, there was a 
significant interaction effect of Day and Preoccupation on Aberrant salience (B = 
0.02, SE = 0.004, p < .01), indicating an increase in the relationship between 
Aberrant salience and Preoccupation over time.   
 
5.6.6 Hypothesis 3: Change in delusional conviction over 
time will be associated with a higher level of belief flexibility 
5.6.6.1 Relationship between baseline belief flexibility (on MADS) 
and ESM level of conviction 
Figure 5.5 
Change over time in conviction by baseline response to Possibility of being 


















PM Positive (n=6) PM Negative (n=10)
 
 154 
 The ESM levels of conviction by baseline BF on the two MADS items 
(Possibility of being Mistaken – PM; Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction – 
RTHC) are presented in Figures 5.5 and 5.6.  There was no significant interaction 
between Day and baseline MADS PM on Conviction (B = 0.05, SE = 0.03, p = .07).  
The main effect of Day was significant (B = -0.04, SE = 0.02, p = .03), but that of 
baseline MADS PM was not (p > .10).  Therefore, there was a reduction in 
conviction over time (holding PM constant), and the reduction did not differ 
between the PM-positive and PM-negative groups.   
 On the other hand, there was a significant interaction between Day and 
baseline MADS RTHC in predicting Conviction (B = 0.06, SE = 0.03, p = .04), 
indicating that change in conviction over time was significantly different between 
the two RTHC groups, with conviction increasing in the RTHC-positive group and 
decreasing in the RTHC-negative group (see Figure 5.6). 
 
Figure 5.6 
Change over time in conviction by baseline response to Reaction to 
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5.6.6.2 Relationship between momentary levels of belief flexibility 
and conviction on the ESM  
 The mean ESM levels of BF summary score (i.e. average score of the three 
BF items on the ESM) and conviction are shown in Figure 5.7.   There was a 
significant interaction between Day and ESM level of BF in predicting Conviction 
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(B = 0.02, SE = 0.01, p < .01), indicating a greater association between ESM levels 
of BF and conviction over time.  Note that a higher level of conviction was 
associated with a higher level of flexibility, which was in the opposite direction to 
the analysis using baseline MADS BF data. 
 
Figure 5.7 
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5.6.7 Hypothesis 4: Within the same day, there will be an 
association between conviction at one assessment point 
and belief flexibility at the next assessment point, and vice 
versa 
 Using within-day time-lagged data on the ESM, multilevel models were 
tested with BF summary score at T0 predicting conviction at T1, controlling for 
conviction at T0.  Observations when T1 was the first signal of the day or where 
items were not completed were excluded from these models, resulting in a total 
number of 614 observations.  After controlling for the effect of Conviction at T0 (B 
= 0.31, SE = 0.05, p < .01), BF summary score at T0 predicted Conviction at T1 
significantly (B = 0.11, SE = 0.06, p = .05).  A separate model tested the prediction 
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in the reverse direction.  After controlling for the effect of BF at T0 (B = 0.27, SE = 
0.04, p < .01), Conviction at T0 did not predict BF at T1 (B = 0.05, SE = 0.03, p 
> .10).  Therefore, a higher momentary level of BF predicted an increase in 
conviction at the next ESM assessment within the day, but not the other way round.  
Again, the association between more flexibility and higher conviction was not 
consistent with the analysis using baseline BF data. 
 
5.6.8 Hypothesis 5: There will be an association between 
JTC bias at baseline and fluctuations in delusional 
conviction and belief flexibility over time 
 Among the 16 participants who completed the ESM assessment, 14 (valid 
percentage 87.5%) showed the JTC bias on the 85:15 beads task and eight (valid 
percentage 57.1%) on the 60:40 beads task.  Considering that the percentage of JTC 
on the 85:15 task among the ESM participants was unusually high compared to 
previous studies, and that grouping participants based on their performance on the 
85:15 would lead to great imbalance in group sizes, the sample was grouped based 
on their 60:40 task performance (JTC = 8, no JTC = 6).  There was no difference 
between the JTC and non-JTC group on errors on the 85:15 (chi-square = 1.84, df = 
1, p = .18) nor on the 60:40 (chi-square = 1.84, df = 1, p = .18) tasks. 
5.6.8.1 Relationship between JTC and conviction 
 The ESM levels of conviction in individuals who showed the JTC bias on 
the 60:40 beads task and those who did not are presented in Figure 5.8.  There was a 
significant interaction between JTC and Day on Conviction (B = 0.10, SE = 0.03, p 
< .01).  The main effect of Day was significant (B = -0.07, SE = 0.02, p < .01) and 
that of JTC was not (B = 0.98, SE = 1.01, p > .10).  Therefore, conviction change 
over time was different between the two JTC groups, with an increase in conviction 
in the JTC group and a decrease in the no-JTC group. 
 Within-day variability (i.e. SD) of conviction in individuals who showed the 
JTC bias on the 60:40 beads task and those who did not is presented in Figure 5.9.  
There was a significant interaction between Day and JTC in predicting within-day 
variability of Conviction (B = 0.08, SE = 0.04, p = .04).  The main effect of Day 
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was significant (B = -0.08, SE = 0.03, p < .01), but that of JTC was not significant 
(p > .10).  Therefore, change in variability of conviction over time was different 
between the two JTC groups, with more variability in the JTC group. 
 
Figure 5.8 
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Figure 5.9 
Within-day variability (measured by SD) of conviction by baseline JTC on 
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5.6.8.2 Relationship between JTC and belief flexibility 
 The ESM levels of BF summary score in individuals who showed the JTC 
bias and those who did not are presented in Figure 5.10.  There was a significant 
interaction between JTC and Day on BF (B = 0.08, SE = 0.02, p < .01).  Therefore, 
change in BF over time was different between the two JTC groups, with an increase 
in BF in the JTC group and a decrease in the no-JTC group, which, similarly to 
other ESM BF results, is opposite to the predicted direction. 
 
Figure 5.10 
Change over time in ESM belief flexibility by baseline JTC on the 60:40 
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 Within-day variability (i.e. SD) of BF in individuals who showed the JTC 
bias on the 60:40 beads task and those who did not is presented in Figure 5.11.  The 
interaction between Day and JTC in predicting variability of BF was not significant 
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 This study investigated moment-to-moment fluctuations and changes over 
time in 16 acute patients as they began antipsychotic treatment.  ESM variables 
included delusional dimensions, belief flexibility, and aberrant salience.  To our 
knowledge, this is the first study to have measured aberrant salience and belief 
flexibility using ESM.  It is also the first investigation of people with acute 
psychosis using ESM over two weeks. 
We found that conducting ESM in an acute sample of in-patients with 
delusions was feasible, although not without challenges.  Firstly, the inclusion 
criteria were restrictive – patients who had active delusions recruited very early on 
during their treatment.  As some potential participants were too disturbed or 
disorganised to take part at that stage, recruitment was difficult and slow.  Although 
only patients with at least a moderate level of delusions were recruited, it is possible 
that this sample represented patients who were relatively less severe within the 
target population.  Secondly, out of the 26 patients who consented to the study, only 
16 participants (61.5%) completed more than 30 ESM diary entries.  Note that the 
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assessment period in this study was longer than in most ESM studies, which 
typically covered six days with participants completing 20 or more diaries entered 
into analysis (Palmier-Claus et al., 2011b).  Although there was no significant 
difference between the ESM completers and the rest of the sample in clinical 
measures and reasoning biases at baseline, unmeasured or other factors that 
differentiated the completers from the non-completers could not be ruled out, e.g. 
ability to use a PDA independently.  Among the 16 participants who completed the 
minimum number of entries, compliance rate (70.7%) in this study was comparable 
to other studies using computerised ESM in in-patients with schizophrenia, e.g. 
69% for an assessment of four times a day over a week in Granholm et al. (2008), 
and 79% for an assessment of ten times over a day in Kimhy et al. (2010). 
 We found good inter-item consistency within constructs, including new 
constructs such as belief flexibility and aberrant salience.  Items of opposite 
constructs (i.e. positive and negative affect) were also associated in an expected 
direction, although the strength of association was weak.  This indicates that 
participants were able to provide reliable responses to ESM questionnaires on the 
PDA, even though they were hospitalised for an acute psychotic episode.   
However, congruence was low between ESM scores and interview ratings 
for psychotic symptoms and delusional dimensions at baseline.  For change over 
two weeks, ESM and clinical ratings showed consistency for delusional dimensions 
but improvement in hallucinations and delusions was found only on clinical ratings, 
and not ESM.  Discrepancies between ESM and interview-based measures had also 
been found in Peters et al. (2011) and Stone et al. (1993), who argued that ESM 
captured moment-by-moment phenomena that were not measured by retrospective 
measures.  Similarly, in the present study, clinical ratings were more sensitive to 
overall change between baseline and week 2, while ESM allowed for examination 
of momentary changes during the two weeks.  Clinical ratings require a reflection of 
the participant’s experiences over the last week, whereas ESM represents the 
participant’s thoughts and feelings at the time of assessment.  Apart from the time 
frame of assessment, the fact that ESM is a self-report also makes it different from 
the interviewer-rated clinical scales.  Therefore, a lack of congruence between 
measures does not necessarily indicate a lack of validity of ESM; rather, it is likely 
that the two approaches of assessment represent different aspects of the reality.  
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Unfortunately, since this study did not include another self-report measure other 
than ESM, this explanation of the discrepancy in findings is only speculative. 
 On the contrary, attention should be drawn to the discrepancy between the 
ESM and clinical ratings of belief flexibility (BF).  Firstly, individuals grouped by 
their baseline BF on MADS measures were associated with ESM BF in the opposite 
direction (although both associations did not reach statistical significance).  
Secondly, the finding of an association between higher conviction and higher ESM 
BF was in the opposite direction from the finding using interview data of BF, in this 
and all previous studies (e.g. Freeman et al., 2004; Garety et al., 2005; see also 
Studies 1 and 2 of this thesis).  These inverse associations raised the possibility that 
participants answered the BF items in the opposite direction.  The items on BF and 
delusional dimensions were included in the same section, but the BF items were 
reverse scored (i.e. a higher score is better) and the dimension items were not.  
While the possibility that participants rated the BF items in the opposite direction 
can be considered, it is not strongly supported because items on positive and 
negative affect were also in one section but responses were reliable.  Another 
possible reason is that BF involves evaluation of experiences and belief, but ESM is 
well suited for measuring momentary experiences/events but not reflective thinking 
(Palmier-Claus et al., 2011b).  It might be that the ESM items failed to capture the 
evaluative process of BF.  In fact, the BF items not only demanded evaluative 
thinking, but were also the lengthiest among all the items.  Even though the 
experimenter guided participants through each question during the practice session, 
it remains a possibility that the participants were confused by the complex sentences 
when they filled in the questionnaires on their own.  However, if this were the case, 
the responses would have been more random and yet internal consistency among 
the three items was high.  It is not immediately obvious which (or all) of these 
possibilities might have led to the unusual BF ratings, but as BF was measured 
using ESM for the first time, and concern is raised about the validity of the ESM 
measure of BF, the related findings should be interpreted with caution.   
With the above considerations of measurement, key findings of this study 
are as follows: (i) there was a reduction in general symptomatology and delusions 
over two weeks of antipsychotic treatment (as measured by clinical ratings); (ii) on 
both clinical ratings and ESM, delusional distress and disruption improved, but 
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conviction and preoccupation did not; (iii) aberrant salience did not change; (iv) 
Reaction to hypothetical contradiction (as measured by MADS) predicted the level 
of and changes in conviction; and (v) JTC bias predicted both an increase over time 
in level and variability of conviction.   
 In this sample, PANSS total score and ratings of delusions and 
hallucinations reduced by more than 20% over two weeks.  This finding, consistent 
with previous studies, lends support to the ‘early onset hypothesis’ of antipsychotic 
action which postulated that antipsychotic response starts within the first two weeks 
of treatment (Agid et al., 2003; Leucht et al., 2005a).  However, there was no 
change in delusion (and an increase in hallucinations) on ESM, suggesting that 
patients did not perceive the symptom improvement subjectively.  The discrepancy 
between subjective rating and observer’s ratings of symptom change is of clinical 
relevance.  Specifically, our finding implies that inquiring into patients’ perception 
of symptom improvement is important as it may be different from the clinician’s 
view. 
 However, delusional distress and disruption did improve over time, as 
measured by both clinical ratings and ESM.  Delusional conviction and 
preoccupation did not improve over two weeks during antipsychotic treatment, 
again consistently across the two assessment methods.  Although the lack of 
improvement in preoccupation was not expected, our finding is consistent with 
Mizrahi et al. (2006) in suggesting that conviction does not change significantly in 
the early phase of antipsychotic treatment. 
As hypothesised, aberrant salience was associated with both delusional 
distress and preoccupation, but did not change over time.  While this finding 
potentially suggests a lack of response of aberrant salience to antipsychotics at the 
early stage of treatment, the small sample size might have limited the significance 
of potential findings.  More importantly, aberrant salience was assessed using ESM 
for the first time.  Therefore, before drawing conclusions, replication of this result 
would be needed. 
The close association between delusional conviction and BF found in 
previous studies using the MADS interview (Brett-Jones et al., 1987; Garety et al., 
2005), was confirmed using similar measures.  Specifically, individuals who had a 
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positive (i.e. flexible) response to one of the measures (RTHC) on the MADS 
showed a lower level of conviction (at baseline and throughout) than those who 
were not flexible, although individuals grouped by the PM measure of the MADS 
did not differ in ESM conviction.  This provides some support for the Garety et al.’s 
(2005) model that BF contributes to the change in or persistence of delusional 
conviction.  However, there was also some evidence that individuals who were less 
flexible on RTHC showed decreasing levels of conviction over time, while those 
who were flexible showed a small increase over time.  Nevertheless, given that both 
groups had quite extreme conviction scores at baseline (2.3 in the RTHC-positive, 
and 5.3 in the RTHC-negative), this interaction could be explained by a regression 
towards the mean, whereby individuals with extreme ratings tend to score less 
extremely at repeated testing (Everitt, 2002).  This interaction was not found for the 
PM measure, suggesting it is not a robust finding. 
Using ESM measures of BF, analysis of time-lagged data showed that BF 
predicted an increase in conviction.  Moreover, individuals who jumped to 
conclusions increased in BF over time.  As discussed, the validity of the ESM BF 
measures is of concern, so no firm conclusions can be drawn from these results.  
Nonetheless, this study demonstrated the feasibility of applying temporal analysis to 
time-lagged data on key processes entailed in cognitive model of delusions during 
an acute stage of recovery. 
This study found an interesting relationship between conviction and the JTC 
bias.  The group showing JTC increased in both the level over time and within-day 
variability of conviction, while the non-JTC group showed the opposite pattern on 
both measures, even though the two groups did not differ in conviction at baseline.  
This supports the proposition that JTC contributes to persistence of delusions and 
moderates treatment response (Garety et al., 2005; Menon et al., 2008).  More 
importantly, by assessing patients’ delusions on a moment-by-moment basis, the 
present study confirmed a direct association between JTC and variability of the 
delusional belief per se.  This is consistent with data from probabilistic tasks which 
showed that patients with delusions tend to jump to conclusions and to revise their 
certainty estimates in view of potentially disconfirming information, i.e. “mak(ing) 
strong judgements based on little information” (Moritz, Woodward, & Hausmann, 
2006, p. 327).  In their review, Garety and Freeman (1999) concluded that, as 
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shown in ‘neutral’ tasks, “people with delusions may be more ready to abandon 
existing hypotheses and form new ones, again on the basis of little evidence” (p. 
131).  The present study took one step further and found that this tendency may 
apply to delusional conviction as well.  That is, JTC aggravated patients’ tendency 
to shift their judgements (including about their delusion) from moment to moment, 
and patients who jumped to conclusions maintained a generally higher level of 
conviction over time than those who did not jump to conclusions.  Note that 
grouping was based on JTC on the more conservative (60:40) version of the beads 
task only, and therefore a replication is needed using other JTC measures and in a 
larger sample.  These results call for a better understanding of the mechanisms 
underlying JTC and the development of treatment for this bias.  Recent 
developments in reasoning training targeting the JTC bias (Moritz et al., 2011b; 
Ross et al., 2011; Waller et al., 2011) have shown promise in remediating reasoning 
biases including the JTC effectively. 
There are several limitations to this study.  Firstly, the validity of the new 
ESM measures of BF and aberrant salience has not been established.  Self-report 
measures of aberrant salience were not available for external validation.  As 
discussed, BF responses did not appear to be random but were in an opposite 
direction to the interview-based ratings.  These have limited the interpretability of 
the associated results.  Secondly, the relatively small number of ESM completers 
restricted the kind of analysis performed.  In particular, the subgroups by baseline 
reasoning bias had sizes smaller than n = 10 each.  In relation to the issue of sample 
size, patients were not sub-divided based on the type of antipsychotics they were 
taking.  Although we did not intend to compare effect of various antipsychotics on 
our key variables, we are aware that different medications may differ in their effect 
on affect (Lataster et al., 2011), which may have an indirect impact on delusional 
dimensions.  Lastly, there were dropouts and missing data, which might have 
further limited the statistical power of analysis.  Therefore, replication of the novel 
findings is needed, particularly for analyses involving the new ESM measures. 
Against these caveats, we conclude that this study corroborated other 
evidence that delusional dimensions improve within the first few weeks of 
antipsychotics with delusional conviction remaining least changed, that baseline 
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What has been learnt about change in delusions and 
reasoning processes, and the way forward 
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6.1 Summary of the studies 
Change in delusions was the focus of this thesis.  The central research 
question was not about improvement in overall level of severity of the symptom, as 
it has previously been widely shown that delusions improve with antipsychotic 
treatment.  What was of particular interest was the process of change in delusions 
over time and during treatment, i.e. what aspects of a delusional experience respond 
to treatment?  Do the psychological processes associated with delusional 
dimensions change, and if so, do they change together with delusional dimensions? 
Do reasoning biases predict change in delusions?  To look at the process of change, 
three longitudinal studies were conducted using three separate samples of patients at 
different stages of recovery.  All samples were patients with delusions of at least 
moderate severity.  Participants in Studies 1 and 3 were in an acute stage of 
psychosis, with Study 3 participants having received antipsychotic treatment for 
less than two weeks, and Study 1 participants less than four weeks.  68.7% of Study 
3 participants and 65.0% of Study 1 participants were in their first episode of 
psychosis, whereas Study 2 participants were patients with longer-term conditions, 
and a recent relapse of psychosis.  The studies captured different trajectories 
through the disorder, with Studies 1 and 3 covering the early phase of antipsychotic 
treatment for eight and two weeks respectively, and Study 2 following patients over 
one year during a more stable stage.  Sample sizes in Studies 1 (N = 40) and 2 (N = 
273) were relatively large among studies of the same kind. 
Within a framework of delusions as psychological phenomena, a range of 
measures were employed in order to achieve a fine-grained assessment of their 
change over time.  Symptom rating scales were included to examine changes in the 
severity of symptomatology.  However, the focus of interest was multi-
dimensionality of delusions, which was measured by interviews and self-reports.  
These measures were chosen because (i) they assessed various dimensions of 
delusions which had been shown to change independently over time and with 
treatment; and (ii) the questions were individually designed so that the specific 
wording corresponded to the idiosyncratic content of patients’ delusions.  These 
measures, therefore, allowed for sensitive assessment of the same delusional belief 
for each individual across time points.  This was especially important in the early 
phase of treatment, e.g. Study 1, when drastic changes in phenomenology were 
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expected.  When the process of change during the acute phase of treatment was 
concerned, i.e. Study 3, a still more sensitive assessment was demanded.  We 
adopted the experience sampling method (ESM), a structured diary of moment-to-
moment psychological experiences in the flow of daily life.  ESM has been used in 
studies of psychiatric disorders including schizophrenia, but this was the first time it 
has been used to assess multi-dimensional delusional changes over two weeks in an 
acute sample of patients who had only just begun medication.  Using ESM, Study 3 
explored whether acute patients were able to give reliable ‘on-line’ reports of their 
symptoms and delusional experiences, how delusional dimensions changed over 
two weeks of treatment, and whether reasoning biases predicted momentary level 
and within-day fluctuations of delusional conviction. 
Apart from delusional changes, another key aim of the thesis was to 
investigate the prospective relationship between delusional dimensions and 
psychological processes over time and during treatment.  Mood changes were 
examined in Study 1, using validated questionnaires.  Two reasoning processes 
were examined in all studies – the ‘jumping to conclusions’ (JTC) bias and belief 
flexibility (BF), as they have been proposed to be closely associated with the 
development and maintenance of delusions (see review in Chapter 2).  Using 
multiple measures of JTC, BF and delusional conviction, Study 2 established the 
factor structure of these constructs, as well as their relationship over time.  Study 1 
examined early response of JTC and BF to antipsychotics over eight weeks in an 
acute sample.  Based on the results of the literature review (Chapter 2) and Study 1, 
which suggested that BF was more likely to change (than JTC) during improvement 
in delusions, we explored the use of ESM to capture within-day changes in BF in a 
shorter time frame of two weeks.  As well as BF, new ESM measures were also 
devised for aberrant salience in Study 3, and its proposed relationship with the 
emotional aspects of delusions (i.e. distress and preoccupation) was tested. 
In summary, this thesis consists of three empirical studies examining the 
process of change in delusional dimensions over periods ranging from two weeks to 
12 months, as well as their relationship with psychological processes such as 
reasoning and aberrant salience. 
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6.2 Summary of results 
Key findings of the studies are summarised in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 
Summary of findings of all studies 
 Study 1 (N=40): 8 weeks Study 2 (N=273): 12 months Study 3 (N=16): 2 weeks 
Overall change in 
symptom severity 
Delusion improved on PANSS  Delusion improved on PANSS and 
SAPS 





All dimensions improved 
Dimensions correlated with each other 
Conviction improved over first three 
months 
Distress and disruption improved, 
conviction and preoccupation did 
not 
Change in JTC & 
BF 
PM (but not RTHC) improved 
JTC did not change 
Cognitive biases reduced 
Appraisals of anomalous event improved 
BF factor did not change 





Higher BF was associated with lower 
conviction 
Baseline BF did not predict change in 
conviction 
Higher BF associated with lower 
conviction 
Baseline BF predicted conviction 
change (0-3 months) at trend level 
Higher BF (on MADS RTHC) 
associated with lower conviction 
ESM BF associated with conviction 





JTC was not associated with level of 
conviction 
Baseline JTC did not predict change in 
conviction 
No correlation between JTC factor and 
conviction factor 
Baseline JTC did not predict change in 
conviction 
Patients with delusions had increased 
JTC than patients without delusions at 
two of the three time points 
Individuals who did not JTC 
decreased in level and variability of 
conviction over time (while those 
who showed JTC increased) 
Relationship 
between JTC & BF 
 Weak association at baseline only Individuals who JTC increased in 
level of ESM BF 
Relationship 
between delusions, 
mood and aberrant 
salience 
Preoccupation co-varied with depression 
and anxiety 
Other dimensions co-varied with 
subjective distress 
 Distress and preoccupation 
associated with aberrant salience 
cross-sectionally and over time 
Change in mood 
and aberrant 
salience 
Trend improvement in anxiety 
Depression and subjective distress did not 
change 
(measured by multi-level modelling) 
 Aberrant salience did not change 
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 As set out at the beginning of this chapter, the aim of this thesis was to 
investigate the process of change over time and during treatment.  We confirmed 
that there was indeed a change, i.e. symptom improvement, in our samples.  In all 
three studies, there was a reduction in severity of delusions and overall 
symptomatology over the study periods.  Therefore, our samples were examined 
during the course of recovery.  When we examined changes in delusional 
dimensions, the picture was less consistent.  Distress and disruption improved over 
two weeks in Study 3 on both interview-based and self-report measures.  
Conviction and preoccupation did not improve.  However, all four dimensions 
improved together over eight weeks in Study 1, and marked reduction was evident 
in the first two weeks.  Our hypothesis that aberrant salience would be associated 
with delusional distress and preoccupation was supported, and this relationship 
grew stronger over time.  However, the lack of change in aberrant salience was 
unexpected.   
We investigated the role of BF and JTC in the development and 
maintenance of delusional dimensions across studies using multiple measures.  As 
hypothesised, individuals with higher BF had a lower level of conviction (across 
studies), although there was mixed evidence as to whether baseline BF predicted 
change in conviction.  However, the association between BF and conviction was in 
the opposite direction when BF was measured using ESM, and the validity of these 
specific items was questioned.  In contrast, JTC was not associated with conviction 
and did not predict conviction change in Studies 1 and 2, but individuals who 
showed JTC increased in the level and variability of conviction over time. 
 
6.3 Theoretical implications 
6.3.1 Differential response of delusional dimensions to 
antipsychotics? 
 One of the hypotheses in Studies 1 and 3 was that the various delusional 
dimensions would respond to the early stage of antipsychotics differently.  Study 1 
aimed to replicate Mizrahi et al.’s (2008) finding that preoccupation and distress 
responded to early antipsychotic treatment faster and to a greater extent than 
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conviction.  Using a sample that doubled the size of that in Mizrahi et al. (2008), 
Study 1 compared relative changes in all dimensions using linear mixed modelling.  
The hypothesis that the affective aspects (i.e. distress and preoccupation) would 
improve faster than conviction was not supported.  All dimensions improved over 
eight weeks, and conviction did not change differently from other dimensions.  In 
fact, there was a strong correlation between dimensions across time points.  In 
contrast, in Study 3 distress and disruption improved over the first two weeks of 
antipsychotic medication, but conviction and preoccupation did not.  Therefore, 
these findings suggest that delusional dimensions did respond to antipsychotics 
differentially in Study 3, but not in Study 1.  The results remained discrepant 
between the two studies when delusional change was examined over a comparable 
period of time.  Over the first two weeks of treatment, all dimensions (including 
conviction) showed marked reduction in Study 1 (see Figures 3.1, A.1, A.2).  On 
the other hand, conviction remained largely unchanged over two weeks in Study 3. 
The following possible explanations of the inconsistent results have been 
considered.  Firstly, the Study 1 sample had higher ratings on all dimensions at 
baseline (see Table A.1) than the Study 3 sample (see Table 5.3), hence having 
more potential for improvement over time.  Secondly, the Study 3 sample had a 
shorter duration of treatment, suggesting a possibility that a differential response to 
treatment among dimensions occurs only in a very early phase of treatment.  In 
Mizrahi et al. (2006) where a differential response was reported, the participants 
were drug free (or had started antipsychotics within last 48 hours).  The Study 3 
sample, although not completely drug-free, was more comparable to Mizrahi et al.’s 
(2006) than the Study 1 sample, but delusional change was not measured beyond 
two weeks, and the sample size was small.  However, measures in Studies 1 and 3 
were superior to Mizrahi et al. (2006) for examining treatment response of 
delusional dimensions because delusions (rather than ‘principal psychotic 
experiences’) were measured specifically and our conviction measure did not 
include an element of insight.  Therefore, what is needed is another longitudinal 




6.3.2 What does symptom improvement on clinical rating 
scales mean?  
Symptom ratings and multi-dimensional ratings revealed a rather different 
picture of the process of recovery.  There was a significant reduction in delusions 
and general symptomatology on symptom rating scales in both Studies 1 and 3.  
However, conviction improved in Study 1 only.  It was distress and disruption that 
improved in Study 3, suggesting that clinical ratings were largely affected by these 
affective dimensions of delusions.  This is intriguing because conviction is central 
in the definition of delusion (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; Appelbaum 
et al., 2004; Harrow et al., 1988; Kendler et al., 1983), and guidance of delusion 
ratings on PANSS and SAPS does operationalise severity of the symptom based on 
various dimensions including conviction, distress and disruption, etc.  However, 
delusions were rated as reduced even though the strength of the belief (i.e. 
conviction) remained high, suggesting that multi-dimensional assessment of 
delusional experiences provided additional and important information about 
recovery which was not represented in clinical ratings.  Therefore, it is 
recommended that assessment of dimensions is included in treatment outcome 
evaluation and clinical practice. 
 
6.3.3 Aberrant salience was associated with delusional 
dimensions but did not change with antipsychotics 
Study 3 investigated change in aberrant salience according to Kapur’s (2003; 
Kapur et al., 2005, 2006) notion of the construct, and hypothesised that aberrant 
salience would be associated with delusional distress and preoccupation over two 
weeks of treatment as measured by ESM.  Three ESM items were developed to 
assess this construct, with acceptable internal consistency.  However, the measures 
were not validated against any external assessment of aberrant salience.  This was a 
problem because the concept itself has been rather loosely defined.  Aberrant 
salience in schizophrenia had been reported using the Salience Attribution Task 
(SAT; Roiser et al., 2009) and the Aberrant Salience Inventory (ASI; Cicero, Kerns 
& McCarthy, 2010).  However, the SAT provides behavioural indices of adaptive 
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and aberrant salience based on goal-directed behaviour, and the ASI measures 
“lifetime occurrence or trait aberrant salience that can be used in non-clinical 
samples”.  Therefore, both measures were not suitable for the purpose of this study, 
and were not directly comparable to the ESM measures, which focused on 
subjective feelings of novelty, attention grabbing, and exaggerated importance at 
the moment of assessment. 
Using ESM, the hypothesis of an association between aberrant salience and 
delusional distress and preoccupation was confirmed, with these associations 
becoming stronger over time.  This is consistent with Kapur and Mamo’s (2003) 
proposition that aberrant salient experiences are distressing.  However, the finding 
that aberrant salience did not improve over two weeks of antipsychotic treatment, 
unlike distress, was not expected.  One possible interpretation of this finding is that 
aberrant salience did not respond to antipsychotics because the treatment was not 
optimal, as indicated by a lack of change in delusional preoccupation.   Another 
interpretation is that there was a change in aberrant salience but the change was not 
captured by the measures.  Bearing in mind that the measurement of aberrant 
salience used ESM only, and for the first time, and was not validated against other 
measures, it is not clear how valid or sensitive this measure is to change in aberrant 
salience.  While Study 3 had demonstrated the feasibility of obtaining subjective 
reports of aberrant salience as experienced through ESM, future work is needed to 
further develop the assessment measure, specify its validity and reliability, and 
examine aberrant salience in individuals across stages during the course of illness, 
from prodrome, to acute stage, to remission.  
 
6.3.4 Relationship between BF and the strength of delusions 
Three questions were addressed about BF and conviction: (i) how was BF 
related to level of conviction? (ii) did BF improve with antipsychotics? (iii) did 
having better BF predict better treatment response in conviction?  Various measures 
were used to approach these issues, including the MADS items – Possibility of 
being Mistaken (PM) and Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction (RTHC) in all 
studies, and an additional Generation of Alternative Explanations (AE) item from 
the EoE interview in Study 2.  Analysis of BF was based on responses to individual 
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items in Studies 1 and 3, and as a factor in Study 2.  Strong evidence was found for 
an association between higher BF and a lower level of conviction cross-sectionally, 
with the only exception in Study 3, where level of conviction was not significantly 
associated with PM.  Therefore, we have corroborated previous evidence (e.g. 
Freeman et al., 2004; Colbert et al., 2010) that BF is closely related to the strength 
of conviction.  Study 2 tackled this conceptual issue: if BF is so strongly associated 
with conviction, could it simply be another way of measuring conviction?  Using a 
large sample (N = 273) of patients with delusions in current relapse of psychosis, 
factor analysis found that BF, JTC, and conviction are three separable factors.  BF 
was not simply an indirect representation of conviction, although it was consistently 
related to conviction.  Therefore, measuring BF as a separate construct to conviction 
is conceptually meaningful and important, and the way one evaluates one’s 
delusional belief is consistently associated with the strength of that belief. 
So which way does the relationship go?  Does being flexible reduce 
conviction, or does weak conviction make one more likely to evaluate one’s belief 
flexibly?  This is an important question because understanding the directionality of 
the association will bring us closer to the mechanism of belief maintenance and to 
developing effective treatment strategies.  The best approach to test the 
directionality of a relationship is to intervene on one aspect in randomised 
conditions and examine changes in the other aspect.  This had recently been done in 
studies of reasoning training (e.g. Ross et al., 2011; Waller et al., 2011), which 
provides preliminary evidence that intervening with BF leads to conviction change.  
Rather than testing directionality of the relationship experimentally, Study 3 
attempted to examine the temporal relationship between BF and conviction using 
time-lagged data.  In this study, BF at one moment predicted an increase in 
conviction at the next assessment moment within the same day, but not the other 
way round.  While this might potentially indicate a link from BF to conviction, the 
fact that higher flexibility actually predicted an increase in conviction was not as 
hypothesised and was in the opposite direction to all previous published findings 
using MADS.  Therefore, on the basis of questionable validity of the ESM measures 
of BF (which will be further discussed in section 6.3.7), both the short term 
prediction of change and the directionality of the association between BF and 
conviction remains an open question. 
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Since BF was closely related to the strength of belief, it was expected that 
BF would also change as conviction improved with treatment.  Findings of a change 
in BF were mixed.  In Study 3, where there was no change in conviction, BF did not 
change over two weeks on either MADS or ESM.  In Study 1, where conviction 
declined over eight weeks, patients became more likely to consider the possibility 
of being mistaken (PM) about their delusion.  However, even though the proportion 
of patients who were flexible on PM doubled from 30% at baseline to 60% at week 
8, a substantial 40% still did not consider the possibility of being mistaken about 
their delusion.  In addition, almost half of the patients responded inflexibly when 
confronted with a hypothetical scenario that was incompatible with their belief, and 
this did not improve with antipsychotics.  These rates were comparable to the stable 
sample in Study 2.  Therefore, although some patients began to evaluate their 
delusional belief more flexibly over eight weeks of antipsychotics, a substantial 
proportion of patients remained inflexible. 
Did a lack of BF maintain level of conviction over time and during 
treatment?  Over 12 months in Study 2, baseline BF predicted an improvement in 
conviction in the first three months, though at trend level only.  Note, however, that 
change in conviction in this study was modest.  During treatment in the acute phase 
of psychosis (Studies 1 & 3), baseline BF did not predict changes in conviction.  
This should be interpreted against the caveat that there was no conviction change in 
Study 3, and that baseline conviction differed between the flexible and inflexible 
individuals, potentially limiting the room for further improvement in conviction in 
the flexible group.   
In summary, higher BF was consistently associated with a lower level of 
conviction.  BF began to improve over eight weeks of antipsychotics, but the 
improvement was incomplete and approximately half of patients remained 
inflexible.  Garety et al. (2005) proposed that higher BF would moderate conviction 
change.  Our results did not consistently support this, although a modest change in 




6.3.5 Stability and prevalence of JTC 
 The three studies in this thesis have extended our understanding of stability 
and prevalence of JTC in individuals with delusions.  JTC was relatively stable over 
12 months in Study 2, and during the acute and early stage of antipsychotic 
treatment in Study 1.  This is consistent with previous reports, for example, Peters 
and Garety (2006) of patients in a recovery phase, and Ormrod et al. (2012) of 
patients with first episode psychosis.  These findings support the stability of JTC 
within the study periods.  Note that different stages of recovery were examined in 
separate studies, so how JTC might change from the acute phase to the recovery 
phase of illness was not directly investigated.   
When JTC across phases of illness was compared, data suggest a possible 
exacerbation of the reasoning bias in acute psychosis.  The tendency of JTC (i.e. 
making a decision after viewing two beads or fewer) was stronger in the acute phase 
(Studies 1 & 3) than in the recovery phase (Study 2).   In Study 2, the prevalence 
rate of JTC was around 40-60%, which was comparable with previous studies of 
individuals with delusions (see reviews by Fine et al., 2007; Freeman, 2007; Garety 
et al., 2007).  In Studies 1 and 3, the JTC rates were a lot higher –  77% (Study 1) 
and 65% (Study 3) on the 60:40 task, and 76% on the 85:15 task (Study 3).  50-70% 
of the sample made a decision after only one bead.  The number of beads drawn to 
decision (2.67 (Study 1) and 3.96 (Study 3) on the 60:40 task, and 2.68 (Study 3) on 
the 85:15 task) was comparable or greater than some studies of patients with 
delusions (e.g. Fear & Healy, 1997; Huq et al., 1988; Moritz & Woodward, 2005; 
Warman et al., 2007), but less than others (e.g. Dudley et al., 2011; Lincoln et al., 
2010; Peters & Garety, 2006; Peters et al., 2008).   
Two possible explanations for the discrepancy in JTC rates may apply.  
Assessment of JTC was conducted by the same researcher in Studies 1 and 3, which 
was different from Study 2.  Although the same computerised task was delivered 
with the same instructions given, subtle differences in the way instructions were 
given cannot be entirely ruled out.  However, a more likely explanation for the 
discrepancy lies in the difference in the stage of illness.  In most studies that 
reported JTC in patients with delusions (e.g. Garety et al., 2005; Menon et al., 2008; 
Moritz & Woodward, 2005), patients were assessed when they had been stabilised 
with medication.  The only exception is Menon et al. (2008) in which more than 
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half of the sample were drug-free when assessed.  However, only less than one-third 
of Menon et al’s (2008) sample were in-patients and recruitment was not restricted 
by severity of delusions.  When only patients with active delusions (with a PANSS 
delusion score of 3 or above) were included, Warman et al. (2007) reported a 
prevalence of JTC as high as 80% on both the neutral and self-referent versions of 
the beads task.  Studies 1 and 3 included only patients who had active delusions of 
at least a moderate level of severity, and who had not, or just started, antipsychotic 
treatment.  Therefore, the Study 1 and 3 samples were closer to Warman et al’s 
(2007), and together these findings suggest that JTC is more pronounced in patients 
with acute delusions (see also Brankovic & Paunovic, 1999; Startup et al., 2008). 
Was JTC more prevalent in the acute phase because of impulsiveness or 
poor understanding of the task (Balzan et al., 2011)?  This was not likely because (i) 
participants drew more beads in the harder version of the task (60:40) than in the 
easier version (85:15) when both versions were used in Study 3, and (ii) there were 
no more errors in the JTC group than the non-JTC group.  There has been a debate 
on whether JTC bias is attributable to neurocognitive deficits such as working 
memory, but the data so far are inconsistent (e.g., Broome et al, 2007; Dudley et al., 
1997a; Menon et al., 2006; Ormrod et al., 2012).  A memory aid (cf. Dudley et al., 
1997a) was included in both Studies 1 and 3, so memory demands of the task were 
minimised. 
In summary, the three studies in this thesis did not find a change in JTC over 
time and with treatment, but there was more JTC in the acute phase than in the 
recovery phase, which potentially suggests that JTC might improve across phases.  
This is a hypothesis which can be tested when JTC is measured from the acute stage 
of illness through to the stabilised stage.   
 
6.3.6 JTC and divergent change in conviction 
Garety et al.’s (2005) proposal that JTC would be associated with level of 
conviction and its response to treatment was tested in all three studies.  Contrary to 
Garety et al’s (2005) model, JTC was not associated with level of conviction cross-
sectionally in any of the studies.  This suggests that JTC is not closely related to 
delusional conviction, and Study 2 instead suggested that it was related to presence 
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or absence of delusions.  Findings were mixed regarding prediction of conviction 
change.  JTC did not predict change in conviction in Studies 1 and 2.  As discussed, 
the overall change in conviction was small in Study 2, hence limiting the power of 
this study to investigate moderation effects.   
On the other hand, when the momentary level of conviction was measured 
using ESM, and change was assessed from the initiation of antipsychotic treatment, 
very early in an acute episode, a potential role of JTC in affecting treatment 
response was found in Study 3.  ESM encompassed multiple assessment points 
within a day, and across days, thus measuring more observations than the interviews.  
While baseline level of conviction did not differ between individuals who showed 
the JTC bias and those who did not, conviction declined during treatment in the 
non-JTC group, but increased in the JTC group, suggesting that only the non-JTC 
group responded to antipsychotics.  Therefore, in this study JTC contributed to the 
maintenance of conviction and moderated treatment response.  This is a novel 
finding, and suggests that effective treatment for JTC may strengthen patients’ 
response to antipsychotics.   
The non-JTC group decreased not only in the level of conviction, but also in 
the variability of conviction during antipsychotic treatment, while the JTC-group 
maintained a high variability of conviction.  This finding is in line with Moritz et 
al’s. (2006) and Garety and Freeman’s (1999) suggestion that people with delusions 
tend to revise their certainty estimates or abandon their hypotheses based on little 
evidence.  Study 3 demonstrated that patients did revise their judgement of their 
delusional belief within a day (see also Peters et al., 2011), and that this tendency to 
revise their judgement was enhanced by JTC.  As individuals who showed a JTC 
tendency made judgements based on limited evidence, they changed their 
judgement about their belief relatively easily based on new (again limited) evidence, 
possibly in response to what was happening at the moment, leading to unstable 
appraisals.  It is possible that as individuals kept changing their appraisals over time, 
preoccupation of the delusions was also maintained.  Study 3 reported a lack of 
change in preoccupation over two weeks, but the potential link between JTC, 
variability of conviction and the maintenance of preoccupation is a hypothesis to be 
tested with future research.   
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It is of interest to speculate how the JTC effects on level of conviction and 
variability of conviction might be inter-related.  Rather than arriving at one 
conclusion and holding onto it consistently, patients might abandon a delusional 
idea at one moment but then become certain about it again at the next; hence 
maintaining a high overall level of conviction and limiting response to antipsychotic 
treatment.  This is consistent with Garety et al.’s (1991) proposal that a lack of 
influence of stored regularities on current input (Hemsley, 1987, 1993) underlies the 
JTC effect, but this suggestion was not explicitly tested in Study 3.  While Study 3 
reported an interesting relationship between JTC and maintenance of conviction 
with treatment, this was a novel finding which requires replication, and individuals 
were grouped by JTC on the 60:40 version of the beads task only.  Future research 
will be needed to test the hypothesised link between JTC, variability of conviction 
and maintenance of delusions. 
In summary, it seems that BF and JTC contribute to the aetiology of 
delusions differently.  BF is closely related to the state of delusion, with higher 
flexibility strongly associated with lower conviction.  It responded partially to 
antipsychotics as conviction improved, but did not predict treatment response of 
conviction.  In contrast, JTC was not associated with level of conviction.  It did not 
change over time or with antipsychotic treatment (although it might change from 
the acute to the stable phases).  There was preliminary evidence suggesting a role of 
JTC in maintaining delusions potentially via limited data gathering and a lack of 
influence of stored regularities, which causes both fluctuations and persisting 
conviction.  JTC is also specific to delusions, rather than being a general 
characteristic of psychosis, as supported by the difference in JTC between patients 
with and without delusions.  Different processes are involved in JTC and BF, as a 
weak association was found between the two constructs in the factor analysis in 
Study 2.  Moritz et al. (2010a) also reported JTC and inflexibility as separate factors 
and argued for them to be treated independently.   
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6.3.7 Use of ESM in acute patients with delusions over two 
weeks 
The use of the experience sampling method (ESM; Csikszentmihalyi & 
Larson, 1987; Myin-Germeys et al., 2009) in Study 3 was innovative in a number of 
ways.  Firstly, the duration of 14 consecutive days was one of the longest periods 
among the published ESM studies.  Secondly, while ESM had been used in patients 
with psychosis (including delusions) before (e.g. Myin-Germeys et al., 2001; 
Palmier-Claus et al., 2011a), it was the first time that patients in an acute stage of 
psychosis who had not been stabilised with medication were assessed using this 
method.  Thirdly, new constructs, namely BF and aberrant salience, were included.  
This section reflects on the use of this methodology in this particular group of 
patients and suggests further development. 
Recruitment for Study 3 was a challenge.  Among 68 suitable patients who 
were invited to take part in the study, 26 consented to take part, resulting in a total 
consent rate of 38%.  While Studies 1 and 3 shared the same sites of recruitment, 
with similar inclusion criteria (except for a shorter duration of treatment in Study 3), 
the consent rate was higher (51.3%) in Study 1.  Over a two-week period, two out 
of 40 patients (5.0%) in Study 1 dropped out, but eight out of 26 patients (30.8%) 
dropped out in Study 3.  It was likely that engagement was more challenging in 
Study 3 because participants had been on treatment for a shorter period of time than 
were the Study 1 sample and were approached during a turbulent time, having just 
been admitted on the ward.  But it was also likely that the relative difficulty with 
recruitment for the ESM study was related to the demands of the self-assessment.  
Individuals were required to use the personal digital assistant (PDA) independently, 
to keep the PDA with them at all times, to respond to the signals quickly, and to 
charge the battery when necessary.  Apart from reasons for refusal that were similar 
between the two studies, some patients refused to take part in Study 3 because they 
did not think they could manage the assessment on their own, or keep the PDA safe 
in the ward environment where they had no guarantee over security. 
One related issue was the pros and cons of using computerised format of 
ESM.  Two PDAs were lost during the study, and one was damaged.  Granholm et 
al. (2008) also reported loss of a PDA.  Therefore, the costs incurred on replacing 
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the PDAs should be considered when planning for this kind of study.  On the other 
hand, ESM studies using paper-and-pencil format also require participants to carry 
with them a wristwatch that signals assessment times, and there are also reports that 
these wristwatches go missing (Palmier-Claus, personal communication).  Another 
problem that arose was flaws or bugs in the software.  There were a few occasions 
where the data collected from the PDA were in a strange format or simply missing.  
Specialist technical support was required to recover the data.  Although there were 
difficulties in relation to the use of an electronic device and computer software, the 
paper-and-pencil format was not without problems either, and on the whole the 
advantages of computerised ESM over paper-and-pencil format (e.g. time-stamped 
data, no backfilling of reports, automatic data entry, etc.), are considered to have 
outweighed the difficulties.     
For the individuals who did take part in the ESM study, the assessment was 
considered acceptable.  Completion rates of self-reports was comparable with other 
studies with in-patients diagnosed with schizophrenia (e.g. Granholm et al., 2008; 
Kimhy et al., 2010).  A few patients commented that the assessment was enjoyable 
because it gave them “something to do”, made them “less bored”, and helped them 
“understand (their) feelings better”.  The high internal consistency among items of 
the same construct suggested that patients in an acute stage of psychosis were able 
to enter valid ‘online’ reporting of subjective experiences in an electronic device 
without the presence of a researcher.  Therefore, this study showed feasibility of 
obtaining internally consistent self-reports from acute patients of psychosis using 
ESM. 
The next question was whether ESM provided additional information about 
change that was not already represented by interview-based measures.  Change 
between interview-based measures and ESM measures was consistent for delusional 
dimensions, but not for severity of psychotic symptoms.  One possible explanation 
was that the external validity of ESM was better for delusional dimensions than for 
psychotic symptoms.  However, this explanation was not supported by the fact that 
measures were partially consistent for psychotic symptoms but not consistent for 
delusional dimensions at baseline.  In other words, for delusional dimensions, ESM 
and clinical ratings were not associated at baseline, but both measures showed 
similar changes with treatment.  For psychotic symptoms, baseline measures were 
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partially consistent, but only clinical ratings showed an improvement over two 
weeks.  Therefore, it was more likely that ESM and clinical ratings represented 
different processes of change.  As discussed by Peters et al. (2011) and Stone et al. 
(1993), ESM captured moment-by-moment phenomena that were not measured by 
retrospective measures.  When ESM measures across a week were analysed 
collectively, Granholm et al. (2008) reported a strong association between ESM 
(across the week) and baseline PANSS scores of psychotic symptoms among 
community-dwelling patients with schizophrenia.  Note that Granholm et al. (2008) 
compared baseline clinical ratings with ESM data across the whole week, whereas 
Study 3 compared baseline clinical ratings with ESM data on the same day.  We did 
not compare the baseline symptom rating scales with ESM in the whole week, 
because rapid change with treatment was expected in our sample, and it was the 
change that was of interest.  However, the difference between Study 3 and 
Granholm et al. (2008) supports the view that clinical ratings represented the 
overall (or averaged) level of severity, while ESM measures represented the level at 
the moment which could fluctuate within and between days.  Palmier-Claus et al. 
(2011b) also reported that “an assumption of ESM is that response will vary over 
time” and the value of ESM was to determine if a variable was “trait-like (i.e. 
showing minimal variation across time and situations) or state-like (showing large 
variation in responses over time and situations)” (p. 16).  We took advantage of this 
feature of ESM and investigated not only whether conviction and BF were state-like, 
but also whether JTC trait predicted variation in the state-like constructs.  This kind 
of analysis could not be done with clinical ratings alone. 
The ESM measures of BF in Study 3 were problematic.  ESM responses on 
these items did not seem to be random; rather, they were consistently in the 
opposite direction from the interview ratings and the expected association with 
conviction.  It is speculated that participants might have problems with these 
specific items because (i) they were the only inverse scored items within the same 
section; (ii) they involved reflective thinking which was not sensitively measured 
by ESM; and (iii) the questions were wordy with a complex sentence structure.  
Future research will be needed to clarify these issues. 
ESM differed from clinical ratings on (i) being an assessment of momentary 
experiences (and not retrospective), and (ii) being a self-report measure.  It was not 
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clear to what extent the discrepancy in findings about change between measures 
was related to (i) or (ii), or both.  This question could be tested in future studies 
using both ESM and other self-report measures.   
 
6.4 Limitations 
This thesis addressed two main questions: (i) how delusions change over 
time and with treatment, and (ii) whether reasoning biases predict delusional change.  
In relation to the first question, a limitation of Studies 1 and 3 was that not all 
participants were antipsychotic-naïve when assessed, and Study 2 recruited patients 
with established psychotic illnesses, who were all already medicated.  While in 
Studies 1 and 3 the researcher approached the participants as early as possible, a 
delay of recruitment occurred in some cases, due to patients’ request or the advice 
of ward staff to wait for a few days.  Moreover, in order to facilitate recruitment, we 
did not limit inclusion to patients with a first episode psychosis.  We are aware that 
patients who have received antipsychotics before may respond differently to those 
who are new to the treatment.  Specific limitations of the ESM methodology were 
discussed at length in Section 6.3.7 and in Chapter 5.  Most importantly, the 
measures of BF were questionable and need to be further developed.  In addition, 
since numerous comparisons were included and some of the questions had not been 
tested before, replication of the ESM results are needed.  
 Other limitations are related to the second question, i.e. moderation of 
change.  Firstly, only a small change in conviction over time was reported in Study 
2.  Secondly, an unusually high rate of JTC was reported in Studies 1 and 3.  These 
limited the effectiveness of examining group difference on changes over time.  
Thirdly, the power of the analyses was limited by small group sizes when 
individuals were compared based on reasoning biases, especially in Study 3.   
 Other limitations concern the overall design of the studies.  Firstly, patients 
with various subtypes of delusions were analysed as a group.  The studies did not 
set out to test the treatment response or association with reasoning biases between 
various subtypes of delusions.  There is evidence that various subtypes bear 
differential relationships with attributional style (e.g. Jolley et al., 2006), and very 
recently there are reports of a differential relationship between delusion subtypes 
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and JTC and BF (Garety et al., in press; Menon, Addington, & Remington, 2011).  
Secondly, this thesis consisted of longitudinal studies covering either the early stage 
of treatment or the stable stage.  The patients were not examined from one stage to 
another continuously.  Stability of constructs for the longer-term could only be 
inferred from the difference between the acute and recovery stages.  For example, 
JTC was more severe in the acute stage than in the recovery stage, so it is possible 
that JTC might improve if the same patients are followed for long enough.  
However, this remains a hypothesis to be tested. 
 
6.5 Clinical implications and future research 
Studies 1 and 3 confirmed that delusions improved with antipsychotics, but 
the improvement was not complete.  These studies also shed some light on how 
psychological processes (including reasoning biases, aberrant salience and affect) 
relate to delusions over time, respond to treatment, and moderate treatment response.  
These findings carry important clinical implications as they will help to identify 
processes that are likely to lead to improved treatment outcome. 
Most importantly, this thesis confirmed previous findings (e.g. Garety et al., 
2005; see Chapter 2 for literature review) that delusions are closely related to BF 
and JTC, and further specified their relationships in three longitudinal samples 
during different trajectories of recovery.  BF was consistently found to be 
associated with a lower level of conviction.  There was a hint that BF predicted 
treatment outcome (see Brett-Jones et al., 1987) in Study 2 only, but no moderation 
effect was found in the acute phase.  JTC was not closely associated with conviction 
or BF, suggesting that JTC is not a marker of conviction.  However, it is elevated in 
the acute phase (as reported in Studies 1 and 3; Menon et al., 2008; Warman & 
Martin, 2006).  It is relatively stable within studies, but might change between 
phases.  JTC appears to be a predisposing factor to the development of delusions (as 
reported in Study 2; Van Dael et al., 2006) and might potentially contribute to the 
maintenance of conviction (Study 3).  Therefore, these findings suggest that 
effective treatment of both BF and JTC will be of benefit to improvement in 
delusions.   
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The routine psychiatric interventions for psychosis did not remediate these 
reasoning biases adequately.  JTC did not respond to antipsychotics, and BF only 
responded partially.  Recent development of more focused interventions for 
reasoning processes has shown support for changing delusions via modifying 
reasoning.  Moritz and Woodward (2007) designed a four-week metacognitive 
training (MCT) approach, targeting a range of reasoning biases, including 
attributional style, JTC, liberal acceptance, bias against disconfirmatory evidence, 
need for closure, overconfidence in errors, and theory of mind.  Moritz et al. (2011c) 
combined MCT with an individualised cognitive-behavioural therapy-oriented 
approach (MCT+) and reported a greater improvement in both delusions (including 
conviction) and JTC following MCT+ than active control.  Ross et al. (2011) 
administered a single-session computerised reasoning training (including some 
tasks from the MCT) to patients with delusions.  The tasks targeted JTC and BF.  
They found an improvement in data gathering following the session, and some 
small though non-significant changes in BF and conviction.  They then extended the 
reasoning training into the Maudsley Review Training Programme (Waller et al., 
2011), with the addition of real-life scenarios and delusion-relevant material in the 
exercises.  They found an improvement in JTC, BF and delusional conviction in 
patients with high levels of conviction.  Therefore, early evidence has shown that 
reasoning training can reduce JTC and BF in patients with high levels of conviction, 
and also lead to changes in conviction, in the short term.  Future research will be 
needed to examine the effectiveness of reasoning training on JTC and BF and 
delusional conviction in the longer term, as a stand alone treatment or an adjunctive 
treatment with cognitive behavioural therapy for delusions.  In addition, there has 
been an increase in interest in looking for the mechanism underlying the JTC 
phenomenon (see reviews by Fine et al., 2007; Lincoln et al., 2010).  Study 3 found 
that JTC predicted the level and variability of conviction during treatment.  Future 
research could further investigate this role of JTC, and whether variability in the 
acute phases is involved in the maintenance of delusions.  It will also be of interest 
to see if reasoning training will reduce variability of conviction as JTC improves. 
 The use of ESM to measure moment-by-moment fluctuations of aberrant 
salience and belief flexibility needs further investigation.  If validity of the 
measures is improved, ESM is a potentially valuable method for delineating the 
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direction of the relationship between conviction and BF, and for examining change 
in aberrant salience over time and during treatment. 
 
6.6 Concluding remarks 
 This thesis consisted of a programmatic investigation of psychological 
changes in delusions over time and with treatment, using detailed assessments of 
delusions and reasoning biases, during various phases of recovery.  Some findings 
in this thesis are consistent with previous studies, for example, that JTC and BF are 
associated with delusions, and that delusions consisted of multiple dimensions 
which relate to other psychological processes and respond to treatment differentially.   
Some findings are new, for example, the factor structure of BF, JTC and conviction, 
the feasibility of assessing changes in delusions and associated psychological 
processes using ESM, and the potential relationship between JTC and the level and 
variability of conviction during treatment.  It is hoped that this thesis has taken one 
step further towards our understanding of the psychology of delusions during the 
recovery process, and will inform future research in psychological model and 
treatment for delusions. 
*  *  *  *  * 
 Delusions are complex psychological phenomena, which are part of the 
complex illness of psychosis.  The endeavour to understand delusions and psychosis 
is in some way not dissimilar to the old story of “the blind men and the elephant”: 
four blind men try to understand what an elephant looks like by touch.  One, 
grabbing a tooth, says an elephant is like a thick radish.  The other one, touching the 
ear, says it is a palm-leaf fan.  The third man, clutching a leg, says an elephant is a 
big pillar, and the fourth man pulls the tail and says an elephant is just a straw rope.  
While this thesis has examined delusions from a cognitive/ reasoning approach, 
other ways of understanding this symptom and illness are possible.  Perhaps if we 
walk around the ‘elephant’ and consider alternative views, rather than jumping to 
conclusions based on insufficient data gathering, we will all gain a fuller 
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Psychological response to medication 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research study.  Before you 
decide you need to understand why the research is being done and what it 
would involve for you.  Please take time to read the following information 
carefully.  Talk to others about the study if you wish.  Ask us if there is 
anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.  Take time to 
decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The purpose of the study is to help us understand how medication you are 
taking is helping you in the way you think and feel.  Scientific research has 
told us that medications help people deal with some of their upsetting 
thoughts and emotions, but we still need to understand further the exact 
mechanisms of how the therapeutic effect happens psychologically and 
when such effect starts to take place. 
 
Why have I been invited? 
In order to help us understand the effect of medication over time, we will be 
interviewing patients who are at the early stage of taking medication.  Since 
you have just begun/will begin taking medication, we invite you to take part 
in this study.  We are inviting a total of 40 patients to participate in this study. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you whether or not you decide to take part.  We will describe the 
study and go through this information sheet, which we will then give to you.  
We will then ask you to sign a consent form to show you have agreed to 
take part.  If you do decide to take part, you can always change your mind 
at a later stage and withdraw from the study without giving a reason.  This 
would not affect the standard of care you receive. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
You will be interviewed by a research psychologist for a total of 5 times 
within a period of 8 weeks.  The interviews will take place in the ward where 
you are staying, or in a clinic when you have your psychiatric follow-up.  The 
interview times will be arranged between the research psychologist, you, 
and your care coordinator so as not to disrupt your ward routine or any other 
clinical service. 
The interviews will discuss any distressing unusual experiences you may 
have and how you think about them.  The interviews will also involve you 
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filling out some questionnaires, with the help of the interviewer.  In some of 
the interviews, you will be asked to do simple and brief experimental tasks 
presented on the computer, to help us know how you interpret things in 
general. 
The first and last (i.e. at week 8) interviews will take longer, about 1.5-2 
hours each.  The interviews at week 1, week 2, and week 4, will last 
between 30 minutes to an hour.  You will be allowed to take breaks when 
needed. 
 
Expenses and payments 
£10 per hour of interview will be given to you in order to remunerate you for 
your time. 
 
What will I have to do? 
You will be asked to attend the research interviews at the time and date 
arranged.  You will also need to let the interviewer know whether you are 
taking the medication regularly. 
 
Will there be any potential risks or restrictions in taking part? 
The study procedures are not invasive and will not affect your standard 
treatment or management.  Your medication will not be withheld at any point 
of the study. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
We cannot promise the study will give you any direct or immediate benefits, 
but the information we get from this study will help improve the treatment of 
people with distressing unusual experiences. 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
If you withdraw from the study, we will destroy all your identifiable data, but 
we will need to use the anonymised data collected up to your withdrawal. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Yes. All information which is collected about you during the course of the 
research will be kept strictly confidential, and any information about you 
which leaves the hospital will have your name and address removed so that 
you cannot be recognised.  Your identifiable data will be stored securely and 
only be accessed by authorised persons such as the clinical team and the 
chief investigator.  In the rare occasion where the research process reveals 
that you or the others are subject to serious risk, confidentiality will have to 
be broken and the relevant information will need to be disclosed. 
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
Results of the study will be available after all the data have been collected 
and analysed.  The broad scientific results of the study will be published in 
scientific journals.  A summary of the results will be available to participants 
upon request.  You can ask the researcher to send you a copy of the result 
summary when the study is completed. 
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Who is organising and funding the project? 
The person leading the research is Ms. Suzanne So, who is a Hong Kong-
qualified clinical psychologist, and a PhD student at the Institute of 
Psychiatry, King’s College of London.  The project is supervised by Prof. 
Philippa Garety, Prof. Shitij Kapur, and Dr. Emmanuelle Peters. 
The project is funded by a Medical Research Council research grant. 
 
What has reviewed the project? 
All research in the NHS is looked at by independent group of people, called 
a Research Ethics Committee, to protect your safety, rights, wellbeing and 
dignity.  This study has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by the 
Camden and Islington NHS Trust Research Ethics Committee.  The study 
reference number is 08/H0722/76. 
 
Who do I contact for further information? 
We encourage you to discuss this with your care coordinator or clinician if 
you have doubts.  If you would like further information please contact 
Suzanne So (research psychologist) by telephone on 020 7848 5728, or 
email at suzanne.so@iop.kcl.ac.uk 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to 
speak to the researchers who will do their best to answer your questions 
(contact details as above).  If you remain unhappy and wish to complain 
formally, you can do this through the NHS Complaints Procedure.  Details 
can be obtained from the hospital. 
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PSYCHOLOGICAL RESPONSE TO MEDICATION 
CONSENT FORM 
 
OFFICE USE ONLY 
Patient identification number:   Participant number: 
 
  Please 
initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
for the above study.  I have had the opportunity to consider the 
information, ask questions and have had these answered 
satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time without giving any reason, without my 
medical care or legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I agree to take part in the above study.  
4. I permit the researcher to view my case notes for the purpose of 
this study. 
 
5.  I would like to receive a copy of the results of the above study.  
 
 
____________________ _________________ _____________ 
Name of patient Signature Date 
   
____________________ _________________ _____________ 




Original to be kept in medical notes; one copy each for patient & researcher site file 
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Psychological Prevention of Relapse in Psychosis 
 
Study I: Cognitive Behaviour Therapy compared to Treatment As Usual. 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide, it 
is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what 
it will involve.  Please take time to read the following information carefully 
and discuss it with friends, relatives and members of your health care team 
if you wish.  Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like 
more information.  Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
Some people have unusual, worrying or distressing experiences or beliefs, 
which bring them into contact with mental health services.  We think such 
experiences may be helped by talking them through with someone, a 
therapist, who is able to discuss them in detail.  This kind of help is called 
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT).  Cognitive means thoughts, behaviour 
is what you do and feel.  CBT may help you to understand what you are 
experiencing and feeling, and may help you to cope with it differently, and to 
feel less worried. 
 
CBT is a relatively new treatment, developed in the last 10 years.  We still 
do not know how exactly it helps people to improve, to prevent relapse, or to 
continue to manage their problems.  This study therefore aims to see 
whether CBT does help to prevent relapse and to improve our 
understanding of the treatment so that we can develop it further to be more 
helpful. 
 
The whole study will involve 500 patients in different Trusts in London and in 
East Anglia.  We are approaching patients who have had a recent 
recurrence of their symptoms and are inpatients on acute wards, or are in 
contact with community mental health teams.   
 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.  If you do decide to take 
part you will be given this information sheet to keep and will be asked to 
Psychological 
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sign a consent form.  If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw 
at any time and without giving a reason. 
 
If you do agree to take part, you will either be offered CBT and your usual 
treatment or your usual treatment with your team alone.  This choice of 
treatment will be made by drawing lots.  You will have a one in two chance 
in receiving the CBT treatment.  This is called random allocation to 
treatment and helps us to make comparisons between people in each group 
who have a different treatment. 
 
CBT involves weekly or fortnightly meetings for up to one year which will be 
arranged at a time to suit you.  Whether or not you have CBT you will also 
be asked to meet a research worker and complete regular assessments 
over one year.  Assessments are likely to last between one and two hours 
over one or more sessions.  At the end of the 2nd year you will be asked to 
complete a final set of assessments to see if any changes that may have 
occurred are still there.  After that you will continue with your usual 
treatment with you team or with your GP. 
 
We hope that this new treatment will be helpful.  However, this cannot be 
guaranteed.  The information we get from this study may help us to improve 
treatments. 
 
If you consent to take part in the study we will check your medical records 
for details of your care and other treatment.  All information that is collected 
about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential.  
Any information about you that leaves the hospital/Trust will have your 
name and address removed so that you cannot be recognised from it. 
 
If you consent, we will inform your consultant psychiatrist and the team 
responsible for your care about your involvement in the study.  We will send 
them a very brief summary of our assessment unless you do not wish us to 
do this. 
 
Since we are trying to provide the very best treatment possible, we would 
like to audio tape sessions that you have with your therapist.  The reason for 
this is to check that the therapy is carried out in the way that we expect it to 
be.  We will ask you separately for your consent to this. 
 
When the study is finished the results will be published.  This is likely to be 
in 2007.  We will not identify you individually in any report or publication of 
the research. 
 
The research is funded by a medical research charity, called The Wellcome 
Trust.  The research has been considered and approved by the Institute of 
Psychiatry/South London and Maudsley NHS Trust research ethics 
committee. 
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Thank you for reading this, if you need further information please contact a 
member of the research team, the names of people to contact are given 
below. 
 
We will give you this information sheet to keep as well as a signed consent 
form if you agree to take part in the study. 
 
Amy Hardy & Alison Gracie, Research Psychologists, Department of 
Psychology, Institute of Psychiatry, Denmark Hill, London, SE5 8AF.  Tel: 
020 7848 0328  Email: A.Hardy@iop.kcl.ac.uk. 
 
Suzanne Jolley, Research Clinical Psychologist, Academic Psychology 
Department, 3rd Floor, Adamson Centre for Mental Health, Block 8, South 
Wing, St. Thomas’ Hospital, Lambeth Palace Road, London, SE1 7EH.  Tel: 
020 7928 9292 ext. 1017  
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Psychological Prevention of Relapse in Psychosis 
 
Study II: Family Intervention, Cognitive Behaviour Therapy or Treatment As 
Usual. 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide, it 
is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what 
it will involve.  Please take time to read the following information carefully 
and discuss it with friends, relatives and members of your health care team 
if you wish.  Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like 
more information.  Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
Some people may have unusual, worrying or distressing experiences or 
beliefs, which bring them into contact with mental health services.  We think 
such experiences may be helped by talking them through with someone, a 
therapist, who is able to discuss and re-evaluate some of the evidence on 
which they are based.  This kind of help is called Cognitive Behaviour 
Therapy (CBT).  Cognitive means thoughts, behaviour is what you do and 
feel.  CBT may help people to understand what they are experiencing and 
feeling, and may help them to cope with it differently, and to feel less 
worried. 
 
The experiences of people may also be helped by talking to the person and 
their family about what is happening, trying to sort out any ongoing 
problems and to help with the upset and worry that these can cause.  This is 
called Family Intervention (FI).  Usually two therapists would come and 
meet with the person with psychosis and their relatives at home. 
 
FI is a relatively well established kind of treatment whereas CBT is more 
recent.  We still do not know, however, how either of these affect ideas and 
feelings, and how this continues to be helpful when treatment is finished.  
More evidence is needed to establish whether one of the treatments is 
better that the other. 
Psychological 
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The whole study will involve 500 patients in different Trusts in London and in 
East Anglia.  We are approaching patients and their relatives.  The person 
will have had a recent recurrence of their symptoms and either be an 
inpatient on an acute ward or be in contact with community mental health 
teams.   
 
It is up to you and your relative(s) to decide whether or not to take part.  We 
will seek consent from your relative(s) separately.  If you do decide to take 
part, you will be given this information sheet to keep and will be asked to 
sign a consent form.  If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw 
at any time and without giving a reason. 
 
If you do agree to take part, there are three possibilities. 
 
1) Family Intervention – in this case the person and identified members 
of the family will be offered meetings with two therapists, fortnightly, 
for up to a year.  There will be an opportunity to have information 
about the problems of psychosis, help with sorting out everyday 
problems and help with dealing with the worry and upset that these 
problems can cause.  In addition, the usual clinical care from the 
mental health team will continue to be offered. 
 
2) Cognitive Behavioural Therapy – in this case the person will be 
offered weekly to fortnightly individual sessions for up to a year with a 
therapist.  In these sessions the therapist will discuss with the person 
their worries and experiences, and discuss the reasons for their 
concerns and how they may cope with them differently and feel less 
worried.  In addition, the usual clinical care from the mental health 
team will continue to be offered. 
 
3) The person and their relatives will be offered the usual clinical care 
from the mental health team and will have regular meetings with a 
research worker to find out how everyone is getting on. 
 
If you consent, CBT or FI or the usual treatment alone will be offered for one 
year.  The choice of treatment will be made by drawing lots.  There will be a 
one in three chance of receiving the CBT treatment, a one in three chance 
of receiving the family intervention treatment and a one in three chance of 
receiving the usual care alone.  In addition, in all of these cases you will be 
asked to meet a research worker and complete regular assessments.  The 
assessments are likely to last between one and two hours over one or more 
sessions.  At the end of the second year you will be asked to complete a 
final set of assessments to see if any changes that may have occurred are 
still there.  After that, you will continue with usual treatment with the mental 
health team or with the GP.   
 
We hope that these treatments will be helpful.  However, this cannot be 
guaranteed.  The information we get from this study may help us to improve 
treatments.   
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If you do take part in the study we will check the medical records for details 
of care and other treatment.  All information that is collected about you 
during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential.  Any 
information about you that leaves the hospital/Trust will have your name and 
address removed so that you cannot be recognised from it. 
 
If you consent, we will inform the consultant psychiatrist and the team 
responsible for your or your relative’s care about your involvement in the 
study.  We will send the team a very brief summary of our assessment 
unless you do not wish us to do this. 
 
Since we are trying to provide the very best treatment possible, we would 
like to audio tape sessions that you have with the therapist.  The reason for 
this is to check that the therapy is carried out in the way that we expect it to 
be.  We will ask you separately for your consent to this. 
 
When the study is finished the results will be published.  This is likely to be 
in 2007.  We will not identify you individually in any report or publication of 
the research. 
 
The research is funded by a medical research charity, called The Wellcome 
Trust.  The research has been considered and approved by the Institute of 
Psychiatry/South London and Maudsley NHS Trust research ethics 
committee. 
 
Thank you for reading this, if you need further information please contact a 
member of the research team, the names of people to contact are given 
below. 
 
We will give you this information sheet to keep as well as a signed consent 
form if you agree to take part in the study. 
 
 
Amy Hardy & Alison Gracie, Research Psychologists, Department of 
Psychology, Institute of Psychiatry, Denmark Hill, London, SE5 8AF.  Tel: 
0207 8480328  Email: A.Hardy@iop.kcl.ac.uk. 
 
Suzanne Jolley, Research Clinical Psychologist, Academic Psychology 
Department, 3rd Floor, Adamson Centre for Mental Health, Block 8, South 
Wing, St. Thomas’ Hospital, Lambeth Palace Road, London, SE1 7EH.  Tel: 
0207 9289292 ext. 1017 Email: Suzanne.jolley@kcl.ac.uk 
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F u n d e d  b y  T h e  W e l l c o m e  T r u s t  
 
Centre Number:  
Study Number: 1  
Patient Identification Number for this trial: 
 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANT 
 
Title of Project:  Psychological Prevention of Relapse in Psychosis 
Study I – Cognitive Behavioural Therapy compared to Treatment As Usual. 
 
Name of Researcher:Phil Watson 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
dated ………… (version …….) for the above study and have had the 
opportunity to ask questions. 
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, without my medical 
care or legal rights being affected. 
 
 
3. I understand that sections of my medical notes may be looked at by the 
research team or from regulatory authorities where it is relevant to my 
taking part in research.   
I give permission for these individuals to have access to my records. 
 
 






__________________  ____________  _____________ 
Name of Participant   Date    Signature 
 
__________________  ____________  _____________ 
Name of Person taking  Date    Signature 
consent (if different from researcher) 
 
__________________  ____________  _____________ 
Researcher    Date    Signature 
 
1 for participant; I for researcher; 1 to be kept with hospital notes. 
Psychological 
Prevention of 
Relapse in Psychosis 
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STUDY PATIENTS WANTED 
Changes in delusions and 




• Any episode of psychosis 
• Active delusions 
• Not on antipsychotics yet OR been 
on antipsychotics for <1 week 




 3 interviews within 2 weeks 
 Electronic diary for 2 weeks 
 Remuneration given (max. £60) 
 
Contact: 
Suzanne So, research psychologist, IoP 
Tel: 0207 848 5728  Email:suzanne.so@kcl.ac.uk 
 
☺Thank you very much☺ 
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Psychological response to medication 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research study.  Before you 
decide you need to understand why the research is being done and what it 
would involve for you.  Please take time to read the following information 
carefully.  Talk to others about the study if you wish.  Ask us if there is 
anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.  Take time to 
decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The purpose of the study is to help us understand how medication you are 
taking is helping you in the way you think and feel.  Scientific research has 
told us that medications help people deal with some of their upsetting 
thoughts and emotions, but we still need to understand further exactly how 
the medication effect takes place. 
 
Why have I been invited? 
In order to help us understand the effect of medication over time, we will be 
interviewing patients who are at the early stage of taking medication.  Since 
you have just begun/will begin taking medication, we invite you to take part 
in this study.  We are inviting a total of 25 patients to participate in this study. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you whether or not you decide to take part.  We will describe the 
study and go through this information sheet, which we will then give to you.  
We will then ask you to sign a consent form to show you have agreed to 
take part.  If you do decide to take part, you can always change your mind 
at a later stage and withdraw from the study without giving a reason.  This 
would not affect the standard of care you receive. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
You will be asked to answer some questions on a electronic diary.  The 
electronic diary will be programmed on a personal digital assistant (PDA).  
This will beep 7 times a day during your waking hours for 13 consecutive 
days.  Each time the PDA beeps, you will be required to stop your current 
activity and immediately complete the diary entry on the PDA.  Each diary 
entry takes only a few minutes to complete.  At the first research interview, 
the interviewer will discuss the questions in detail and practise filling out the 
diary with you, until you are confident in completing the diary on your own.  
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The interviewer will discuss with you the questions to be included in the 
diary.  The diary will start the day after the first interview.  During the 13-day 
diary taking, the interviewer will contact you regularly to provide support and 
answer any questions that may come up about the diary. 
You will be interviewed by a research psychologist for a total of 3 times 
within a period of 2 weeks.  The interviews will take place in the ward where 
you are staying, or in a clinic when you have your psychiatric follow-up.  The 
interview times will be arranged between the research psychologist, you, 
and your care coordinator so as not to disrupt your ward routine or any other 
clinical service. 
The interviews will discuss any distressing unusual experiences you may 
have and how you think about them.  The interviews will also involve you 
filling out some questionnaires, with the help of the interviewer.  In the first 
interview, you will be asked to do a simple and brief experimental task 
presented on the computer, to help us know how you interpret things in 
general. 
The first interview will be the longest and will take half an hour to 1 hour.  
The follow-up interviews at week 1 and week 2 will last between 15 to 30 
minutes.   You will be allowed to take breaks when needed. 
 
Remuneration 
£10 per hour of interview and £20 per week of diary (i.e. £40 for a complete 
course of 13 days’ diary entries) will be given to you in order to remunerate 
you for your time. 
 
What will I have to do? 
You will be asked to attend the research interviews at the time and date 
arranged, and to fill out the electronic diary as soon as it beeps.  You will 
also need to let the interviewer know whether you are taking the medication 
regularly. 
 
Will there be any potential risks or restrictions in taking part? 
There are no risks or restrictions in taking part in this study.  Study 
participation will not affect your standard treatment or management.  Your 
medication will not be withheld at any point of the study. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Participating in this study does not give you any benefits, but the information 
we get from this study will help improve the treatment of people with 
distressing unusual experiences. 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
If you withdraw from the study, we will destroy all your identifiable data, but 
we will use the anonymised data collected up to your withdrawal. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Yes. All information which is collected about you during the course of the 
research will be kept strictly confidential, and any information about you 
which leaves the hospital will have your name and address removed so that 
you cannot be recognised.  Your identifiable data will be stored securely and 
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only be accessed by authorised persons such as the clinical team and the 
chief investigator.  In the rare occasion where the research process reveals 
that you or the others are subject to serious risk, confidentiality will have to 
be broken and the relevant information will need to be disclosed. 
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
Results of the study will be available after all the data have been collected 
and analysed.  The broad scientific results of the study will be published in 
scientific journals.  A summary of the results will be available to participants 
upon request.  You can ask the researcher to send you a copy of the result 
summary when the study is completed. 
 
Who is organising and funding the project? 
The person leading the research is Ms. Suzanne So, who is a Hong Kong-
qualified clinical psychologist, and a PhD student at the Institute of 
Psychiatry, King’s College of London.  The project is supervised by Prof. 
Philippa Garety, Prof. Shitij Kapur, and Dr. Emmanuelle Peters. 
The project is funded by a Medical Research Council research grant and the 
Croucher Foundation Scholarship. 
 
What has reviewed the project? 
All research in the NHS is looked at by independent group of people, called 
a Research Ethics Committee, to protect your safety, rights, wellbeing and 
dignity.  This study has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by the 
South East London Research Ethics Committee 4.  The study reference 
number is 10/H0807/44. 
 
Who do I contact for further information? 
We encourage you to discuss this with your care coordinator or clinician if 
you have doubts.  If you would like further information please contact 
Suzanne So (research psychologist) by telephone on 020 7848 5728, or 
email at suzanne.so@kcl.ac.uk.  Alternatively, you may contact Prof. 
Philippa Garety at philippa.garety@kcl.ac.uk.  
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to 
speak to the researchers who will do their best to answer your questions 
(email suzanne.so@kcl.ac.uk or philippa.garety@kcl.ac.uk).  If you remain 
unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do this through the NHS 
Complaints Procedure.  Details can be obtained from the hospital. 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. 
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PSYCHOLOGICAL RESPONSE TO MEDICATION 
CONSENT FORM 
 
  Please 
initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
for the above study.  I have had the opportunity to consider the 
information, ask questions and have had these answered 
satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time without giving any reason, without my 
medical care or legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I agree to take part in the above study.  
4. I permit the researcher to view my case notes for the purpose of 
this study. 
 
5. The personal digital assistant (PDA) is a property of King’s 
College London. I agree to return the PDA to the researcher 
after this study. 
 
6.  I would like to receive a copy of the results of the above study.  
 
 
____________________ _________________ _____________ 
Name of participant Signature Date 
   
   
____________________ _________________ _____________ 




Original to be kept in medical notes; one copy each for patient & researcher site file 
 
 
   




Measures of all studies 
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CARDS TASK (Study 1) 




To what extent do you believe in each of the following explanations? 
 
1. It works because the system is able to read people’s minds. 
 Do not 
believe 




Please circle one of the two options below: 
It works only for me / It would work for everybody 
 
2. It is not the computer which guessed; there is someone involved behind this. 
 Do not 
believe 




Please circle one of the two options below: 
It works only for me / It would work for everybody 
 
3. It is a trick that is part of a bigger conspiracy by others against me. 
 Do not 
believe 




Please circle one of the two options below: 
It works only for me / It would work for everybody 
 
4. It was done to trick me or make me look stupid. 
 Do not 
believe 




Please circle one of the two options below: 
It works only for me / It would work for everybody 
 
5. It is just a puzzle. 
 Do not 
believe 




Please circle one of the two options below: 
It works only for me / It would work for everybody 
 
6. It is related to some of my recent experiences. 
 Do not 
believe 




Specify (optional):  
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CLINICAL GLOBAL IMPRESSIONS (Study 1) 
 
DATE:    __________________ 
 
PATIENT NAME:   __________________ 
 
RATER’S NAME & TITLE: ___________________________________ 
 
 
Please kindly circle the number that would best represent your clinical 




SEVERITY OF ILLNESS 
Considering your total clinical experience with this particular population, how ill is 
the patient at this time? 
 
1 normal/ not ill 
2 borderline mentally ill, not at all ill 
3 mildly ill 
4 moderately ill 
5 markedly ill 
6 severely ill 




Compared to his/her condition at admission to the hospital, how much has the 
patient changed? 
 
1 very much improved 
2 much improved 
3 minimally improved 
4 no change 
5 minimally worse 
6 much worse 






THANK YOU VERY MUCH for taking the time to rate this patient. 
 
   
   264 




In this questionnaire you will find a number of descriptions of everyday events. 
After each situation are different ways that people might react, labelled A, B, or 
C. Please imagine yourself in each situation as vividly as possible.  
 
Once you have imagined that the event is happening to you, please choose the 
option that best describes how you might think about the situation. If none of 
the options matches completely how you might react, choose the one which is the 
closest. If more than one option applies, choose the one which would run 
through your mind most often. When you have decided which option you are 
most likely to think, put a circle around the letter next to it. 
 
There are no right or wrong answers. Work through the questions fairly quickly, 
making sure you pick the option that is nearest to what your immediate reaction 
might be.  
 
 
1. Imagine you receive a letter and you 
notice it is not sealed.  
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: Someone has deliberately opened this letter 
already  
 
B: I wonder if this may have been opened again after 
it was written  
 
C: I don’t think anything of it 
 
 
2. Imagine that you are walking down the 
street when you hear your name being 
called, but when you look around you don’t 
see anybody.  
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: Something strange is going on  
 
B: There is something really dangerous about this  
 
C: I must be imagining things   
 
 
3. Imagine your food tastes different from 
usual.  
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: Someone may have done something to my food 
on purpose  
 
B: This food must have been prepared with a 
different ingredient today   
 
C: Someone has deliberately spiked my food  
 
 
4. Imagine that on your way to work you 
notice that all the traffic lights turn red as 
you approach them.  
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: It’s going to take me longer to get in this morning   
 
B: That’s all I need, I’m going to be really late now  
 
C: My day is going to be ruined  
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5. Imagine you are standing at a bus stop 
when the bus you have been waiting for 
drives past half empty without stopping.   
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: People are always so nasty  
 
B: People aren’t very nice sometimes  
 
C: The driver must be in a bad mood today 
 
6. Imagine you have a really bad pain in 
your head.  
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: There must be something wrong with me  
 
B: There’s lots of different reasons why I might have 
this pain 
  
C: I must have something really serious, like a brain 
tumour 
 
7. Imagine that while on the bus you notice 
a stranger staring at you.  
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: The way this person is staring at me is a bit 
worrying   
 
B: This person must mean me harm to be staring at 
me that way   
 
C: This person is being really rude to be staring at 
me in that way   
 
8. Imagine you are sitting at home and 
suddenly you feel very odd.  
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: I wonder why I feel odd, could something sinister 
be going on somewhere 
 
B: This feeling is proof that there is something bad 
happening somewhere to someone I know   
 
C: I must be over-tired or something 
 
 
9. Imagine you applied for a job and did 
not get it. 
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: Perhaps I can get some feedback about why I did 
not get the job   
 
B: I wonder if I did not do very well at interview  
 
C: I'll never be able to get a job 
 
10. Imagine that you are on a train when 
you suddenly have a strong feeling you 
have been there before. 
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: This is some kind of premonition that something 
awful has happened or will happen   
 
B: I wonder whether this is some kind of 
premonition  
  
C: This is a weird, but common experience  
 
 
11. Imagine you get turned down to go out 
by someone you like or a friend. 
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: I quite often get rejected in this situation  
 
B: You win some, you lose some  
 
C: I always get rejected for anything I try  
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12. Imagine that one day you enter a shop 
and you hear people laughing.  
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: They must be laughing at me  
 
B: I wonder if they are laughing at me  
 
C: The laughing is probably nothing to do with me   
 
13. Imagine there are police cars outside 
your house. You suddenly realise you feel 
uncomfortable.  
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: Funny how just seeing the police has this 
unsettling effect on people 
 
B: I wonder why I feel so uncomfortable, could the 
cars be something to do with me  
 
C: I must have done something wrong to feel so 
uncomfortable, they’ve come to get me  
 
14. Imagine you are watching television, 
and suddenly the screen goes blank.  
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: Weird things are always happening  
 
B: This sort of thing seems to happen quite a lot  
 
C: There must be something wrong with the TV 
today  
 
15.  Imagine two people in a queue at a 
supermarket both look your way at the 
same time and then immediately start to 
talk to each other.  
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: This is not the first time this has happened 
 
B: This sort of thing can happen in queues 
 
C: This always happens wherever I go  
 
16. Imagine you are waiting in a café for an 
acquaintance to arrive, and you suddenly 
feel a strange shivery feeling inside. 
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: Feeling shivery is a bad omen, I don’t think I 
should meet this person 
 
B: I must be nervous about meeting this person  
 
C: I wonder if feeling shivery means something bad 
might happen 
 
17. Imagine you think you see a shadowy 
figure moving across the wall of an empty 
room. 
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A:  I wonder what that was  
 
B:  My eyes must be playing tricks on me  
 
C: There must have been someone or something 
there 
 
18. Imagine that the phone rings. When you 
answer, the other party hangs up.  
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: I wonder if there’s something suspicious about 
this  
 
B: Somebody is definitely checking up on me  
 
C: Someone’s probably got the wrong number 
   
   267 
 
19. Imagine you are watching the news on 
TV about a recent disaster, and you find 
yourself feeling guilty. 
  
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: If I feel guilty I must be responsible in some way  
 
B: It’s normal to feel guilty when a disaster has 
happened to someone else  
 
C: I wonder why I feel guilty, maybe I’m 
unwittingly responsible in some way  
 
 
20. Imagine you are listening to the radio 
and suddenly there is crackling 
interference.  
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: Someone has deliberately tampered with my radio 
so that it is no longer tuned properly  
 
B: I wonder if someone has been fiddling with my 
radio  
 
C: There is some sort of interference on the radio 
waves  
 
21. Imagine that you are sitting on a train, 
and you think you can hear two people 
behind you talking about you. When you 
look round they are reading their papers 
and not talking to each other. 
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: They were definitely talking about me, they’re 
just pretending to be reading their paper  
 
B: I’m sure I heard them talking about me, maybe I 
was wrong  
 
C: I should find out if anyone else ever has this kind 
of experience before deciding what really happened  
 
22. Imagine you are at home; everything is 
quiet when you hear a sudden fast banging 
on the walls.  
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: The neighbours are doing this deliberately to 
upset me  
 
B: The neighbours could be doing some kind of 
home improvements  
 
C: The neighbours might be trying to tell me 
something  
 
23. Imagine you a reading a newspaper or 
magazine, and you read an article which 
has some special relevance to you.  
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: This article seems to have been written with 
people like me in mind 
 
B: I wonder if someone may have written this article 
for me   
 
C: Someone has definitely written this article for me 
specifically  
 
24. Imagine you notice that a person you 
don’t know is looking at you. You suddenly 
find yourself feeling unsettled. 
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: Feeling this unsettled means this person intends 
to do me harm  
 
B: I wonder why I feel this unsettled, could this 
mean this person is thinking bad things about me   
 
C: Being looked at can make people feel unsettled, I 
don’t worry about it 
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25. Imagine that one evening you are sitting 
at home alone when a door suddenly slams 
by itself in another room.  
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: Someone or something must have got into the 
house  
 
B: I wonder if somebody or something’s there   
 
C: It’s probably a draught  
 
26. Imagine someone you know calls you 
just as you were thinking about them. As 
you pick up the phone you suddenly realise 
you are feeling upset.  
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: It’s odd that I should feel upset, but I don’t read 
too much into it  
 
B: I wonder why I feel upset, could there be 
something peculiar about this call  
 
C: Feeling upset means something, it must be bad 
news  
 
27. Imagine you are walking down the road 
when you suddenly notice a careers poster 
which seems to stand out from your 
surroundings. 
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: I wonder why my eyes seem so drawn to that 
poster  
 
B: Maybe I’m noticing it because my career isn’t 
such a success  
 
C: It’s a sign that my life is such a failure  
 
 
28. Imagine you are on a bus; the driver 
keeps stopping abruptly, so that you 
stumble each time. 
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: I wonder if he’s doing it on purpose to wind 
people up  
 
B: This bus driver can’t drive properly  
 
C: He’s doing it on purpose to humiliate me 
 
 
29. Imagine you hear that a friend is having 
a party and you have not been invited. 
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: I wonder if they don’t like me as much as I 
thought they did  
 
B: Perhaps I can try to find out a bit more about the 
situation before making any assumptions   
 
C: They obviously don’t like me  
 
30. Imagine you are dozing on the sofa in 
front of the TV and you suddenly wake up 
startled.  
 
I am most likely to think: (please circle A, B 
or C) 
 
A: I tend to always wake up startled when I’m 
dozing  
 
B: The TV must have woken me  
 
C: I can never get any sleep  
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete the questionnaire 
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MAUDSLEY ASSESSMENT OF DELUSIONS SCALE 
BELIEF MAINTENANCE SECTION (All studies) 
 
 
1.01 How sure are you about X?  Do you have any doubts at all? 
4 Absolutely certain 
3 Almost certain 
2 Quite certain 
1 Have some doubts 
0 Doubt it 
 
 
2. Belief maintenance factors 
Can you now explain why you continue to think that X is so?  Has anything happened since 
the idea first came to you? 
 
2.01 Experiences since formation 
 
 
1  Yes 
0  No 
2.02 Experiences in last week 
 
 
1  Yes 
0  No 
2.03 Internal state maintaining belief in last week  
(e.g. mood, abnormal experience, AH) 
 
1  Yes: _______________ 
0  No 
2.04 External events maintaining belief in last week 
(e.g. genuine events misinterpreted) 
 
1  Yes: _______________ 
0  No 
2.05 Did you look for any evidence or information to 
check whether X is true or not? 
 
1  Yes :_______________ 
0  No 
2.06 Asking you to think about it now – can you think 
of anything at all that has happened that goes 
against your belief 
 
1  Yes: _______________ 
0  No 
 
2.07 When you think about it now is it at all possible 
that you are mistaken about X? 
1  Yes 
1  Maybe 
1  No with hesitation 
0  No 
 
2.08 Let me suggest something hypothetical to you – 
Something that does not fit with your view and 




  3  Ignores or rejects 
relevance 
  2  Accommodates into 
system 
  1  Changes level of 
conviction 
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4 I am absolutely certain that X 
3 I believe very strongly that X 
2 I believe that X 
1 I have some doubts that X 
How sure/certain 
are you about X 
0 I do not/ no longer believe that X 
  0  100 
   
4 I think/worry about X absolutely all of the time 
3 I think/worry about X most of the time 
2 I think/worry about X some of the time 
1 I think/worry about X occasionally 




0 I do not think/worry about X any more 
  0  100 
   
4 When thinking about X I feel extremely (emotion) 
3 When thinking about X I feel very (emotion) 
2 When thinking about X I feel quite (emotion) 
1 When thinking about X I feel slightly (emotion) 
How (distressed) 
have you been 
about X 
0 When thinking about X I do not/ no longer feel (emotion) 
  0  100 
   
4 X affects my life completely 
3 X affects my life greatly 
2 X affects my life quite a bit 
1 X affects only some parts of my life 
How much has X 
been affecting/ 
getting in the way 
of your life 
0 X doesn’t affect my life (anymore) 
  0  100 
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POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE SYNDROME SCALE (All studies) 
 
  




P1 Delusions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
P2 Conceptual disorganisation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
P3 Hallucinatory behaviour 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
P4 Excitement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
P5 Grandiosity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
P6 Suspiciousness 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
P7 Hostility 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
       
Negative Scale 
N1 Blunted affect 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
N2 Emotional withdrawal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
N3 Poor rapport 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
N4 Passive/ apathetic social 
withdrawal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
N5 Difficulty in abstract 
thinking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
N6 Lack of spontaneity & flow of conversation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
N7 Stereotyped thinking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
       
General Psychopathology Scale 
G1 Somatic concern 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
G2 Anxiety 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
G3 Guilt feelings 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
G4 Tension 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
G5 Mannerisms & posturing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
G6 Depression 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
G7 Motor retardation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
G8 Uncooperativeness 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
G9 Unusual thought content 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
G10 Disorientation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
G11 Poor attention 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
G12 Lack of judgement & insight 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
G13 Disturbance of volition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
G14 Poor impulse control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
G15 Preoccupation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
G16 Active social avoidance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Positive scale (PANSS-P):   _________ 
Negative scale (PANSS-N):   _________ 
General psychopathology (PANSS-G):  _________ 
Total score (P+N+G):    _________ 
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How often do you experience voices? e.g. every day, all day long, etc. 
 
 
0 Voices not present or present less than once a week (specify frequency if present) 
 
1 Voices occur for at least once a week 
 
2 Voices occur at least once a day 
 
3 Voices occur at least once an hour 
 





When you hear your voices, how long do they last 
e.g. few seconds, minutes, hours, all day long? 
 
 0 Voices not present 
 1 Voices last for a few seconds, fleeting voices 
 2 Voices last for several minutes 
 3 Voices last for at least one hour 




When you hear your voices where do they sound like they’re coming from? 
- Inside your head and/or outside your head? 




0 Voices not present 
 
1 Voices originate inside head only 
 
2 Voices outside the head, but close to ears or head 
Voices inside the head may also be present 
 
3 Voices originate inside or close to ears and outside head away from ears 
 




How loud are your voices? 
Are they louder than your voice, about the same loudness, quieter or just a whisper? 
 
 0 Voices not present 
 1 Quieter than own voice, whispers 
 2 About same loudness as own voice 
 3 Louder than own voice 
 4 Extremely loud, shouting 
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5 Beliefs re. origin of voices 
 
What do you think has caused your voices? 
- Are the voices caused by factors related to yourself or solely due to other people or 
factors? 
- If external: How much do you believe that your voices are caused by (patient’s 
attribution) on a scale from 0-100 with 100 being that you are totally convinced, have no 
doubts and 0 being that it is completely untrue? 
 
 0 Voices not present 
 1 Believes voices to be solely internally generated and related to self 
 2 Holds < 50% conviction that voices originate from external causes 
 3 Holds ≥ 50% conviction (but < 100%) that voices originate from external cause 
 4 Believes voices are solely due to external causes (100% conviction) 
 
6 Amount of negative content of voices 
 
Do your voices say unpleasant or negative things? 
- Can you give me some examples of what the voices say? e.g. ______________ 
- How much of the time do the voices say these type of unpleasant or negative items? 
 
 0 No unpleasant content 
 1 Occasional unpleasant content 
 2 Minority of voice content is unpleasant or negative (< 50%) 
 3 Majority of voice content is unpleasant or negative (> 50%) 
 4 All of voice content is unpleasant or negative 
 





Not unpleasant or negative 
 
1 Some degree of negative content, but not personal comments relating to self or family 
e.g. swear words or commands not directed to self e.g. “the milkman’s ugly” 
 
2 Personal verbal abuse, comments on behaviour e.g. “shouldn’t do that or say that” 
 
3 Personal verbal abuse relating to self-concept e.g. “you’re lazy, ugly, mad, perverted” 
 
4 Personal threats to self e.g. threats to harm to self or family, extreme instructions or 
commands to harm self or others and personal verbal abuse as in #3 
 
8 Amount of distress 
 
Are your voices distressing?  How much of the time? 
 
 0 Voices not distressing at all 
 1 Voices occasionally distressing, majority not distressing 
 2 Equal amounts of distressing and non-distressing voices 
 3 Majority of voices distressing, minority not distressing 
 4 Voices always distressing 
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9 Intensity of distress 
 
When voices are distressing, how distressing are they? 
- Do they cause you minimal, moderate, severe distress? 
- Are they the most distressing they have ever been? 
 
 0 Voices not distressing at all 
 1 Voices slightly distressing 
 2 Voices are distressing to a moderate degree 
 3 Voices are very distressing, although subject could feel worse 
 4 Voices are extremely distressing, feel the worst he/she could possibly feel 
 
10 Disruption to life caused by voices 
 
How much disruption do the voices cause to your life? 
- Do the voices stop you from working or other daytime activity? 
- Do they interfere with your relationships with friends and/or family? 
- Do they prevent you from looking after yourself, e.g. bathing, changing clothes etc? 
 
 
0 No disruption to life, able to maintain independent living with no problems in daily 
living skills. Able to maintain social and family relationships (if present) 
 
1 Voices cause minimal amount of disruption to life e.g. interferes with concentration 
although able to maintain daytime activity and social and family relationships and be 
able to maintain independent living without support 
 
2 Voices cause moderate amount of disruption to life causing some disturbance to 
daytime activity and/or family or social activities. The patient is not in hospital 
although may live in supported accommodation or receive additional help with daily 
living skills. 
 
3 Voices cause severe disruption to life so that hospitalisation is usually necessary. The 
patient is able to maintain some daily activities, self-care and relationships whilst in 
hospital. The patient may also be in supported accommodation but experiencing severe 
disruption of life in terms of activities, daily living skills and/or relationships. 
 
4 Voices cause complete disruption of daily life requiring hospitalisation. The patient is 
unable to maintain any daily activities and social relationships. Self-care is also 
severely disrupted. 
 
11 Controllability of voices 
 
Do you think you have any control over when your voices happen? 
Can you dismiss or bring on your voices? 
 
 
0 Subject believes they can have control over their voices and can always bring on or 
dismiss them at will 
 
1 Subject believes they can have some control over the voices on the majority of 
occasions 
 
2 Subject believes they can have some control over their voices approximately half of 
the time 
 
3 Subject believes they can have some control over their voices but only occasionally. 
The majority of time the subject experiences voices which are incontrollable 
 
4 Subject has no control over when the voices occur and cannot dismiss or bring them on 
at all 
 
   






1 Amount of preoccupation with delusions 
 
How often do you think about your beliefs? 
 
 
0 No delusions, or delusions which the subject thinks about less than once a week 
 
1 Subject thinks about beliefs at least once a week 
 
2 Subject thinks about beliefs at least once a day 
 
3 Subject thinks about beliefs at least once an hour 
 
4 Subject thinks about delusions continuously or almost continuously 
 
2 Duration of preoccupation with delusions 
 
How long do you spend thinking about your beliefs? 
 
 0 No delusions 
 1 Thoughts about beliefs last for a few seconds, fleeting thoughts 
 2 Thoughts about delusions last for several minutes 
 3 Thoughts about delusions last for at least one hour 




On a scale 0-100, how much do you believe your thoughts to be true? 
 
 
0 No conviction at all 
 
1 Very little conviction in reality of beliefs (< 10%) 
 
2 Some doubts relating to conviction in beliefs (10-49%) 
 
3 Conviction in beliefs is very strong (50-99%) 
 
4 Conviction is 100% 
 
4 Amount of distress 
 
How often do your beliefs cause you distress? 
 
 
0 Beliefs never cause distress 
 
1 Beliefs cause distress on the minority of occasions 
 
2 Beliefs cause distress on < 50% of occasions 
 
3 Beliefs cause distress on the majority of occasions when they occur (50-99% of the 
time) 
 
4 Beliefs always cause distress when they occur 
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5 Intensity of distress 
 
How much distress do your beliefs cause you? 
 
 0 No distress 
 1 Beliefs cause slight distress 
 2 Beliefs cause moderate distress  
 3 Beliefs cause marked distress  
 4 Beliefs cause extreme distress, could not be worse 
  
6 Disruption to life caused by beliefs 
 
What is the degree of disruption to your life as a result of these beliefs? 
 
 
0 No disruption to life, able to maintain independent living with no problems in daily 
living skills. Able to maintain social and family relationships (if present) 
 
1 Beliefs cause minimal amount of disruption to life e.g. interferes with concentration 
although able to maintain daytime activity and social and family relationships and be 
able to maintain independent living without support 
 
2 Beliefs cause moderate amount of disruption to life causing some disturbance to 
daytime activity and/or family or social activities. The patient is not in hospital 
although may live in supported accommodation or receive additional help with daily 
living skills. 
 
3 Beliefs cause severe disruption to life so that hospitalisation is usually necessary. The 
patient is able to maintain some daily activities, self-care and relationships whilst in 
hospital. The patient may also be in supported accommodation but experiencing severe 
disruption of life in terms of activities, daily living skills and/or relationships. 
 
4 Beliefs cause complete disruption of daily life requiring hospitalisation. The patient is 





Auditory hallucinations Delusions 
1. Frequency  1. Amount of preoccupation  
2. Duration  2. Duration of preoccupation  
3. Location  3. Conviction  
4. Loudness  4. Amount of distress  
5. Beliefs re-origin of voices  5. Intensity of distress  
6. Amount of negative content  6. Disruption to life  
7. Degree of negative content    
8. Amount of distress    
9. Intensity of distress   AH scale score  
10.  Disruption to life   Delusions scale score  
11. Controllability   Composite total score  
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SCALE FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF POSITIVE SYMPTOMS 






Mild Moderate Marked Severe 
Hallucinations 
H1 Auditory hallucinations 0 1 2 3 4 5 
H2 Voices commenting 0 1 2 3 4 5 
H3 Voices conversing 0 1 2 3 4 5 
H4 Somatic or tactile hallucinations 0 1 2 3 4 5 
H5 Olfactory hallucinations 0 1 2 3 4 5 
H6 Visual hallucinations 0 1 2 3 4 5 
H7 Global rating of severity 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
      
Delusions 
D1 Persecutory delusions 0 1 2 3 4 5 
D2 Delusions of jealousy 0 1 2 3 4 5 
D3 Delusions of sin or guilt 0 1 2 3 4 5 
D4 Grandiose delusions 0 1 2 3 4 5 
D5 Religious delusions 0 1 2 3 4 5 
D6 Somatic delusions 0 1 2 3 4 5 
D7 Ideas and delusions of reference 0 1 2 3 4 5 
D8 Delusions of being controlled 0 1 2 3 4 5 
D9 Delusions of mind reading 0 1 2 3 4 5 
D10 Thought broadcasting 0 1 2 3 4 5 
D11 Thought insertion 0 1 2 3 4 5 
D12 Thought withdrawal 0 1 2 3 4 5 
D13 Global rating of severity 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
      
Bizarre behaviour 
B1 Clothing & appearance 0 1 2 3 4 5 
B2 Social & sexual behaviour 0 1 2 3 4 5 
B3 Aggressive & agitated behaviour 0 1 2 3 4 5 
B4 Repetitive or stereotyped behaviour 0 1 2 3 4 5 
B5 Global rating of severity 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
      
Positive formal thought disorder 
F1 Derailment (loose associations) 0 1 2 3 4 5 
F2 Tangentiality 0 1 2 3 4 5 
F3 Incoherence (word salad, schizophasia) 0 1 2 3 4 5 
F4 Illogicality 0 1 2 3 4 5 
F5 Circumstantiality 0 1 2 3 4 5 
F6 Pressure of speech 0 1 2 3 4 5 
F7 Distractible speech 0 1 2 3 4 5 
F8 Clanging 0 1 2 3 4 5 
F9 Global rating of severity 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
      
A1 Inappropriate affect 0 1 2 3 4 5 
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SUBJECTIVE UNIT OF DISTRESS SCALE (Study 1) 
 








   





Supplementary results of Study 1 using the Psychotic Rating Scales (PSYRATS) 
and the Personal Questionnaire (PQ) 
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 As the first study focusing on changes in delusional dimensions in response 
to antipsychotic treatment, Study 1 included three measures of delusional 
dimensions –Visual Analogue Scale (VAS), Psychotic Rating Scales (PSYRATS; 
(Haddock et al., 1999), and Personal Questionnaire (Shapiro, 1961).  For the sake of 
succinctness, only results of VAS were reported in Chapter 3.  VAS was chosen as 
it is more sensitive to the idiosyncratic nature of individuals’ delusions, provides a 
continuous measure, and has the greatest range of ratings.  This appendix presents 
analyses of the key research question (Hypothesis 1, i.e. change of delusional 
dimensions) measured by PSYRATS and PQ, using the same statistical approach as 
reported in Chapter 3. 
 
A.1 Hypothesis 1: Delusional distress, preoccupation and 
impact on functioning will reduce before delusional 
conviction 
A.1.1 Delusional dimensions at each time point 
 Mean scores of delusional dimensions on PSYRATS and PQ at different 
time points are shown in Tables A.1 and A.2.  Pearson correlations of the four 
dimensions at each time point are shown in Tables A.3 and A.4. 
 
Table A.1 
Mean levels (SD) of delusional dimensions on PSYRATS 
 Week 0 
(n = 40) 
Week 1 
(n = 36) 
Week 2 
(n = 37) 
Week 4 
(n = 30) 
Week 8 
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Table A.2 
Mean levels (SD) of delusional dimensions on PQ 
 Week 0 
(n = 38) 
Week 1 
(n = 36) 
Week 2 
(n = 36) 
Week 4 
(n = 30) 
Week 8 












































Pearson correlations of delusional dimensions on PSYRATS at each time 
point 
  Week 0 (n = 40) 
  Conviction Preoccupation Distress Disruption 
Week 0 Conviction 1    




















  Week 1 (n = 36) 
  Conviction Preoccupation Distress Disruption 
Week 1 Conviction 1    
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  Week 2 (n = 37) 
  Conviction Preoccupation Distress Disruption 
Week 2 Conviction 1    




















  Week 4 (n = 30) 
  Conviction Preoccupation Distress Disruption 
Week 4 Conviction 1    




















  Week 8 (n = 32) 
  Conviction Preoccupation Distress Disruption 
Week 8 Conviction 1    
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Table A.4 
Pearson correlations of delusional dimensions on PQ at each time point 
  Week 0 (n = 38) 
  Conviction Preoccupation Distress Disruption 
Week 0 Conviction 1    




















  Week 1 (n = 36) 
  Conviction Preoccupation Distress Disruption 
Week 1 Conviction 1    




















  Week 2 (n = 36) 
  Conviction Preoccupation Distress Disruption 
Week 2 Conviction 1    




















  Week 4 (n = 30) 
  Conviction Preoccupation Distress Disruption 
Week 4 Conviction 1    
 Preoccupation 0.71 1   
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p<.01  















  Week 8 (n = 32) 
  Conviction Preoccupation Distress Disruption 
Week 8 Conviction 1    





















 Consistent with VAS, delusional dimensions on PSYRATS and PQ were 
correlated with each other at most time points, and especially strongly at the later 
time points. 
 
A.1.2 Changes in delusional dimensions 
 Changes in delusional dimensions on PSYRATS are shown in Figure A7.1.  
Using the maximum likelihood method, the effects of Time and Dimension, and the 
Time x Dimension interaction on the PSYRATS scores were tested in a linear 
mixed model (AIC = 1982.92, BIC = 2078.50).  There was a significant effect of 
Time (F = 26.13, df = 1, p < .01), Dimension (F = 23.23, df = 3. p < .01), and Time 
x Dimension interaction (F = 6.32, df = 3, p < .01).  It should be noted, however, 
that the assumption of normality of residuals is not met for two dimensions and 
some of the time points.  Therefore, the results of this mixed model should be 
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Figure A.1 































Conviction Preoccupation Distress Disruption
 
 Changes in delusional dimensions on PQ are shown in Figure A.2.  Using 
the maximum likelihood method, the effects of Time and Dimension, and the Time 
x Dimension interaction on the PQ scores were tested in a linear mixed model (AIC 
= 2166.06, BIC = 2261.27).  There was a significant effect of Time (F = 16.27, df = 
1, p < .01) and Dimension (F = 9.82, df = 3. p < .01).  However, the Time x 
Dimension interaction effect was not significant (F = 1.91, df = 3, p = .13).  
Therefore, the interaction effect was removed and a second model with the effects 
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of Time and Dimension on PQ scores was tested.  The model fit indices of the 
second model (AIC = 2165.70, BIC = 2247.31) indicated a better fit of the data.  
Again, the effects of Time (F = 15.10, df = 1, p < .01) and Dimension (F = 9.29, df 
= 3, p < .01) were both significant.  In order to check whether the effect of Time is 
non-linear, a third model with the effects of Dimension, Time, and a quadratic term 
of time (squared Time) was tested.  The model fit indices of the third model (AIC = 
2157.14, BIC = 2243.29) indicated a better fit of the data than the previous two 
models.  In other words, all dimensions declined over time, and the reduction 
became smaller over time.  There was a significant difference between dimensions, 
but there was no interaction between dimensions and time.  Therefore, the 
hypothesis that delusional conviction reduces more slowly or to a lesser degree than 
the other dimensions was not supported.  The assumption of normality of residuals 
is met for all dimensions and time points. 
 Pair-wise comparisons between dimensions were tested, based on estimated 
marginal means in the same model (i.e. the third model).  With Bonferroni 
adjustment for multiple comparisons, level of Preoccupation was significantly lower 
than Conviction (difference = -0.48, SE = 0.10, df = 172.00, p < .01), Distress 
(difference = -0.26, SE = 0.09, df = 172.00, p = .03), and Disruption (difference = -
0.38, SE = 0.10, df = 172.00, p < .01). 
 In summary, mixed modelling analyses of all three measures revealed a 
decline in all delusional dimensions over time.  While there was an interaction 
between time and dimension for PSYRATS (i.e. dimensions improving at different 
rates), this result should be interpreted with caution because the assumption of 
normality of residuals is not satisfied.  Besides, the scoring of the PSYRATS item 
on Disruption to life depends heavily on whether the patient is in hospital.  When 
disruption is assessed by the extent to which the delusion interferes with one’s life 
regardless of where he/she is, as in VAS and PQ, results are consistent that there is 
no interaction between time and dimension.  To conclude, these results suggest that 
all dimensions improve equally over time, and the hypothesis that conviction 
improves more slowly or in a lesser degree is not supported.  
 
 
